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Can the state foster autonomy in addicted drug users—without requiring 
abstinence? When these users participate in the delivery of state-funded services for 
which they are also recipients, how can we understand the role of the state? Is a battered 
woman who chooses to remain in an abusive, even potentially lethal, relationship acting 
autonomously? What, if any, is the role of the state in intervening in her decision making 
process? Do harsh sanctions, including loss of all benefits, levied by a paternalistic state 
on welfare recipients who fail to meet rigid work and conduct requirements facilitate 
autonomy-competency? Can autonomy and coercive relations of domination coexist? 
This dissertation begins to reconcile the sometimes paradoxical questions surrounding the 
role of the state in fostering autonomy through social service delivery, often in our most 
vulnerable citizens, citizens that conventional theories of autonomy largely fail to 
accommodate.  
Despite the complexity of these questions, I argue that the state does indeed have 
an obligation to foster autonomy, wherever possible, in its individual citizens. Moreover, 
I suggest that despite the apparent tensions that emerge in extant practical and theoretical 
attempts to engage in autonomy-fostering practices, it is possible – and desirable – for the 
state to endeavor to do so.  Such an obligation clearly exists in states that lay claim to 
standards of equal citizenship rights for all members of the community – liberal 
democracies that are founded on particular notions of justice and inclusion. Simply by 
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virtue of focusing on this particular attribute – autonomy – this study makes two claims. 
First, I participate in the project of “reclaiming” autonomy from its conventionally 
individualistic context. That is, I argue that autonomy ought to be valued. Though 
feminists and other critical scholars have at some points seen this concept as 
exclusionary, a growing number of theorists have reconceived of autonomy in a way that, 
I am convinced, highlights its importance. Second, I suggest that autonomy is a capacity 
that can be fostered. This claim follows from the first insofar as it is related to the 
reconceived notion of autonomy as relational. I will discuss relational autonomy in 
greater detail below, but briefly, on this conception, autonomy develops not in isolation 
but out of particular enabling social relations. 
With these initial claims in mind, in the chapters that follow I draw on empirical 
examples of social service delivery models in order to develop a theory of the 
“autonomy-fostering state.” Moreover, I consider the implications of such a theory for 
our conceptions of autonomy, citizenship, service delivery practices, and the state itself. 
In this introductory chapter, I lay out the theoretical starting points for my consideration 
of each of these interrelated concepts and anticipate how they will come to life in the 
context of the “case studies” I offer. The theory of autonomy I offer is closely tied to 
citizenship insofar as I claim that the capacity for autonomy is a central requirement for 
access to and exercise of the rights and status associated with citizenship; that is, 
citizenship is in many ways the political realization of autonomy. My theory of the state 
also follows from the account of autonomy I put forth. I suggest that given a notion of 
autonomy as socially constituted, the state-citizen relationship must be seen as a pivotal 
site at which such constitution occurs. Furthermore, I turn to service delivery because it is 
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for many the primary site at which interaction with the state takes place. As well, my 
concern with the autonomy of vulnerable and marginalized people makes service delivery 
particularly illuminating. This project, then, contributes to theories of autonomy and the 
state in two different but related ways. I offer a normative account of what the autonomy-
fostering state might look like. Following from this account, I offer a set of analytic tools 
that help us to better make sense of the contradictions and tensions that emerge from the 
practices of existing liberal-democratic states. 
 
I. Autonomy 
Feminist political theorists have rightly been concerned with problems of autonomy 
for some time. The broadly conceived feminist project of overcoming gender oppression 
(understood in a far ranging array of ways) is necessarily connected to the notion of 
individual autonomy; where such oppression has denied women, and those ideas, 
institutions, and relationships gendered “feminine,” proper respect, recognition, and 
access to resources, it has often also (or consequently) denied them the opportunity to 
develop and exercise autonomy. By autonomy, I mean the capacity to live one’s life 
according to one’s own plans, that is, the capacity for “self-government.”  Despite the 
relevance of autonomy to feminism, feminists have also been concerned about the 
implications of such notions of “self-government,” which are sometimes criticized for 
being overly individualistic, for referencing only atomistic, unencumbered, and 
independent individuals, categories that have conventionally excluded most women, and 
 4  
  
for ignoring the inherent sociality of human beings. In response to these claims, many 
theorists, feminist and otherwise, have argued that autonomy is a “relational” concept.1 
Given that humans are socially embedded creatures, autonomy cannot be theorized as 
though such interdependence does not exist.  Rather, as Jennifer Nedelsky explains, we 
must navigate the path between acknowledging the “constitutiveness of social relations” 
and the “value of self-determination.”2   Autonomy can be understood then, as Joel 
Anderson and Axel Honneth write, “as an acquired set of capacities to lead one’s own 
life”—that is acquired in the context of our various relationships.3 Furthermore, as John 
Christman notes, the capacities associated with autonomy “do not merely emerge 
naturally, but must be developed through various processes involving educational, social 
and personal resources.”4 In turn, Anderson and Honneth argue, given the importance 
liberal societies often place on protecting the vulnerable, “[they] should be especially 
                                                 
1 Among the many pieces that take up relational autonomy (some without using the term) are: Seyla 
Benhabib, Situating the self : gender, community, and postmodernism in contemporary ethics, (New York: 
Routledge, 1992);Paul Benson, "Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization," Social Theory and Practice 17, 
no. 3 (1991);John Christman, "Saving Positive Freedom," Political Theory 33, no. 1 (2005);John Philip 
Christman, The Inner citadel : essays on individual autonomy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989);Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, "A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. 
Welfare State," in The subject of care : feminist perspectives on dependency, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and 
Ellen K. Feder (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), ix, 382;Marilyn Friedman, 
Autonomy, gender, politics, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003);Eva Feder Kittay, Love's 
labor : essays on women, equality, and dependency, (New York: Routledge, 1999);Catriona Mackenzie and 
Natalie Stoljar, Relational autonomy : feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000);Martha Minow, Making all the difference : inclusion, exclusion, and 
American law, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990);Jennifer Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy: 
Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities," Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1, no. 7 (1989);Jennifer Nedelsky, 
"Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self," Representations 30 (1990);Iris Marion Young, Justice and the 
politics of difference, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990);Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and 
democracy, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000);Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth, 
"Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice," in Autonomy and the challenges of liberalism : new 
essays, ed. John Philip Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 127-
49 
2 Jennifer Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities," Yale Journal of Law 
and Feminism 1, no. 7 (1989): 9. 
3 Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth, "Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice," in Autonomy and 
the Challenges of Liberalism: New Essays, ed. John Philip Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129. 
4 John Christman, "Saving Positive Freedom," Political Theory 33, no. 1 (2005): 87. 
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concerned to address vulnerabilities of individuals regarding the development and 
maintenance of their autonomy.”5  Anderson and Honneth identify three “relations-to-
self” that are central to autonomy and therefore require particular social-supports: self-
respect, self-trust, and self-esteem.6 It is relationships of recognition that are central to 
establishing each of these “relations-to-self,” and where such recognition does not exist, 
one’s autonomy is threatened.  That is, “one’s autonomy is vulnerable to disruptions in 
one’s relationship to others.”7 
This attention to the vulnerability of our capacity to act autonomously brings into 
focus the relations of power that are so pivotal in determining what contexts will be most 
conducive to developing autonomy-competency.  The trajectories of power extant in 
given social contexts are important for our understanding, in particular, of what types of 
relationships constrain Anderson and Honneth’s “relations-to-self,” and therefore the 
development of the capacities required for autonomous action.  
For example, Marilyn Friedman discusses autonomy in relation to male 
dominance.8  Friedman points out just how damaging and contraindicated relations of 
dominance are to autonomy.  One response to the experience of being dominated, 
Friedman explains, is to “abandon wants and values that dominance relationships prevent 
[the dominated] from realizing.  A dominated person may try to convince herself that she 
never really wanted those things in the first place.”9  In addition, Friedman notes, a 
chronically dominated person may come to rely on certain structures and institutions for 
                                                 
5 Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth, "Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice," in Autonomy and 
the Challenges of Liberalism: New Essays, ed. John Philip Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 127. 
6 Ibid., 132-37. 
7 Ibid., 130. 
8 Marilyn Friedman, "Autonomy and Male Dominance," Ibid. (Cambridge, UK; New York). 
9 Ibid., 157. 
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protection.  She may subsequently be reluctant to criticize these sources of protection; 
“My capacity for critical thinking would be constrained by my need for protection.”10  
The likelihood of, first, abandoning one’s desired means or ends or, second, losing the 
opportunity and/or capacity to level criticisms at dominant institutions in society, which 
happen to afford some of us protection from some kinds of domination, clearly represents 
a serious assault on the opportunity to develop the capacity to or to act autonomously.  In 
turn, where the state delivers social services in such a way that leads those dependent on 
it to be embedded in relations of dominance, autonomy is threatened. 
This relational conception of autonomy and, in turn, the reasons motivating scholars 
to pursue such a conception are central to my argument in this dissertation, especially 
given that they fundamentally make the possibility of fostering autonomy coherent. But 
in addition to drawing upon existing accounts of relational autonomy, in the chapters that 
follow I use the empirical examples that serve as “case studies” to present a richer 
account of the nature of the specific social relations that enable and hinder autonomy, and 
the empirically situated problems or discontinuities that suggest a need for greater nuance 
in our theories of autonomy. For example, one chapter on services for domestic violence 
survivors draws our attention to, on the one hand, the complexities of the effects of 
oppressive socialization on autonomy, and on the other hand, the contextual nature of the 
criteria we ought to use to evaluate the extent to which agents and their actions are 
autonomous.  Further, in a chapter on the “new paternalism,” the relationship between 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 162. In a situated that is not characterized by chronic domination, however, one might also be more 
likely to take advantage of needed protection, while maintaining the appropriate critical stance in relation to 
the source of protection. For example, in Chapter 3, I explore potentially autonomy-enabling services for 
domestic violence survivors that can be understood as a form of protection. 
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autonomy and paternalism is complicated in light of a more nuanced conception of 
paternalism that takes into account power relations.  
In order to better grapple with these problems of autonomy, I offer elements of a 
theory of autonomy that differ from other theorists’ accounts. I do this first, in my 
treatment of the debate over procedural vs. substantive accounts of autonomy and second, 
in my use of both the ascriptive and capacity-related notions of autonomy. The debate 
between procedural and substantive accounts of autonomy has preoccupied autonomy 
theorists for some time. For Marilyn Friedman, the relational conception of autonomy is 
most feasible when understood as content-neutral. Theorists who understand autonomy as 
“content-neutral” or “procedural” argue that  “the content of a person’s desires, values, 
beliefs, and emotional attitudes is irrelevant to the issues of whether the person is 
autonomous with respect to those aspects of her motivational structure and the actions 
that flow from them.11 That is, what matters for autonomy is not the substance of the 
autonomous belief, action, etc., but the way in which one arrives at this belief, action, and 
so on. There are no particular values that the autonomous individual must choose in 
accordance with in order to count as such. Rather, the key to autonomy for proceduralists 
is some form of self-reflection, indicating that actions are taken in accord with certain 
values held by the individual, rather than impulsively or according to the values one does 
not perceive to be “one’s own.”  Friedman explains: “That something matters deeply to a 
person when she attends to it, and that this concern partly directs her choices and actions, 
                                                 
11 Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, "Introduction," in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives 
on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (New York: Oxford UP, 2000), 13. 
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imparts a special significance to her behavior that it is appropriate to call determination 
by herself as the self she is.”12 
However, such a conception of autonomy is limited, many theorists have noted, by 
the pervasive existence of oppressive socialization and the internalization of values that 
serve in effect to limit one’s autonomy. This does not mesh well with the high value 
proceduralists place on the individual’s perception of herself as engaging in critical self-
reflection that enables her to make choices and take actions that are “her own.”  In 
response to such objections, theorists of procedural relational autonomy note that what is 
“her own” will always be a product of social relations: we cannot dismiss perception of 
self-reflection out of hand simply on account of socialization. But Paul Benson highlights 
an important problem with this response.13 He writes, “Certain forms of socialization are 
oppressive and clearly lessen autonomy. In some prominent cases, the general means by 
which oppressive socialization operates are no different than those through which benign 
socialization takes effect.”14 Thus, unless we are willing to concede that decisions made 
under the constraints of seriously oppressive socialization are equally autonomous to 
those taken within the context of socialization that, for example, takes place within the 
context of a supportive family to endow children with a sense of self-esteem, critical 
reflection may not fit the bill as a means for discerning between autonomous and non-
autonomous behavior.  
In contrast, substantive views of autonomy require that autonomy be consistent with 
certain conditions that go beyond the procedural requirements of self-reflection. While 
                                                 
12 Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, Studies in Feminist Philosophy (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 21. 
13 Paul Benson, "Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization," Social Theory and Practice 17, no. 3 (1991). 
14 Ibid.: 385. 
 9  
  
some strong substantive theories require that autonomous individuals have the capacity to 
direct their own lives in accord with quite specific values or norms (for example, they 
may require a high degree of rationality or rejection of specific norms), others are less 
stringent, requiring that one’s autonomous decisions, preferences or actions be 
formulated or taken in accord with broader content-guidelines. For example, in a related 
account of responsibility, Benson suggests that “self-worth” is an ideal condition for 
evaluating standards of personal responsibility (and autonomy) that helps us to make 
normative claims about the oppressive socialization.15 
I defend a substantive account of autonomy in this dissertation. I develop this account 
most fully in Chapter 3. In that chapter I stress that the “substance” of autonomy must be 
figured with attention to the specificity of a given context. As critics of substantive 
accounts of autonomy have rightly noted, the risk of a substantive approach figured 
wrongly (for a particular context) is that such an account runs the risk of being 
exclusionary or further marginalizing groups that do not conform to the account that fails 
to be contextually sensitive. Instead, particular arenas, be they policy arenas, cultural 
arenas, political contexts, etc., may serve as spaces within which the specificities of the 
substance of autonomy can be worked out. As I explain in the later chapters, this 
methodological approach– moving back and forth between concrete intuitions and more 
general theories – can be understood as contiguous with the general sense in which 
attention is paid to the relevance of experience in much feminist theoretical work. 
Moreover, ultimately, it is the ability to make normative claims about oppression that is 
central to my defense of a substantive account of autonomy. Rather than generating 
                                                 
15 Paul Benson, "Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character of Responsibility," in Relational 
Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and 
Natalie Stoljar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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exclusionary criteria for autonomy, a substantive account of autonomy generates much 
needed mechanisms for criticizing dominant social structures that constrain autonomy.  
The second way in which I expand on the existing accounts of relational autonomy is 
by making use of and further developing an account of ascriptive autonomy. As I note 
above, I understand autonomy to be the capacity to pursue one’s on ends or life plans. 
But there is a finer distinction to be made in specifying what it means to be autonomous. 
Following other theorists,16 I view autonomy as not only referring to a capacity but to a 
status. That is, one is recognized as autonomous; autonomy is ascribed to some 
individuals and not to others. It may well be the case that autonomy is ascribed to 
individuals who possess the capacity referred to initially. However, given the politically 
charged and conceptually muddled ways in which the concept is sometimes deployed in 
popular and academic contexts, the attribution of recognition and the existence of 
capacity may also fail to overlap. Nevertheless, the two senses of autonomy are indeed 
interwoven. Recognition theorists, as I discuss in greater depth in Chapter 3, have noted 
that the psychic effect of misrecognition can often impede our sense of self and following 
from this, I argue, our capacity to act autonomously.17 On the other hand, the ascription 
of autonomy to one who is not necessarily fully endowed with the capacities for 
autonomy may in fact promote the development of these capacities: the experience of 
                                                 
16 See Richard H. Fallon, "Two Sense of Autonomy," Stanford Law Review 46, no. 4 (1994); Mika 
LaVaque-Manty, "Kant's Children," Social Theory and Practice 32, no. 3 (2006). 
17 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Polity Press, 1995); Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann, Multiculturalism and the Politics of 
Recognition: An Essay (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). Nancy Fraser also discusses the 
effects and implications of misrecognition, but she focuses more on the institutional effect, expressing 
some wariness about exploring the psychic effects. See further Chapter 3. Nancy Fraser, "From 
Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a "Postsocialist" Age," in Justice Interruptus: 
Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition (New York and London: Routledge, 1997); Nancy 
Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London; 
New York: Verso, 2003). 
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being recognized as autonomous may create certain expectations, responsibilities, and 
feelings of inclusion that themselves promote autonomy. This interrelatedness makes 
attention to the dual nature of autonomy important to a fully fleshed out theory of the 
autonomy-fostering state. 
I use this notion of ascriptive autonomy to further elucidate the relationship between 
harm and autonomy in Chapter 4 and to complicate our understanding of paternalism in 
Chapter 5. Simply by breaking autonomy down in this way, we are able to get a better 
handle on what it means to foster autonomy. Indeed, both autonomy understood in the 
ascriptive sense and in the capacity sense are relationally constituted. The ascription of 
autonomy is often a function of the expansiveness of our conception of the autonomous 
individual; in disentangling autonomy from independence, I seek to widen the 
possibilities for such ascription – or to theorize the institutional and social conditions 
under which relations of recognition are more justly configured.  
An understanding of autonomy as both a capacity and status highlights the link 
between autonomy and citizenship. I turn next to a brief overview of the notion of 
citizenship that I develop in the dissertation, and that in a sense motivates the concern 
with autonomy to begin with. 
 
II. Citizenship 
The link between relations of power and the ability or inability of individuals to 
develop and exercise the capacity to act autonomously is made particularly salient when 
we consider the relationship between autonomy and citizenship in contemporary welfare 
states. In a similar sense to the way in which I have described autonomy above, 
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citizenship has been importantly theorized as referring to a status. Autonomy, both in its 
capacity and status form, I suggest, is critical to the status of citizenship and the related 
claims to the rights and duties associated with citizenship.  The limitations placed on an 
individual’s development and exercise of the capacity to act autonomously by, for 
example, relations of dominance, directly bear on first, her attainment of recognition as a 
full rights bearing citizen, and second, her capacity to exercise the rights and perform the 
duties associated with the status of citizenship.  
The notion of citizenship-as-status is most famously explored by T.H. Marshall. 
Over half a century ago, Marshall referred to this status as one that “admitted [men] to a 
share in social heritage” and recognized them as “full members of the society.”18 In the 
nineteenth century, Marshall explains, the growing conflict between the equality claims 
of the citizen and the inequalities in social class created by the market system created 
increased tension between what he refers to as social rights on the one hand and civil and 
political rights on the other hand.   Civil rights, and political rights (which Marshall sees 
as a secondary offshoot of civil rights), are associated with the new competitive market—
the equality of opportunity afforded to all (male) citizens—while social rights, “the right 
to a modicum of economic welfare and […] to live the life of a civilized being according 
to the standards prevailing in the society,” are associated with relatively static, pre-
determined rights based on needs.19  The Poor Law Act of 1834 in England made a 
particularly striking move in the process of attempting to slice social rights out of the 
status of citizenship.  The poor were required to make their claims to social rights as an 
alternative to the rights afforded citizenship, including civil rights of personal liberty and 
                                                 
18 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays (Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 
1950), 6. 
19 Ibid., 8. 
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any political rights they may have possessed.20 The status of citizenship was revoked 
from those who were “dependent” on the state.  The protection of the state was available 
only in exchange for the renouncement of one’s rights as a citizen.   
Marshall claims that social rights encountered a revival in the twentieth century.  
Indeed, within the U.S. context, there was a growing movement toward increased social 
rights, perhaps reaching its height in the form of the Great Society pursued by President 
Johnson.  However, the status of citizenship has increasingly, since the 1970’s and 
particularly in recent years, been regressing in the direction of the stigma and 
disenfranchisement that characterized the era of the Poor Law; for example, welfare 
reforms in Britain and the United States at the end of the 20th century challenged 
entitlement-based approaches to welfare provision (to varying degrees). Moreover, 
though his theory has proved useful for feminist accounts of welfare, dependence, and 
autonomy, feminist theorists and scholars of welfare policy have criticized Marshall’s 
account for its failure to fully account for the experience of women.  For one, his 
chronology of the development of civil, political, and social rights, in that order, does not 
describe the experience of women in most places in the world.  Linda Gordon notes, 
“throughout the world women won important social rights from the state before they got 
the vote.”21 Beyond simply perverting the chronology of the development of citizenship 
rights, this failure to fully consider the role of women leads Marshall to overlook various 
forms of dependence.  While dependence on the state is, for him, mistakenly stigmatized, 
Marshall primarily considers dependence (in adult males) as emerging from exclusion, 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 15. 
21 Linda Gordon, "The New Feminist Scholarship on the Welfare State," in Women, the State, and Welfare, 
ed. Linda Gordon (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990). See also Ruth Lister, Citizenship: 
Feminist Perspectives, 2nd ed. (Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 2003). 
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temporary or permanent, from the wage-labor workforce.  Therefore, my focus on 
feminist conceptions of autonomy in the dissertation pushes Marshall’s approach to 
dependence further by reinserting experience of women in the development and provision 
of social rights of citizenship, thereby moving beyond a solely market-focused account of 
the appropriate provisions entailed in social citizenship status. 
Throughout the dissertation I therefore explore the implications of explicitly focusing 
on autonomy-fostering in theories of citizenship. In the chapter that follows, I argue for a 
revised notion of social citizenship, founded on a relational conception of autonomy, 
which highlights the necessity for autonomy-fostering service delivery as a component of 
the resources required for full citizenship. In the cases I explore in the remainder of the 
dissertation, more inclusive notions of citizenship are always at the normative foundation 
of the claims I make regarding potentially autonomy-fostering service delivery. 
Accordingly, I view service delivery as a key site at which the assumptions and stigmas 
associated with vulnerability in our society may be challenged and the appropriate 
resources for developing the capacity for autonomy provided. With this in mind, I turn 
next to the implications of and motivations for choosing service delivery as a site of 
importance for the autonomy-fostering state. 
 
III. Service Delivery  
I focus on service delivery in the dissertation because it is a key juncture at which 
the relationship between state and citizen plays out. As Michael Lipsky argues in his 
seminal work Street-Level Bureaucracy, “in a sense street-level bureaucrats implicitly 
mediate aspects of the constitutional relationship of citizens to the state.  In short, they 
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hold the keys to a dimension of citizenship.”22 Street-level bureaucrats—the public 
bureaucrats by whom social welfare services are primarily delivered—play a central role, 
through the practice of service delivery, in determining the access service users have to 
the status of citizenship and, in turn, to autonomy, both as capacity and status. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the delivery of social welfare services has been a site of 
considerable criticism, debate, and frustration, both in the academic fields of political 
science and public policy and within public discourse. Nevertheless, this arena remains 
relatively uninvestigated by political theorists; though considerations of justice and 
liberty in the context of social welfare provision have been of interest to theorists, there is 
little theorizing of service delivery practices specifically as an arena within which 
citizenship – and autonomy – is constructed. I begin to fill this gap whilst relying on the 
empirical evidence that our colleagues in the other subfields of political science provide 
and analyze.  
The challenges of effectively delivering social services are both structural and 
ideological.  With regard to the structural limitations that street-level bureaucracies face, 
Lipsky argues that there are almost insurmountable difficulties in achieving sufficient 
accountability within these settings, where workers possess a high degree of discretion, 
an attribute that is indeed necessary for the jobs they do.23 Accountability, Lipsky notes, 
“is the link between bureaucracy and democracy.”24 Yet, while it seems evident that we 
ought to work to sustain this link, attempts to impose measures of accountability within 
                                                 
22 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1980), 4. 
23 Ibid., 162. 
24 Ibid., 160. 
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the context of social service delivery have threatened the quality of service delivery.25 For 
example, efforts at greater accountability, perhaps in the form of a expanded or more 
intrusive efficiency and accuracy measures, may ultimately “erode workers’ sense of 
responsibility for clients,” leading them to carry out their duties in a more mechanistic, 
potentially less productive, and less empathetic manner.26  
The reasons for this chasm in the maintenance of, on the one hand, accountability, 
and on the other, flexibility or discretion, are manifold.  Some are related to the manner 
in which federal and state level funds are distributed, bearing on the resources specific 
street-level bureaucracies have available to them.  Constantly pressured resources lead to 
overloaded workers, who, while they require discretion, may come to rely on this 
discretion as away of streamlining their work and potentially acting in unfairly 
exclusionary ways.27  In addition, the ideological underpinnings of social welfare service 
provision in general also bear considerable responsibility for the problems facing street-
level bureaucracies.  That is, as Lipsky writes, “American street-level bureaucracies must 
be understood as organizational embodiments of contradictory tendencies in American 
society as a whole.”28 While the welfare state generates programs built to respond to the 
insecurity and inequality that the economic system inevitably produces, these programs—
and the workers who deliver them—are also designed to maintain and reproduce the 
system.  In this sense, street-level bureaucrats are indeed involved in a project of social 
control; their job is to deliver services in such a way that they do not undermine the status 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 178. 
26 Ibid. 
27 For a feminist critique of bureaucracy, see Kathy E. Ferguson, The Feminist Case against Bureaucracy, 
Women in the Political Economy. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984). 
28 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1980), 183. 
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quo, which often requires that they impose disciplinary constraints on clients, with the 
objects of this discipline ranging from the nature of clients’ appearance to other aspects 
of their self-presentation.  Yet, street-level bureaucrats are also, in fulfilling the first 
imperative of the welfare state—that of responding to needs—often a manifestation of 
society’s humanitarian impulses.  These contravening impulses complicate our 
understanding of the state as an agent of social control, as I discuss further below. 
The form and function of social service delivery in the context I pay particular 
attention to here – the United States – is also very much a product of popular conceptions 
of poverty and dependence.  Lipsky, whose book was published in 1980, describes 
Americans’ “deep conviction that poor people at some level are responsible for the 
conditions in which they find themselves, and that receiving benefits labeled ‘for the 
poor’ is shameful.”29 Certainly, this sentiment remains prevalent if not stronger in 2006, 
with the popular welfare reforms of 1996 relying heavily on such assumptions.30  Public 
intellectuals and politicians emphasize the pathology of poverty—referring to an alien 
“underclass”—and on the undeserving nature of those who, they claim, receive benefits 
in exchange for doing no work (participating in the wage-labour economy, that is).  As 
well, Lipsky notes, social services delivered to the poor (or other marginalized groups) 
are seen, in general, as a cost, rather than as a benefit.31 These troubling attitudes and the 
consequent tensions in social service delivery that Lipsky describes manifest themselves 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 181. 
30 The passage of PRWORA has some interesting implications for service delivery, which I will discuss in 
my dissertation.  For example, the institution of conditional benefits that give rise to new sanctioning 
procedures, which may result in permanent loss of benefits for some recipients.   
31 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1980), 181. 
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in on-the-ground practices that directly affect the distribution of citizenship rights in the 
U.S.   
As I mention above, service delivery is perhaps the key site of state-citizen 
relationships.  As Joe Soss writes, “[t]hrough welfare participation, individuals enter a 
relationship with government that may be designed in a variety of ways.”32  Lipsky too 
notes that most citizens have their sole interactions with the state (or what they thing of as 
the state) by way of their engagement with street-level bureaucracies, be they schools, 
welfare offices, or police officers. The relationship that is formed, I suggest, determines 
the extent to which she will be given the opportunity to develop her capacities to act 
autonomously and whether she will be recognized as autonomous.  Joe Soss argues that 
welfare participation teaches clients how government and bureaucracy in particular will 
respond to their claims, and what sorts of claims they are entitled to make upon it; “it 
teaches citizens lessons about whether they can be effective in petitioning government 
and whether they have standing to act without fear of retribution.”33 The “dilemma of 
action,” as Soss puts it, that citizens are conditioned to respond to via welfare service 
delivery experiences, is a central component of both the exercise and development of 
autonomy-competency.  Political or social action, whether in response to the welfare 
system or elsewhere in the public sphere, can be a key arena for building and exercising 
the skills necessary for autonomous activity. 
Soss’s fascinating study of welfare participation as a site of political action 
highlights the important political function of making claims on the welfare state.  
Through interviews and participant-observation, Soss finds that welfare participation can 
                                                 
32Joe Soss, Unwanted Claims: The Politics of Participation in the U.S. Welfare System (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000), 153. 
33Ibid. 
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be a key cite for making claims on the government that are, more so than elsewhere, 
effective in yielding them “tangible, immediate, and helpful actions from government.”34 
Soss argues that through the process of claiming welfare rights—which is mediated by 
service delivery practices—clients “can enhance their power to accomplish goals and 
serve as capable members of the polity.”35 Even in the context of mechanisms of social 
control, welfare may at some junctures afford recipients the opportunity for greater 
autonomy than they likely otherwise would have had.  Soss’s view of service delivery is 
thus, to an extent, more optimistic than Lipsky’s.  While he by no means exonerates the 
system of the sorts of contradictions and tensions that Lipsky finds, he acknowledges that 
social welfare service delivery plays an important role in clearing the way for 
disadvantaged, traditionally marginalized individuals to exercise their capacity to act 
autonomously.  In turn, I want to take Soss’s observations one step further in proposing 
that, through service delivery, the welfare state cannot only allow for autonomous 
activity, it can and should directly engage in the task of fostering autonomy.  Soss’s 
observations do not demonstrate that such activity is occurring.  For the most part, 
delivery of public assistance in the United States36 has not been undertaken in a manner 
that serves to foster autonomy.  However, elsewhere in the welfare state, in sometimes 
equally politicized and stigmatized arenas, some service delivery does seem to fulfill the 
goal of fostering autonomy.  In the dissertation, I consider several examples of these 
programs, which I will introduce in the “plan of the dissertation” below, and extract from 
                                                 
34Ibid., 16. 
35 Ibid. 
36 At the time of Soss’s study “public aid” or what is generally know as “welfare” took the form of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  Since 1996, AFDC no longer exists.  In its stead, eligible 
individuals receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) on the condition of meeting 
relatively stringent work requirements. 
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them some general ideas and principles that may be applicable to the delivery of public 
assistance as well.    
It is important to note that no definitive prescription for service delivery practices 
emerges in the course of the dissertation. This is the case for a number of reasons. First, 
as I stress throughout, contextual details are of much importance to conceiving of the 
relational conditions that best foster autonomy. As I note above, I consider the 
“substance” of autonomy to be constituted in a manner that goes between theoretical 
principles and given political and social contexts. Of particular relevance, the structure of 
relations of power is critical to our understanding of what distinguishes autonomy-
fostering practices from paternalistic practices (as I discuss in Chapter  5). Moreover, my 
discussion of harm reduction in Chapter 4 emphasizes, service users can (and perhaps, 
ought to) play an important role in the delivery of services and the structuring of 
principles according to which such delivery is organized. Given this input, it is difficult to 
delineate autonomy-fostering practices with great specificity. Finally, as I turn to next, 
the “state” is not a singular entity, but a fragmented, diverse, and sometimes 
contradictory set of entities. Given this multiplicity, what constitutes fostering autonomy 
in one manifestation of the state, may not do so in another. 
 
IV. The State 
Some theorists view the goal of fostering autonomy as contrary to the interests of the 
state as a whole, while others argue that turning to the state as a tool with which to resist 
the oppression of marginalized groups, especially of women, is inherently misguided.  
The state, they claim, is either (or both) a mechanism of social control or an instrument of 
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patriarchal power.  These theorists pose an important challenge to both the normative and 
empirical claims in this dissertation.  Of course, most theorists recognize that the state is 
not a monolithic entity; it is an amalgam of various institutions and practices that are not 
always aligned with one another with regard to each one’s interests.  However, even 
when viewed as a complex, if abstract, entity, many theorists still question the plausibility 
of the state as a mechanism of “empowerment”—as the popular buzz-word might be used 
to describe “autonomy fostering”—arguing that the state is too fraught with gendered, 
racialized, power dynamics that privilege the independent, white, male citizen to serve 
this purpose.  However, I argue, along with a number of other feminist theorists writing 
over the course of the past two decades, that out of the competing and often contradictory 
interests and goals emerging from the network of institutions and actors that comprise the 
state come important opportunities for and examples of programs that can and do foster 
autonomy, even in the most vulnerable and traditionally marginalized members of our 
communities. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 – indeed, throughout the dissertation, though sometimes less 
directly – I engage with the understanding of the state that views it as primarily 
mechanisms of social control and masculinist power. Frances Fox Piven and Richard 
Cloward present the most well known, and perhaps most compelling, approach to the 
former critique.37 Piven and Cloward’s model of the welfare state pays particularly 
attention to the social-ordering role of work, or paid employment. When the poor are 
working, they will think and act as required to preserve the source of their subsistence. 
However, non-work has the opposite effect, especially when it is a condition endured by 
                                                 
37 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They 
Fail (New York: Vintage books, 1979); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: 
The Functions of Public Welfare, Updated ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). 
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many people. In the absence of work as a source of order, potential unrest threatens to 
disrupt capitalist production and, in turn, profit-making. Without the regulating function 
of work, and in combination with the effects of material deprivation, people turn to 
various forms of protest and resistance that may, at their most extreme, “threaten to 
overturn existing social and economic arrangements.”38 On this model, welfare does not 
simply attend to the deprivation brought about by unemployment.  Its primary function is 
to restore order.  Order is restored by way of conditionality; relief depends on fulfilling 
certain requirements. On the other hand, the stigma associated with welfare promotes the 
compulsion to work under any conditions, no matter how unjust or unsatisfactory with 
regard to meeting basic needs or respecting fundamental rights. 
Wendy Brown, in turn, offers a version of the social control critique that sees the state 
as being necessarily a masculinist entity.39 As I discuss in Chapter 3, despite the gradual 
diminishment of the power differential between individual men and women, Brown 
argues that the state has come to occupy these same positions of power once held by men. 
Moreover, the state does not deliver on its claims to neutrality, instead taking up a 
masculinist perspective, built on historically male-held leadership roles, masculinist 
institutions and modes of protection and regulation, and the reproduction of dominant 
notions of femininity. Therefore, Brown rejects the notion that the state can be an agent 
of liberation or progressive challenges to gendered forms of oppression; rather, to seek 
out the state as an ally in feminist aims is to turn to an agent of masculine power as a 
mechanism for protection from, paradoxically, masculine power. Though rationalized and 
bureaucratized, state power represents a continued assault on women’s freedom.  
                                                 
38 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare, 
Updated ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 7. 
39 Wendy Brown, "Finding the Man the State," Feminist Studies 18, no. 1 (1992). 
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Though Brown does disaggregate the state in her discussion of its different 
functions,40 she maintains a relatively unnuanced view of the state’s interests, even in its 
multiple functions: all arms of the state ultimately make use of their power for patriarchal 
ends, she argues. While I do not reject the claim that patriarchal power exists to a 
widespread extent within the various arms of the state, I challenge the notion that these 
various arms, even given the continued existence of patriarchy, can never act in enabling 
ways in the lives of women or other feminized subjects. As I will point to in greater detail 
in later chapters, other theorists do offer more nuanced accounts, challenging the category 
of “patriarchy” as an adequately cohesive way of characterizing the state. In her essay on 
“The New Feminist Scholarship on the Welfare State,” Linda Gordon calls into question 
the value of the term “patriarchy” as a descriptive or analytic category for study of the 
welfare state.  First, she notes the fuzziness of the word: “By using a word so filled with 
fatherly, familial, organic, fixed hierarchical relations to describe today’s male 
supremacy, situated in a nonfamilial, inorganic, meritocratic society, we lose much of its 
power and nuance and we makes significant historical change.”41 Moreover, even if the 
state has come to occupy positions of domination previously held my individual men, 
notes Gordon, there is a certain imprecision in describing both individual male 
subordination of women and the gender oppression emerging from the state as examples 
of the “patriarchy.”  Gordon further notes that the use of the “state patriarchy” model is 
inflexible insofar as it fails to acknowledge the genuine gains that women have made, 
instead representing “them as an inevitable epiphenomenon of modernization or 
                                                 
40 Brown divides the state into its the liberal, capitalist, prerogative, and bureaucratic dimensions. 
41 Linda Gordon, "The New Feminist Scholarship on the Welfare State," in Women, the State, and Welfare, 
ed. Linda Gordon (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 22. 
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secularization rather than as the result of collective political struggle, that is, of 
feminism.”42 
Picking up on this critique of the state patriarchy model is presenting only a 
picture of the state as oppressor, Barbara Cruikshank’s Foucaultian account of the 
welfare state highlights the complexities of the inevitable power relations between state 
and citizen.43 Explaining the workings of state power, she defines a “technology of 
citizenship” as “a method for constituting citizens out of subjects and maximizing their 
political participation.”44 Such “technologies of citizenship,” she suggests, do not cancel 
out the autonomy and independence of citizens but are modes of governance that work 
upon and through the capacities of citizens to act on their own.45  Thus Cruikshank takes 
seriously welfare policy that seeks to “empower” recipients; she does not simply dismiss 
such policies as modes of social control.  Nevertheless, she notes that the process of 
making citizens “self-governing” also renders them “governable.”46 Thus, while 
Cruikshank’s approach to the welfare state is more subtle than the “state patriarchy” 
model, she remains suspicious of welfare programs that claim to foster self-government 
in recipients, noting that such self-government often entails the self-directed but highly 
conditioned assent of the recipient to align her goals with those of, for example, 
individuals and groups situated in bureaucratic or therapeutic positions of power. 
Throughout this dissertation, while taking heed of the great potential for the state 
to act as an agent of disempowerment, even if in the less apparent but equally deleterious 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Barbara Cruikshank, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1999). 
44 Ibid., 67. 
45 Ibid., 4. 
46 Ibid., 90. 
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manner Cruikshank points to, I present a more optimistic account of the state – that is, of 
the “autonomy-fostering state.” While I don’t claim that such a state exists in entirety in 
any one place, by pointing to the workings of particular arenas of the states’ many arms, 
and to the interactions between these arms, I begin to offer a picture of a state that 
generates the relational conditions necessary to foster autonomy.47 Sometimes, as in 
Chapter 3, these conditions arise out of the contradictory impulses of the various arms 
involved in a particular type of service delivery, even if the intentionality of each arm is 
not itself aligned with the aim of fostering autonomy. In other cases, the notion of the 
“state” is complicated when its agents – the individuals delivering the state funded 
services – are service users themselves. When users, as in the cases described in Chapter 
4, run their own harm reducing needle-exchange program at the behest of the state, who 
is state and who is client? This confusion is a productive one, I argue. Further, in the case 
of many social welfare services, the recipients of benefits lay claim to needs that are 
explicitly embodied; our understanding of the state must take into account the ways in 
which it accounts for such embodiment. Such attention to “embodied autonomy,” I argue, 
can be found in the autonomy-fostering state, as demonstrated by some of the programs I 
explore in the case studies. 
As with service delivery, no singular theory of the state or “road map” of the 
autonomy-fostering state in particular emerges from this dissertation. Nevertheless, the 
various accounts of autonomy fostering that I offer in this dissertation challenge the 
social control and patriarchy models of the state (while acknowledging the existence of 
                                                 
47 Chapter 3 presents an account of the loosely coupled arms of the state, drawn from work by Lynne 
Haney. See Lynne Haney, "Feminist State Theory: Applications to Jurisprudence, Criminology, and the 
Welfare State," Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000); Lynne Haney, "Homeboys, Babies, Men in Suits: 
The State and the Reproduction of Male Dominance," American Sociological Review 61, no. October 
(1996).. 
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these motivations at certain junctures of state power). As well, these accounts contribute 
and further more complex accounts of the state, like Cruikshank’s, which nevertheless 
tend to focus primarily on the constraining elements of state power, rather than the 
enabling ones, which themselves are often depicted as implicitly constraining. 
 
V. Plan of the dissertation 
In Chapter 2, I further develop the account of citizenship, specifically social 
citizenship, that underpins my concern in this dissertation with fostering autonomy. I 
argue for a revised notion of social citizenship that has at its core a relational conception 
of autonomy.  The standard notion of social citizenship, often attributed to T.H. Marshall, 
does indeed have autonomy at its core; it seeks to correct the economic inequalities that 
compromise one’s ability to act autonomously.  However, it fails to consider autonomy 
relational. That is, as I note above, as a capacity that is not only hindered by material 
barriers, but that is also fostered only in the context of well-structured social 
relationships.  This feminist conception of autonomy brings to light an understanding of 
social citizenship rights as concerned with actively promoting autonomy by establishing 
and cultivating the relational support necessary to foster this capacity. In the chapter, I 
take up two prominent critiques of the concept of social citizenship serve as an entry 
point to theorizing the autonomy-focused model I propose.  On the one hand, some critics 
charge that the rhetoric of social citizenship fails to consider the mechanisms of social 
control that always accompany, and often overshadow, social welfare rights.  On the 
other hand, the language of social citizenship rights is criticized for its so-called 
“passive” conception of citizenship, focusing only on rights without accounting for the 
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role of duties or obligation.  By reconceiving of social citizenship as a status that grants 
individuals not only the right to freedom from material constraints on autonomy, but also 
the right to access services and resources necessary to foster and develop the capacity to 
act autonomously, we can effectively respond to these critiques.  
Beginning with Chapter 3, the chapters that follow take up specific practices that 
may fulfill the requirements of social citizenship, as reconceived in Chapter 2, while also 
developing the theoretical accounts of the state and autonomy that are at the core of the 
dissertation. The first case explores a particular model of service delivery for survivors of 
domestic violence: “coordinated community response” programs (CCRs). This chapter is 
centrally focused on theorizing the state in the context of autonomy-fostering practices. I 
conceptualize the state as a fragmented and plural entity comprised of various “loosely 
coupled” arms that are sometime in conflict with one another. Given this 
conceptualization, the notion of what I refer to as the coordinated fragmented state helps 
us to understand the dynamics that can enable the state to foster autonomy. The case 
helps to elucidate this notion of coordinated fragmentation: CCRs take advantage of the 
tensions inherent in the state in such a way that they are able to foster autonomy more 
effectively than conventional forms of service delivery. Moreover, the multiplicity of this 
model offers opportunities for a balance to be struck between care-oriented and justice-
oriented elements of the autonomy-fostering state. This balance is made effective partly 
because of the mechanisms of self-critique extant in the coordinated fragmented state. 
Additionally, domestic violence services are particularly revealing as a site for 
considering the dynamics of an autonomy-fostering state, since questions of state 
 28  
  
intervention, power relations, and individual autonomy are at the forefront of discussions 
of domestic violence in a wide range of disciplines. 
In second case, explored in Chapter 4, my theoretical focus is the relationship 
between harm and autonomy. Although I argue that harm impedes autonomy, I resist the 
intuitive notion that harm and autonomy exist in a zero-sum relationship – more harm, 
less autonomy. This account does not sufficiently allow for the varieties of harm that 
exist, the multiple sites at which harm is produced and inflicted, and the plural set of 
actors that are affected by harm. Seeking to complicated this account, I suggest that harm 
reduction, a model of response to drug use and addiction that seeks to minimize the harm 
associated with drug use, without necessarily requiring abstinence, is a unique location at 
which the state can foster autonomy in vulnerable citizens. Examples of programs include 
needle exchanges and methadone maintenance. I explore two forms of harm, here. First, I 
suggest that successful harm reduction programs respond to the harm of misrecognition 
by enabling a space for recognition not just by the state, but by the community too—
especially including “peers.” In these spaces a measure of ascriptive autonomy, described 
above, can be achieved. Second, this case demonstrates that autonomy competency 
requires attention to embodied forms of harm, where the notion of harm must be flexible 
and open to continual reinterpretation. In the case of harm reduction service users, the 
terrain of such contestation often revolves around the politics of pain and pleasure. Both 
forms of harm point to the fact that the notion of an autonomous addict is not 
oxymoronic, but simply an example of the confluence of a variety of harms with other 
potentially autonomy enabling forces. Even in situations of extreme dependence, this 
case demonstrates, autonomy is, and ought to be, possible. 
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In Chapter 5, I turn to a final case wherein I consider whether a theory of an 
autonomy-fostering state ought to be understood simply as a version of “forced to be 
free”: is the very notion of the state “fostering autonomy” imbued with some elements of 
paternalism? Moreover, can the state force us to be free; that is, can paternalistic social 
service delivery ever be autonomy-fostering? I approach these important questions by 
distinguishing autonomy-fostering from paternalist practices, specifically those 
associated with the “New Paternalism,” the influential theory of “supervisory” 
approaches to social welfare service delivery that can be linked to recent welfare reforms 
in the United States and Britain, as well as some other European countries. I consider two 
instances of new paternalist service delivery: workfare and pregnancy-prevention 
programs, both directed at welfare recipients. These two programs respond to what many 
new paternalists claim are the two primary causes of poverty: nonwork and unwed 
pregnancy. A careful look at each of these programs sharpens our view of what it means 
for the state to foster autonomy – or to fail to do so, as is the case here. Throughout, I 
suggest that this incompatibility between autonomy-fostering and paternalist social policy 
makes most sense when founded upon a notion of paternalism that highlights its 
implication in oppressive power relations rather than solely its association with 
interventionist policy. In this light, the assumption at the core of New Paternalism – that 
of service users’ incompetence – reveals the autonomy-constraining implications of such 
intervention, which is characterized by a lack of respect and recognition. 
Finally, the concluding chapter (6) takes note of some recent developments in 
policy and media treatment of both harm reduction and domestic violence services, trying 
to reconcile what seem to be continued difficulties at establishing an autonomy fostering 
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state, or at least autonomy fostering practices within the state. Despite the challenges that 
continue to arise, I argue, a theory of the autonomy-fostering state helps us to better make 
sense of the contradictions and tensions that arise on the ground, and to respond to these 
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Towards a Revised Conception of Social Citizenship: An Autonomy-Focused Model 
 
I. Introduction 
Advocates of social citizenship—the status that, as T.H. Marshall wrote, 
guarantees “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and […] to live the life of a 
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society”—have seen their 
notion of the welfare state dissolve in the past decade or so, with a growing number of 
Western states undertaking radical welfare reforms that impose onerous conditions and 
limitations on welfare payment receipt.48 With this challenge to the practices of the 
modern century welfare states in the West, the conceptual terrain occupied by citizenship 
in general, and social citizenship more specifically, has become a particularly relevant 
and lively location for work in political theory.49 Within the framework of this 
dissertation, specifying a vision of citizenship proves particularly crucial. Implicit in the 
theory of the autonomy-fostering state that I put forward is a particular notion of what 
constitutes full citizenship in the modern state and the obligations and institutions that 
accompany such a notion. This chapter makes explicit this conception of citizenship, 
focusing on the social dimensions of citizenship. Social citizenship, in the form I 
elaborate in the following pages, both reflects and acts as a benchmark for the extent to 
                                                 
48 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays (Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 
1950). 
49 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship 
Theory," Ethics 104, no. 2 (1994); Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, 2nd ed. (Washington 
Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 2003). 
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which the state is able to fulfill the autonomy-fostering mandate I envision in this 
dissertation. 
The most prevalent critiques of welfare in both the United States and Western 
Europe come from conservatives who invoke pathologizing notions of “a culture of 
dependency” or ring the alarm bells of “intergenerational dependence,” with these 
charges sometimes taking on a racialized and gendered tone. Though public and scholarly 
attention has recently been focused on conservative critiques of welfare, which have been 
the basis for dramatic policy changes on both sides of the Atlantic, social citizenship has 
also come under fire from voices on the opposite side of the political spectrum. In this 
chapter I explore two such critiques of social citizenship. First, some critics charge that 
the rhetoric of social citizenship fails to consider the extent to which mechanisms of 
social control—overwhelming disciplinary power, bureaucratic lapses in accountability, 
and degrading tools of surveillance—always accompany the rights associated with the 
welfare state. Second, the language of social citizenship rights has also been criticized for 
its so-called “passive” conception of citizenship, focused only on rights without taking 
into account the role of duties or obligation. 
These two important critiques of social citizenship provide an entry point to 
theorizing a revised (or at least clarified) version of social citizenship. I argue that we 
need a richer notion of social citizenship, one that has at its core a relational conception 
of autonomy. While the standard Marshallian version of social citizenship does seem to 
be at bottom about autonomy—it seeks to correct the economic inequalities that 
compromise one’s ability to act autonomously—it fails to consider autonomy as a 
capacity that is not only hindered by material barriers, but that is also fostered only in the 
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context of well-structured social relationships. In this sense, a standard view of social 
citizenship is often concerned only with removing (material) barriers, and rarely with 
actively promoting autonomy by establishing and cultivating the relational support 
necessary to foster autonomy. This revised conception of social citizenship helps us to 
respond to the critiques mentioned above and therefore to defend a notion of social 
citizenship rights more generally. First, if we think of social citizenship rights as 
explicitly concerned with fostering autonomy, the social control critique no longer point 
to flaws in social citizenship as a concept, but to incomplete realizations of the (revised) 
ideal of social citizenship. Second, we can also undermine concerns about the passivity of 
rights-focused accounts of citizenship and the failure of social rights to emphasize duties 
and obligation when we shift the focus of social citizenship to an autonomy-fostering 
model. This is because, I claim here, autonomy is a necessary condition for the exercise 
of one’s capacity to fulfill duties and meet obligations. Therefore, if social citizenship 
acitively fosters autonomy, it can hardly be thought of as promoting something that runs 
counter to citizens’ abilities to fulfill their duties and obligations. 
In advancing this conception of social citizenship, I am not making an empirical 
claim about the current state of social rights in the United States or elsewhere.50 Rather, I 
want to articulate a conception of social citizenship that can serve both as an ideal and as 
a benchmark with which to evaluate social policy and programs. It is essential that we 
engage in this conceptual exercise if we are to advance an argument for something we 
call “social citizenship,” and in order to provide justifications for and a defense of critical 
social welfare programs that have so often come under attack. My discussion of social 
                                                 
50 Some programs advanced by particular arms of the state do reflect the model of social rights I propose in 
this chapter, such as the ones I discuss in the cases that appear in following chapters. Nevertheless, I don’t 
claim that any one state as a whole successful offers social rights as defined in this chapter, as of yet. 
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citizenship here is also not an attempt to provide a “correct” interpretation of Marshall’s 
original conception of social citizenship. Rather, I take up the concept of social 
citizenship as it appears in the context of its defense and criticism by other scholars, in 
particular in the cases of the critiques I examine here. What I ultimately put forth is an 
argument for how we ought to conceive of social citizenship if we are to hold true to the 
values that have motivated this concept’s widespread usage in the first place—notions of 
inclusion, community, and participation—while also responding to the critiques that have 
these days rendered it a beleaguered concept in the context of actual policy. Moreover, 
this notion of social citizenship is one that takes seriously the obligations of the state to 
foster autonomy in its citizens. In the chapters that follow I look more concretely at 
examples of such autonomy-fostering practices, but for now an exercise in conceptual 
clarification will clear the way for these later analyses.  
I begin, then, with two important critiques of social citizenship leveled by other 
theorists. Section II considers the social control critique, while Section III turns to 
critiques of the rights-focused orientation of theories of social citizenship. Both critiques, 
though coming from different vantage points, start from a similar understanding of social 
citizenship and its relationship to autonomy. On these accounts, social citizenship rights 
are primarily focused on the provision of material resources in order to provide the basic 
level of material wealth necessary to exercise individual autonomy. When viewed in light 
of this notion of autonomy, the critiques may indeed be warranted. However, Section IV 
offers a revised conception of social citizenship, which, I argue, helps to resolve some of 
the conceptual tensions we find in the former definition. This revised conception also 
supports arguments for a just and equitable distribution of both material resources and 
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optimally structured service delivery. At the core of this conception of social citizenship 
lies the feminist (“relational”) conception of autonomy, which draws our attention to the 
structure of relationships that may either foster or hinder autonomy. Furthermore, this 
feminist conception of social citizenship rejects the aspiration to overcome need and 
dependence, instead acknowledging their centrality to human life.  In the context of this 
discussion, autonomy can be thought of as both a need in itself and as a mechanism that 
allows citizens to engage in the ongoing contestation over “needs interpretation.”51  
Section V puts this revised conception of social citizenship into action, arguing that it can 
help us to respond to the critiques discussed in Sections II and III. Finally, Section VI 
concludes the argument. 
 
II. Social Citizenship as Social Control: The Politics of Empowerment 
 Painting a particularly rosy picture of the early days of social citizenship rights, 
Marshall writes: 
Social integration spread from the sphere of sentiment and patriotism into that of 
material enjoyment. The components of a civilized and culture life, formerly the 
monopoly of the few, were brought progressively within reach of the many, who 
were encouraged thereby to stretch out their hands towards those that still eluded 
their grasp. The diminution of inequality strengthened the demand for its 
abolition, at least with regard to the essentials of social welfare.52  
 
To be sure, Marshall’s treatise on citizenship and social class does not proceed only in 
such laudatory terms. He later notes the effects of stigma and other tensions in the social 
democratic state. However, like Marshall, contemporary proponents of social citizenship 
                                                 
51 Nancy Fraser, "Struggle over Needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late-Capitalist 
Political Culture," in Women, the State, and Welfare, ed. Linda Gordon (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1990). 
52 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays (Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 
1950), 28. 
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are optimistic that, when fully realized, social rights will alleviate the pressures of 
material want and free citizens to live their lives according to their own wishes, as full 
members of the community. But, primarily among those advocates of social justice who 
are associated with the political left, the promise of social welfare provision as a means to 
autonomy has been met with skepticism. These critics worry that as it provides the poor 
with welfare subsidies, the state also exerts excessive power over recipients. Social 
rights, especially public assistance provision (like Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) payments in the U.S.), are a mechanism adopted by the state primarily 
for the purpose of exerting “social control,” claim such critics. 
 In his essay “Social Citizenship and its Fetters,” Eric Gorham is critical of social 
citizenship, arguing that the concept does not adequately describe on-the-ground 
practices associated with the welfare state.53 Furthermore, Gorham argues that while the 
discourse of social citizenship highlights the increased participation and economic status 
of members of a community, it obscures “the increasing failure of those members to act 
in, and against, the modern state and market.”54 Welfare state policies associated with 
“social citizenship,” Gorham claims, both empower and disempower citizens. The 
accepted notion of citizenship is therefore inadequate as a descriptive of “the modern 
political subject.”  Gorham explains, “citizens must subject themselves to the procedures 
and institutions necessary to ensure that the state can continue to provide rights.”55 This 
notion of “subjection,” which I further discuss and problematize in Section IV, is fleshed 
out by Gorham as he describes the means by which the citizen, or “political consumer,” 
must learn the “correct procedure” necessary to be a citizen and access the commodities 
                                                 
53 Eric Gorham, "Social Citizenship and Its Fetters," Polity 28, no. 1 (1995). 
54 Ibid.: 27. 
55 Ibid.: 29. 
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that are on offer via civic, political, and social provision.56 Though social citizenship 
rights may meet immediate material needs, Gorham (following Foucault) argues that the 
disciplinary power of the welfare state establishes “[s]tability […] often at the prices of 
individual autonomy and self-determination.”57 Though he ultimately rejects the concept, 
Gorham’s working definition of social citizenship is one of those that take material 
resources as the barrier to autonomy. Ultimately, because it fails to offer autonomy even 
in the face of material relief, Gorham questions the conceptual and practical value of the 
concept. 
 Among the most prominent social control theorists are Francis Fox Piven and 
Richard Cloward.58 Though Piven and Cloward do not lodge any conceptual complaints 
against social citizenship per se, their depiction of the (American) social welfare state, its 
failings, and its oppressive motives suggests that they too are skeptical of social 
citizenship, as it has materialized over the past 50 years.59  Though we may think of 
social welfare services such as public assistance as directed primarily at those who are 
unemployed, Piven and Cloward argue that “poor relief” functions to exert social control 
over those in the wage labor economy too. According to Piven and Cloward, work is the 
primary mechanism for establishing order in modern societies.60 They write, “So long as 
people are fixed in their work roles, their activities and outlooks are also fixed; they do 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid.: 36. 
58 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They 
Fail (New York: Vintage books, 1979); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: 
The Functions of Public Welfare, Updated ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). 
59 In this sense, I am in a way stipulating that Piven and Cloward are offering a critique of social 
citizenship. While they might actually advocate for social citizenship broadly speaking, what I want to 
show here is that there analysis of the current (and past) state of social citizenship in the United States 
highlights what “social control” focused critiques of the concept of social citizenship have in mind. That is, 
Piven and Cloward argue that social citizenship, as it has been instantiated in the U.S., fails because it has 
at its core an impetus to control the poor, to “regulate” the poor. 
60 I return to a discussion of the ways in which “work” is conceived of in welfare debates in Chapter 5. 
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what they must and think what they must.”61 When this fixity is disrupted—when 
unemployment rates rise—disorder may ensue, and the threat of it is ever present. 
Welfare, then, serves to restore order and is the means by which the state regains social 
control.  
At the same time, the welfare enterprise also regulates citizens who are not 
current recipients of welfare. Piven and Cloward contend that in times of relative 
stability, the market may fail to provide incentives to work for all people; some have not 
been socialized fully to the “ethos of the market.”62 The welfare system attempts to 
correct this failure. Those who remain on the welfare rolls in times of stability “have been 
universally degraded for lacking economic value and ordinarily relegated to the foul 
quarters of the workhouse, with its strict penal regimen and its starvation diet.”63 By 
maintaining such terrible conditions and fostering the stigmatization that renders 
recipients of relief pariahs, the state in effect “spur[s] people to contrive ways of 
supporting themselves by their own industry, to offer themselves to any employer on any 
terms.”64 On this account, then, social citizenship in the modern state determines the 
“shape” of its entitlements in such a way that the ideal of providing material resources as 
a way of protecting autonomy becomes undesirable, indeed almost intolerable. 
The above is just a brief sample of the variations of “social control” focused 
critiques of social citizenship that exist in the literature. The key point is, however, that 
these critiques turn on the argument that, though the conventional account of social 
citizenship suggests that by providing the material resources necessary to elevate the 
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individual bearer of “social rights” to a reasonable level of comfort, the state eliminates 
the constraints that prevent her from acting autonomously, the concept itself cannot stand 
up to scrutiny. In actuality, as it provides these resources, theorists of the social control 
school argue, the welfare state necessarily also exercises, sometimes subtly and not 
necessarily through obviously “state initiated” entry points, an overwhelming disciplinary 
power over recipients of social rights related entitlements, supressing their autonomy as it 
claims to protect it.  
 
III. Social Citizenship as Passive Entitlement: The Politics of Rights and Duties 
 Unlike the previous critique of social citizenship, which tends to emerge from the 
left, another critique has found its greatest currency on the right, but also holds sway in 
the center of the political spectrum. In their early nineties review of the growing field of 
citizenship focused political philosophy, Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman outline the 
New Right critique of social citizenship that weighed heavily on supporters of the post-
war welfare state in both the United States and Britain.65 Social citizenship, they explain, 
“is often called ‘passive’ or ‘private’ citizenship, because of its emphasis on passive 
entitlements and the absence of any obligation to participate in public life.”66 Though 
advocates of the welfare state and its companion notion of citizenship traditionally argue 
that entitlements help to reconcile the inequalities created by the market and therefore 
remove barriers to the exercise of political and civil citizenship rights, critics claim that 
the promise has not been fulfilled. Explaining this charge, Kymlicka and Norman write, 
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“Far from being the solution, the welfare state has itself perpetuated the problem by 
reducing citizens to passive dependents who are under bureaucratic tutelage.”67 From 
critiques of this nature popular buzz words and phrases such as a “culture of dependency” 
and “intergenerational dependence” emerged. In turn, these phrases have been liberally 
bandied about in the debates leading up to the mid-nineties welfare reforms in both the 
U.S. and Britain. 
 Resisting the critiques of those who view social welfare provision as a threat to 
civic participation, defenders of social citizenship argue that welfare rights are indeed the 
basis for a more vibrant participatory democracy insofar as they aim to curb need.  For 
example, Desmond S. King and Jeremy Waldron focus on the account of the relationship 
between need and the political that has been prominent in what they refer to as “the 
tradition” of political theories of citizenship.68 Citing political theorists from Aristotle to 
Tocqueville to Arendt, King and Waldron point to the contention that people cannot 
participate in the polis or cannot do so well if a certain attention has not been paid to their 
material well-being.69 That is, need undermines civic politics and renders questionable 
the value of an individual’s contributions to the public sphere; “desperate need is 
conceived to interfere with the processes of reflection and deliberation that civic politics 
requires.”70 Whilst acknowledging that need is unlikely to be banished from society, King 
and Waldron nevertheless describe social citizenship rights as aspiring to remove need 
from society in order to foster adequate political debate. 
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 But this defense of social citizenship as a tool to overcome “need,” and therefore 
to provide the basis for civic participation, has been challenged by not only conservatives 
but also those to the left of center. The grounds for these critiques are not only theoretical 
but also empirical. If needs have been met, participation has not followed, and in many 
cases, needs have not been sufficiently met. Michael Ignatieff condemns critiques of 
conservative rhetoric that fail to acknowledge the genuine shortcomings of social 
citizenship as it has emerged in practice.71 The welfare state, he concedes, “did encourage 
the emergence of new styles of moral self-exculpation.”72 Despite claims to the contrary, 
“a structure of collective entitlements does not necessarily increase social solidarity,” 
writes Ignatieff.73 While acknowledging that the transfer of care-work to the state has 
freed those formerly confined to caring roles (largely women) to participate in the labor 
market, Ignatieff also notes that such a transfer may lead to a weakened sense of familial 
and community obligation. As we saw in the previous section, entitlements that purport 
to empower citizens may be accompanied by the exertion of limiting power over citizens. 
To this Ignatieff adds that such “empowerment” has rarely brought about participation or 
any other form of active citizenship: “The entitled were never empowered, because 
empowerment would have infringed on the prerogatives of the managers of the welfare 
state.”74 The tensions between the interests of the welfare bureaucracy and those of the 
so-called empowered citizen-recipient proved too weighty to bring about any genuine 
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empowerment, rendering references to “the enabling and facilitating state” that Ignatieff 
attributes to post-war social democrats contrary to empirical evidence.75 
 These critiques of the passive nature of social citizenship, then, also rely on an 
understanding of social citizenship as primarily focused on overcoming basic material 
needs in order to “enable” citizens to participate in community life and politics. The 
critics charge that first, dependency renders the recipient-citizens passive and therefore 
unlikely to participate in civil and political life, and second, the very structure of welfare 
receipt is so fraught with tensions that the bureaucracy itself tends to stifle the impetus 
and ability of recipients to participate. The latter of these critiques is related to the social 
control argument; insofar as welfare acts to pacify those who are driven to protest or 
unrest by their wants, as Piven and Cloward argue, it also drives them away from their 
duties to participate in general. Despite the differences in the two critiques I have 
discussed, they both presuppose a similar notion of social citizenship, which they go on 
to find fault with. 
   
IV. Relational Autonomy and Social Citizenship: Conceptual Clarity as a Tool   
 At the beginning of the chapter, I suggested that a revised conception of social 
citizenship ought to have a particular notion of autonomy at its center. In the previous 
two sections, I outlined two broadly conceived categories of critiques aimed at the 
concept of social citizenship. Both categories, I claim, are premised upon a similar notion 
of what exactly the target of the critique—social citizenship—consists of, in theory and in 
practice. Indeed, the critics may be construed as viewing social citizenship as a status 
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that grants individuals the rights to freedom from material constraints that may impede 
their ability to act autonomously, and therefore to exercise the rights associated with civil 
and political citizenship. Social citizenship, then, does indeed seem to turn on the concept 
of autonomy. However, my argument is that inherent in this definition are inadequacies 
in both (1) the notion of autonomy at the core of this conventional definition of social 
citizenship and (2) the conception of the conditions under which such autonomy can be 
exercised. In this section, I describe the “remedies” I propose to these inadequacies, and 
how the elaboration and discussion of such remedies can be conceived of as part of an 
ongoing process of contestation over what Nancy Fraser refers to as “the politics of 
needs-interpretation.” 
The insights of theorists of relational autonomy, which, as Marilyn Friedman notes, 
are now relatively widely accepted even by mainstream theorists, have considerable 
significance for our conception of social citizenship.76 There are two points that emerge 
here. First, if the capacity for autonomy is developed in the context of relationships, and 
if this capacity can also be disrupted, curbed, or threatened in the same context, we must 
consider not only the lack of material resources that may act as a constraint to the 
exercise of autonomy. We must also explicitly turn our attention to the provision of these 
resources and to the provision of other services, both of which will serve to constitute a 
set of especially pivotal relationships in the lives of recipients of the entitlements 
associated with social citizenship rights. Whether or not these relationships are 
appropriately structured—whether, for example, they entail relations of domination—will 
be crucial in determining their likelihood of fulfilling the goal of promoting autonomy. 
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The second point follows from John Christman’s argument: autonomy is developed in the 
context of a complex mixture of resources, extending well beyond material resources 
(though they are certainly important). Christman, writing in defense of the closely related 
concept of positive freedom, explains:  
Seeing freedom as more than a set of opportunities created by removing 
constraints from the path of thought and action […] is to set out a view of human 
agency as a set of powers and abilities, ones regarding the development and 
expression of authentic and effective self-government. Certain political 
institutions and policies may well remove or minimize constraints faced by an 
agent but do nothing to establish or protect those powers.77 
 
Specifying a relational conception of autonomy as central to this conception of social 
citizenship, then, is critical in defining the contours of what social citizenship rights will 
look like. If social citizenship is concerned with ensuring the ability of individuals to act 
autonomously, the rights associated with it will look significantly different depending on 
what we mean by autonomy. 
 The second point discussed above—the implications of a relational notion of 
autonomy for our understanding of what resources are required in order to facilitate the 
development of that autonomy—is closely linked to the second of the two “inadequacies” 
I described above. The conventional notion of social citizenship, I argue, inadequately 
theorizes the conditions under which autonomy is developed. Political scientists and 
policy analysts have devoted considerable attention to the question of service delivery; 
ranging from considerations of the plausibility of a just welfare system given the vast 
bureaucracy of many welfare states, to more specific, empirical questions about the levels 
of accountability and discretion required of a successful (however it may be defined) 
system, these analyses place service delivery high on the list of relevant concerns for 
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questions of social rights.78 But political theorists examining normative theoretical 
accounts of social citizenship rarely develop a clear account of what service delivery 
ought to look like if it is to be consistent with the goal of fostering autonomy. This 
concern, I argue, must be accounted for in a theory of social citizenship. 
 This discussion of the role of autonomy in the conception (and practice) of social 
citizenship is, I want to argue, congruent in some ways with Nancy Fraser’s discussion of 
the politics of needs interpretation.79 Fraser wants to shift our focus from the discussion 
of needs to a discussion of the “discourses of needs, from the distribution of need 
satisfactions to ‘the politics of need interpretation.”80 The particular salience of “need” to 
this discussion in general is an important point that I will return to in greater detail in the 
next section when I respond to critics in the “duties and obligations” category, as 
discussed above.  I do, in fact, want to think of autonomy as a unique type of need, but 
also as a key instrument in the very politics of “needs interpretation.”  But for now, I turn 
to Fraser’s argument aims to help us generate a helpful framework for further 
distinguishing the conventional conception of social citizenship from the one I am 
proposing. 
 Fraser divides the politics of needs interpretation into “three analytically distinct 
but practically interrelated moments.”81 Keeping in mind the interrelation of these 
moments, we can identify the contours of a discussion of social citizenship within the 
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framework of Fraser’s “moments.”  The first moment is a struggle for validation of a 
need; it is the pursuit of “political” status (or some other status) for the need.  In a sense, 
Marshall’s conception of social citizenship does this with regard to autonomy; Marshall’s 
notion of social citizenship highlights the importance of autonomy to both inclusion in 
the political community and to the exercise of rights, both explicitly social (i.e. welfare), 
and those related to the other types of citizenship he discusses, political and civil 
citizenship.  
The second moment Fraser describes revolves around “the struggle over the 
interpretation of the need, the struggle for the power to define it and, so to determine 
what would satisfy it” (202). It is within this moment that I want to situate both the critics 
of social citizenship I refer to above and my own discussion here.  While I argue that 
there is general agreement about the centrality of autonomy to questions of social 
citizenship, there is not only disagreement over, but also a lack of clarity regarding the 
meaning and place of “autonomy” in the context of social citizenship.  Moreover, the 
contested nature of needs interpretation that Fraser brings to our attention points to the 
fact that when we consider the concept of social citizenship, we must be very clear about 
the meaning of autonomy, who constructs this meaning, and what interests such 
meanings serve.  Fraser argues that analyses of needs that appeal unquestioningly to 
“socially authorized forms of public discourse” often “neglect the questions whether 
these forms of public discourse are skewed in favor of self-interpretations and interests of 
dominant social groups and, so, work to the disadvantage of subordinate or oppositional 
groups.”82  Indeed, conceptions of autonomy that do not take into account its relational 
character often presuppose an image of the autonomous individual that is exclusionary 
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along various axes. Even if we would not necessarily associate the critics above with 
such an outlook, the conventional account has infected their interpretations in such a way 
that, intentionally or not, has exclusionary implications. Such a conception of autonomy, 
where it shapes the ideal of social citizenship, may arbitrarily (or even pointedly) limit 
the potential for policies associated with social citizenship to genuinely do the work of 
fostering autonomy.  This “work,” as it were, helps to expand the category of individuals 
who will be both recognized as autonomous, and genuinely enabled to develop 
autonomy. 
 
V. Responding to the Critics: The Normative (and Practical) Implications of 
the Model 
 The account of social citizenship developed in Part IV provides a normative basis 
for responding to the critiques of social citizenship outlined above.  That is, this account 
in and of itself clearly cannot remedy the practical problems of contemporary welfare 
states; a theoretical conception cannot serve as the antidote to the shortcomings and 
antipathies that exist in service delivery, political culture, and resource allocation.  
However, as a benchmark—a way to measure whether in fact the welfare state is 
providing the services and resources necessary to genuinely afford all members of the 
community the status of social citizenship—this revised conception, I argue, can help us 
to evaluate and therefore work towards remedying the problems of contemporary welfare 
states.  In this sense, both critiques leveled against the welfare state that I have discussed 
above can be challenged when the target of the critique is the ideal of social citizenship, 
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in its reconstituted form.  The critiques, then, no longer point to flaws in social 
citizenship as a concept, but to incomplete realizations of the ideal of social citizenship.  
i. Social Control 
The critique of social citizenship that expresses concern over the potential (or, 
some argue, necessary) coincidence of social rights and social control is on one level 
relatively easily displaced by our revised notion of autonomy. First, let’s quickly rehearse 
the critique, where the conventional conception of social citizenship remains in place. 
Gorham argues that in order to attain the entitlements associated with social citizenship, 
recipients are subject to the disciplinary forces of the welfare state bureaucracy that 
coercively motivate them to conform to whatever qualities it has deemed appropriate for 
the subjects of social welfare benefits to embody. That is, social citizenship rights, which 
provide the material resources necessary to alleviate constraints on the exercise of 
autonomy, are accessible only to the “good” recipient—the individual who conforms and 
acquiesces to the demands of the disciplinary state. Thus, Gorham argues that social 
citizenship has an inherent contradiction in it: in order to attain autonomy via social 
citizenship rights, an individual must also sacrifice her autonomy. He writes, “the 
stability that permits the exercise of liberty for the citizen,” that is, the material resources 
provided by the state, “also holds the subject in a network of tutelary power constituted 
by school, psychiatry, social work, etc.”83  
 However, when we revisit this critique wielding the revised conception of social 
citizenship, the contradiction is no longer sustainable. Social citizenship rights now refer 
to something well beyond material resources provision; these rights refer explicitly to the 
provision of services and resources that actively foster (relational) autonomy. Therefore, 
                                                 
83 Eric Gorham, "Social Citizenship and Its Fetters," Polity 28, no. 1 (1995): 36. 
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if social citizenship rights are realized only in conjunction with social control, the notion 
itself is incoherent. We cannot refer to a system as engaged in advancing social 
citizenship status if it provides a monthly check to a single mother, but also dictates, for 
example, how she will conduct her intimate relationships and what counts as “work” for 
her. Such a system clearly violates the single mother’s ability to live according to her 
own ‘law’—to act autonomously.84 Furthermore, suppose the services—the check or 
whatever else—are delivered in a way that reproduces relations of domination, simply 
with regard to the professional-client relationship established in welfare offices, or 
extending to other relations of power, including those organized along lines of gender, 
race and sexuality. In this case, our revised model highlights the extent to which these so-
called social rights fail to develop the relationships out of which the capacity for 
autonomy is always partially constituted. Instead, the relationships extant in the service 
delivery context are particularly constraining with regard to the development of 
autonomy. Indeed, in our society, characterized as it is by ongoing inequalities and 
discrimination, many individuals and families who are compelled to rely on entitlement 
based programs are already subject to relations of domination in various aspects of their 
lives and may therefore be particularly in need of the (relational) resources needed to 
assist them in developing the capacity to act autonomously.85  Thus, the contradiction that 
                                                 
84 This is not to say that all attributes of conditionality that may be found in a given welfare system are 
disqualified. Only perhaps a system of guaranteed annual income would achieve this, but it would fail on 
other fronts I cannot discuss here. The point is simply that any social rights must be evaluated not only on 
whether they provide material resources but on whether (in this case) the conditions accompanying these 
resources foster or hinder autonomy competency. 
85 I do not mean to claim that certain classes or categories of people are “less autonomous” than others by 
nature, or even by virtue of their social location. However, on my account of autonomy, there is reason to 
believe that those who have been subject to recurring and sustained experiences of domination may be 
more likely to have been limited in their abilities to develop and exercise the capacity for autonomy. See 
further Marilyn Friedman, "Autonomy and Male Dominance," in Autonomy and the Challenges of 
 52  
  
Gorham, and to an extent Piven and Cloward, point to in their critique of social 
citizenship, is no longer a contradiction in the concept, but a failure to realize the 
requirements of the concept itself. 
 While the more overt forms of social control that Gorham and Piven and Cloward 
point to are relatively easily excluded from the revised conception of social citizenship, 
some theorists point to more subtle forms of coercion that may in fact operate by 
“enabling” citizens, rather than overtly constraining them. Barbara Cruikshank cites 
Foucault’s notion of bio-power in explaining the ways in which welfare “is a form of 
government that is both voluntary and coercive.”86  That is, the simplistic view that 
welfare necessarily dominates and controls recipients in an entirely coercive fashion is 
put to the side, in favor of a model that points to a much more subtle and, in some sense, 
insidious form of power. Cruikshank explains, “welfare recipients are not excluded or 
controlled by power so much as constituted and put into action by power.”87 Foucault’s 
bio-power helps her to elucidate this mode of working through rather than against 
citizens “agency”; “Instead of excluding participation or repressing subjectivity, bio-
power operates to invest the citizen with a set of goals and self-understandings, and gives 
the citizen-subject an investment in participation voluntarily in programs, projects and 
institutions set up to ‘help’ them.”88 
Cruikshank’s model of what she refers to as “relations of empowerment” may 
sound a lot like the ideal of social citizenship as explicitly seeking to foster autonomy 
                                                                                                                                                 
Liberalism: New Essays, ed. John Philip Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
86 Barbara Cruikshank, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1999), 38. 
87 Ibid., 41. 
88 Ibid. 
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that I have laid out. However, as the scare quotes around the word “help” in the previous 
quotation might tip us off to, she is wary, even cynical, about the prospects of this 
empowerment. While Cruikshank claims, first, that her conception of the will to 
empower is “neither clearly liberatory nor clearly repressive,” and second, that 
“empowerment is a power relationship, a relationship of government; it can be used well 
or badly,” she focuses most on the destructive possibilities empowerment affords.89 
Claims to empowerment, she seems to suggest, may create a self-understanding of 
autonomy and self-sufficiency within recipients, but since empowerment is necessarily a 
power relationship, these “self-understandings” emerge from what she calls “technologies 
of citizenship.”  Technologies of citizenship that operate on the basis of the knowledge 
culled by “experts” that seek to “know” the target of empowerment and construct a 
particular kind of subjectivity among them that, Cruikshank believes, still fits a model 
determined by the state to be worthy of the status of citizenship. The question is, then, 
whether such a mode of empowerment, still so fraught with power relations and 
prescriptive forms of agency, can be thought of as fostering autonomy.  
 While Cruikshank’s argument here is convincing in some respects—it serves us 
well to recognize the always-already present power relations that must surround even 
projects of “empowerment”—it also seems to foreclose the possibility of actually 
fostering autonomy, and it does so without showing us any way out. Furthermore, it in 
some ways reverts back to an individualist model of autonomy, rather than a relational 
one. For Cruikshank, the project of empowerment is always suspect because embedded 
within it are relations of power that can never simply stand by neutrally. Empowerment 
also means exercise of power over some individual(s). Yet, this also seems to indicate 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 72, 86. 
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that no one can truly be empowered from without—that relationships that claim to assist 
us to develop our capacities for autonomy are always somehow suspect. Is it the case, 
then, that for an individual to be “truly” autonomous, her capacities must develop in a 
vacuum?  The paradox, then, is that autonomy cannot be developed in isolation and 
where it is developed in the context of social relations, it is not really autonomous. But 
the latter option is also unsatisfying. In specifying a relational account of autonomy, I 
have already rejection a notion of autonomy as “perfect independence.” But seeking to 
provide services that enable individuals to better or more easily choose their own life 
paths, even in the context of dependency, remains, I believe, a realistic and necessary 
pursuit, especially with regard to feminist concerns. Thus, the revised conception of 
social citizenship that I have suggested here responds to Cruikshank’s concerns insofar as 
it highlights relations of power endemic to the delivery of welfare services, but it does so 
without foreclosing the possibility for autonomous agency.  Rather, it helps us to 
distinguish configurations of relationships that hinder autonomy from those that enable 
autonomy.  
ii. Duties and Obligations 
 There are two grounds on which to address the concerns of critics of social 
citizenship who express worries about the effects of welfare receipt on individuals’ 
fulfillment of obligations to the state, or more broadly, their engagement in the polity as 
duty-bearing members of a community. The first point of departure takes us back to the 
question of needs. While Ignatieff claims that need-satisfaction is no guarantee of civic 
engagement, and in fact often renders citizens passive, King and Waldron counter that it 
is by virtue of the removal of needs that citizens become more likely and better 
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contributors to the polity. The second point of departure more broadly addresses the 
relationship between autonomy and community engagement and obligations. Autonomy, 
I argue, is a necessary condition for the capacity to fulfill obligations and duties. 
 King and Waldron, following Arendt’s concerns about need, argue that social 
citizenship, insofar as it is able to eliminate the most desperate of need through the 
provision of material resources, protects autonomy and therefore renders individuals 
more able to participate in politics. The Arendtian line, they note, is that not only does an 
individual’s own desperate need make it difficult to call upon the public spiritedness 
necessary for effective political participation, but it also hinders other, non-needy, 
individual’s abilities by invoking in them the apolitical sentiment of compassion.90 
However, I do not think the aim of eliminating need from the public sphere is a desirable 
or plausible one. To seek out an end to “need” as a way of overcoming the particularity 
and potential irrationality of participation in civic politics obscures our constant and 
inevitable state of human interdependence, which must always imply some sense of need. 
Furthermore, this argument has the effect of marginalizing from civic politics those who 
have particularly obvious or pressing needs, those who are “dependent” in ways that 
come to be highlighted in the context of our society, and those who care for “needy” 
individuals.  This points back to the politics of needs-interpretation I discussed above.  
Politics is very much about needs; not only welfare politics, but much of our political 
discourse hinges in some way or another on questions of needs and needs interpretation . 
Therefore, to try to vanquish need from the politic sphere is to claim that we can initiate 
interpretations, make arguments, and take decisions with regard to needs, all without 
                                                 
90 Desmond S. King and Jeremy Waldron, "Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare 
Provision," British Journal of Political Science 18, no. 4 (1988): 428. 
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acknowledging that such need is ever present in all of our lives, including in politics. 
Allowing those who are “needy” into the public debate—and such need does not have to 
be “desperate” and therefore impairing of our decision making abilities—is essential to 
rendering the politics of needs-interpretation inclusively “political,” rather than 
dominated by the voices of those who claim to transcend need. Thus, need itself is a valid 
point from which we might fulfill our obligation to participate in politics and from which 
we may better be able to identify with other members of the community. 
 The politics of need and its relationship to duties and obligations also returns us 
once again to the centrality of relational autonomy to our conception of social citizenship. 
The wariness we may have in the face of need is very much related to the dominant sense 
in our society that dependence is undesirable and threatening to the “impartiality” that is 
demanded of “good” political participants. As Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon  describe 
in their genealogy of the term dependence, “[i]n the age of democratic revolutions, the 
developing new concept of citizenship rested on independence; dependency was deemed 
antithetical to citizenship.”91 This sense of dependence as incompatible with citizenship 
remains in place today. Furthermore, note Fraser and Gordon, dependence has been 
pathologized and reduced to an individualized affliction, rather than a product of social 
relations and a “condition” that affects virtually all of us. Need is seen as putting us in a 
perpetual state of dependence, and therefore banishing us from civic participation. But 
the relational conception of autonomy is especially important in highlighting the extent to 
which autonomy and dependence are not antithetical; since autonomy develops in the 
context of relationships, interdependence is not only compatible with autonomy, it is a 
                                                 
91 Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, "A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare 
State," in The Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Ellen K. 
Feder (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 19. 
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necessary condition for the development of autonomy. Since the autonomy that we now 
seek to cultivate via social citizenship is “relational,” the notion that both need and 
dependence compromise one’s ability to act as an autonomy citizen is rendered 
incoherent.   
 Finally, the aim of social citizenship both under the revised formula and the 
conventional one is related to autonomy; autonomy is seen as a precondition for 
exercising the rights associated with citizenship. But some theorists argue that a focus on 
rights is in itself atomizing, leading to a diminished sense of community and, indeed, a 
sense that other community members are primarily entities that threaten to infringe on 
our rights. Thus, “fellow” citizens are seen not in a solidaristic sense, but as jeopardizing 
our autonomy. Now, clearly the relational conception of autonomy rejects the claim that 
social relationships in and of themselves threaten our autonomy. But what of rights?  
Isn’t the language of rights counter to the language of duties and obligations?  Although I 
cannot launch a defense of rights here, I do want to point to an alternative way of 
thinking about rights as a potentially fruitful way of resisting this opposition between 
rights and duties. Martha Minow  argues that we should think of rights as embedded in 
and constitutive of relationships. Thus, to briefly highlight an implication of this way of 
thinking, Minow writes, “[b]y invoking rights, an individual or group claims the attention 
of the larger community and its authorities.”92 But, Minow explains, the rights claimant 
not only claims attention in an abstract sense, she reaffirms her connection to the 
community. “At the same time,” Minow notes, “this claim acknowledges the claimant’s 
membership in the larger group, participation in its traditions, and observation of its 
                                                 
92 Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 293. 
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forms.”93 This is especially true if we think of claims to social citizenship rights as claims 
to the opportunity or possibility to develop the capacity to act autonomously, a capacity 
through which one is able to become—and to become recognized94 as—a full member of 
the community. It is only in making this claim that the possibility for fulfilling ones 
duties to the community can emerge. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Social citizenship rights, though under attack for several decades now, are worth 
standing up for. In order to pursue an inclusive and just society, we should seek to 
provide all members of the community with the social welfare services necessary to 
ensure that they may access and exercise full citizenship rights. But, if we are to defend 
this notion of social citizenship rights, we must be clear about what such rights entail and 
what form they will take on the ground in order to fulfill their promises. The conventional 
conception of social citizenship as a status that grants individuals the rights to freedom 
from material constraints that may impede their ability to act autonomously, and 
therefore to exercise the rights associated with civil and political citizenship, leaves open 
the possibility of charges of incoherence and contradiction. Because this conventional 
conception of social citizenship presupposes a notion of autonomy that does not take into 
account the social relationships from which this capacity emerges, it cannot adequately 
conceive of what must be present in order not only to protect autonomy but foster its 
development. The revised conception of social citizenship that I propose in this chapter 
suggests that social citizenship rights should explicitly seek to provide the services that 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
94 See discussion of ascriptive autonomy in later chapters. 
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are necessary to foster the capacity for autonomy. Because this capacity is a product of 
well-structured relationships, social citizenship rights must be particularly focused on 
enacting social service provision that is conducive to this development; where relations of 
domination or other constraining relations are prevalent in service delivery situations, 
autonomy cannot flourish. In the following chapters, I explore further what such 
relationships might look like in the context of service delivery and how a state that 
facilitates and maintains such service delivery relationships – an autonomy-fostering state 
– can be theorized. 
Given this revised conception of social citizenship (and given the case studies that 
follow), I argue that assertions that social citizenship must always masquerade as social 
control or that social rights claims hinder citizens’ sense of obligation and duty are no 
longer salient. Though on the ground instances of social control and limitations on 
obligation may well continue to exist and even thrive at this moment in welfare state 
development, a revised conception of social citizenship allows us to identify these 
problems as failures to live up to social citizenship rather than failures within the concept 
of social citizenship itself. Furthermore, as a benchmark or ideal, this conception of social 
citizenship helps point the way to the strategies and solutions necessary to remedy the 
practical problems extant in today’s welfare states. 
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“Coordinated Fragmentation” and Domestic Violence Services 
 
I. Introduction 
Together, two important strands of recent work in feminist political theory point 
to the need to reconsider the structure of the relationship between the state and the 
(gendered) citizen. First, as I explore throughout the dissertation, feminists have 
challenged individualistic notions of autonomy that ignore the constitutive role played by 
social relationships in its development and exercise. Second, an increasing appreciation 
of the complexities of the state has emerged in feminist work, with monolithic 
interpretations of the state increasingly falling out of favor.95 Insofar as the relationship 
between state and citizen is one of those constitutive relationships highlighted by the 
feminist relational account of autonomy, the now more nuanced feminist accounts of the 
state should consider the possibilities for autonomy-enabling relationships to emerge. We 
need an alternative theory of the state in order to integrate the relational account of 
autonomy with the various other complexities now highlighted in feminist accounts.  
In this chapter, I conceptualize the state as a fragmented and plural entity 
comprised of various “loosely coupled”96 arms that are sometimes in conflict with one 
another. Given this conceptualization, the notion of a “coordinated fragmented” state 
                                                 
95 A recent, prominent example of new feminist theorizing of the state is Cruikshank (1999). 
96 See Haney (2000), who appropriates this term from work by criminologist J. Hagan, in which he 
conceives of the criminal justice system as a series loosely coupled subsystems. See Section IV below. 
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helps us to understand the dynamics that may, or may not, enable the state to foster 
autonomy, where autonomy refers to an individual’s capacity to determine his or her own 
life plans. I come to this understanding of the state by examining a particular mode of 
service delivery for survivors of domestic violence, “coordinated community response” 
(CCR) programs. CCRs, I argue, take advantage of the tensions inherent in the state in a 
way that allows them to foster autonomy more effectively than conventional forms of 
service delivery. In articulating this vision of the state through an analysis of how CCRs 
can effectively harness its multiple and contradictory aims, I also describe a larger notion 
of what I refer to as the “autonomy-fostering state,” a normative (and sometimes 
descriptive) conception of the state as a set of fragmented but coordinated arms that may 
work together to foster autonomy in our most vulnerable citizens. In the context of such a 
state, as the CCR model shows, feminist commitments to particularity and partiality have 
the potential for realization. Moreover, within the multiplicity that defines CCRs, a 
balance is struck between the care-oriented aspects of the state97 and those more 
committed to notions of impartial reason. This balance is made effective partly because 
of the mechanisms of self-critique extant in the fragmented coordinated state – 
mechanisms that can be responsive to feminist critiques of impartiality and universalism. 
Though many feminist accounts of the state reject the view that sees it as purely a 
constraining means of social control, Wendy Brown is skeptical of feminist projects that 
call upon the state to support their emancipatory aims.98 Even as the distribution of power 
and resources has shifted to alter the relationship between individual men and women in 
our society, Brown suggests, the state has come to wield great (masculinist) power over 
                                                 
97 For discussions of “care” see for example: Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982; Feder and Kittay 2002; 
Noddings 1984; Tronto 1993; White 2000. 
98 Brown 1992.  
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women’s lives, rendering “male” power potent as ever. Yet, by framing the state as 
necessarily threatening to women’s autonomy, views like Brown’s all but rule out the 
possibility of an autonomy-enabling relationship between state and citizen and lose sight 
of the intricacies revealed by a relational approach. The notion of the “coordinated-
fragmented state” is conversant not only with theorists who recognize the complexities of 
the state, but also provides one of the tools necessary to take on the challenge presented 
by theorists like Brown. 
The issue of domestic violence is a particularly appropriate location at which to 
theorize this revised notion of the state and service delivery. For many years, feminists 
struggled to move the issue of domestic violence from the “private” sphere to the 
“public.” Though this struggle has proven successful—the state recognizes domestic 
violence as a serious public offense and pursues and punishes offenders in this vein—the 
appropriate role of the state in the lives of women survivors is still a contentious issue. 
The fear that increasing women’s dependence on the state for protection may imperil 
women’s autonomy is widespread in both academic work and within the movement 
against domestic violence. I offer an approach to theorizing the state that helps us to 
reconcile state intervention and relational autonomy without forgoing the important aim 
of publicizing domestic violence.  
 CCRs encompass “a system of networks, agreements, processes, and applied 
principles created by the local shelter movement, criminal justice agencies, and human 
service programs.”99 This system is built around a community approach to domestic 
violence that draws upon multiple resources, including police, legal practitioners, housing 
services, financial and employment services, advocacy services, and mental and physical 
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health services. Advocates of this model suggest that without such coordination, 
“batterers will take advantage of the fragmentation, misunderstanding, and bias of the 
criminal justice system to avoid prosecution and subsequent consequences for their acts 
of violence, often further isolating, manipulating and controlling their victims in order to 
do so.”100 In contrast, CCRs acknowledge and respond to the systems of power relations 
service users are embedded in, which may compromise autonomy.  
 In order to elucidate the nature of this distinctive mode of service delivery as well 
as the notion of “fragmented coordination,” I will proceed as follows. Section II lays the 
groundwork for the rest of the chapter as I lay out a relational account of autonomy and 
present a broad account of the coordinated-fragmented state. Section III describes 
coordinated community response programs. Section IV recapitulates the debates over one 
particularly controversial aspect of CCRs: mandatory arrest and prosecution policies, 
which require that all cases with sufficient evidence proceed through the criminal justice 
system. These debates highlight the perceived conflict between publicity and autonomy 
in the context of service delivery. Moreover, they bring to the fore the distinction 
between a substantive and procedural account of autonomy. Whereas procedural accounts 
of autonomy usually require only certain processes of self-reflection or higher order 
endorsement of preferences, substantive accounts of autonomy require that autonomous 
action be consistent with certain normative conditions, for example those that are 
consistent with the value of autonomy itself. Finally, focusing in particular on the balance 
that emerges between ethics of care and justice under this model, Section V explains how 
CCRs put the notion of fragmented coordination into practice, and therefore effectively 
foster autonomy. 
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II. Complicating Autonomy and the State  
In order to conceptualize the autonomy-fostering state we must rethink 
conventional notions of not only the state but also autonomy. Moreover, it is not only 
dominant narratives of the atomistic, unencumbered individual located within a 
supposedly neutral, universalizing state that must be called into question, but also some 
of the more severe feminist critiques of the state and the notions of autonomy that are 
implicit in these critiques.  
 Questions regarding domestic violence services bring debates over the 
relationship between intervention, non-intervention, and autonomy to the fore – debates 
that lie at the center of my concerns with a relational conception of autonomy in this 
dissertation. Some writers suggest that the publicization of domestic violence and the 
ensuing intervention of the state severely limits women’s autonomy. For some, such a 
loss is a price that must be paid for the now public treatment domestic violence receives, 
while for others it is intolerable. However, such an analysis mistakenly equates autonomy 
with privacy; the erection of boundaries around the individual is seen as a viable means 
to achieving autonomy.101 But, whereas autonomy is best understood as developed in the 
context of relations to others,102 this boundary-focused notion of autonomy reproduces an 
untenable and unrealistic notion of atomistic man. In addition to obscuring the 
fundamentally interdependent nature of human beings, it also suggests the desirability of 
what can plainly be seen as both impossible and undesirable: existence in a vacuum that 
somehow entirely restricts incursions into any and all aspects of the individual’s life. 
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In contrast to this unrealistic notion of autonomy, the contextual and relational 
conception of autonomy that emerges from the feminist critique is the basis for Marilyn 
Friedman’s understanding of an autonomous person as “one who has these capacities [for 
autonomy] and exercises them at least occasionally.”103 For example, the experience of 
being a survivor of domestic violence or of finding oneself compelled to conform to 
certain regulations established by the state (even contrary to one’s will) at some point 
during one’s life does not exclude the possibility of an autonomous life, “one lived by 
someone who has the capacities for autonomy and is able to exercise them frequently 
over a substantial stretch of time.”104 Indeed, in the case of the state’s regulations, this 
instance of coercion may ultimately make the “autonomous life,” as Friedman defines it, 
more feasible.  
 What kind of state can actively foster such a relational notion of autonomy? For 
an important aspect of such a revisioned state, I turn to sociologist Lynne Haney. She 
takes up a concept used by criminologist John Hagan in his analysis of the state: the state 
as a “loosely coupled system.” Trying to make sense of the conflicts, tensions, and even 
contradictions replete in the modern state, she argues that feminists can use this notion to 
“make sense of the diversity of gender regimes within particular state apparatuses.”105 
This helps us to see the state as a series of different arenas linked more or less tightly to 
one another. Haney’s objective is to urge feminists to theorize “the nature of the links 
within state subsystems,” complicating feminist state analysis beyond models oriented, 
for example, wholly toward a “social control” model of Brown’s masculinist state. I 
argue that in some cases it is the “looseness” of the linkages, visible by way of 
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conflicting perspectives in a given mode of service delivery, that serves to foster 
autonomy more effectively than is possible within more tightly bound systems. The latter 
systems may not have the mechanisms to mediate the types of tensions that are 
particularly relevant for questions of autonomy. 
Using Haney’s concept of “loose coupling” alongside my analysis of the workings of 
the “linkages” that comprise these couplings, we can begin to configure a feminist theory 
of the (autonomy-fostering) state. This theory runs contrary to the model of the state as 
primarily or solely an agent of social control and male dominance, a model that has led 
some feminists to be reluctant to view the state as an ally in feminist struggles. Though 
individual power relations between men and women have shifted, social control theorists 
like Brown claim that the effects of “male” power have hardly been neutralized. Brown 
writes, “[the state] mediates or deploys almost all the powers shaping women’s lives – 
physical, economic, sexual, reproductive, and political – powers wielded in previous 
epochs directly by men.”  The state’s various arms, she writes, are collectively involved 
in a “politics of protection,” an exclusionary system of regulation that hinges on the claim 
that women require the protection of men. This protection, she charges, provides women 
with a choice between the arbitrary force of violence, harassment, discrimination, 
deprivation, and a host of other typically gender-based forms of oppression on the one 
hand—not the least of which is domestic violence against women—and what she refers 
to as “rationalized, procedural unfreedom” on the other hand. Given these circumscribed 
options, Brown argues that that to turn to the state to foster the autonomy of (vulnerable) 
women is inherently misguided; it “involves seeking protection against men from 
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masculinist institutions, a move more in keeping with the politics of feudalism than 
freedom.”106 
On Brown’s account, the nature of the domination exerted by the masculinist state 
is equally if not more constraining than the oppression women have long faced at the 
hands of individual men. She argues, despite its appearance of neutrality and its 
intangible vastness, the state is a highly masculinized set of practices, institutions, and 
discourses.  Explaining what she interprets as the essentially masculinist nature of the 
state, Brown writes: 
The state can be masculinist without intentionally or overtly pursuing the 
‘interests’ of men precisely because the multiple dimensions of socially 
constructed masculinity have historically shaped the multiple modes of 
power circulating through the domain called the state – this is what it 
means to talk about masculinist power rather than the power of men.   
 
The oppressive power of the masculinist state as conceptualized by Brown is exacerbated 
by the dependence of (American women), who are, she notes, now dependent on the state 
for their survival in unprecedented numbers.107 
 Brown’s exposition of protection as the exploitation and misappropriation of 
power held over the vulnerable is deeply pessimistic; it almost entirely closes the door to 
state-centered solutions to women’s subordination. Rather than abandoning the state as a 
source of protection, where protection can never be a conduit to liberation, I argue that 
we might instead reconsider which practices we include as “protection,” in particular 
insofar as protection can be read in relation to the explicit enablement of the capacity for 
autonomy. Despite the ways in which “protection” has manifested itself in the 
masculinist arms of the state to date, elsewhere in the complicated and plural state we can 
                                                 
106 Brown 1992, pp. 29, 8 (emphasis in original). 
107 Brown 1992, pp. 8, 14, 7.  
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find instances of alternative manifestations of protection. Domestic violence emerges as a 
poignant example of where the need for protection is evident, while the possibilities – 
especially when we examine the model of the CCR – for autonomy fostering, even in the 
context of dependence, can be realized. Although Brown acknowledges that the state is 
complex and has multiple functions, she does not provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the effect of this multiplicity on such appeals to the state for “protection.” I argue that the 
tensions and even contradictions between the various arms of the state, which CCRs 
acknowledge and harness, may prove useful for feminist aims, where they are exploited 
effectively.  
Pointing to the importance of conceptualizing the multiplicity of the state, and the 
configuration of this multiplicity at given points in time, Haney suggests that it is 
“fruitful to conceive of the state as fragmented and layered, with various sites of control 
and resistance.”108 With this fragmentation a productive balance emerges. Where some 
arms of the state pursue care-based forms of service delivery, others attend to more 
traditional justice-based forms, and hybrids of these forms emerge in still other arms. But 
this variety alone does not instantiate the autonomy-fostering state; rather it is a 
coordinated fragmentation that brings about such a possibility.  
The emphasis on coordination flags two important aspects of this model of the 
state. First, despite their different and contradictory aims, various arms of the state may 
adapt, evolve, or shift their modes of service delivery in response to the other arms of the 
state that they are connected with via a coordinating body, the nature of which will 
depend on the particular service to be delivered. In this sense fragmentation allows for a 
plurality of approaches to service delivery, each potentially structuring their relationships 
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to the service user in different autonomy enabling configurations; coordination, in turn, 
links these different arms together in such a way that they offset one another’s (often) 
otherwise unitary understandings of the ideal approach to service delivery. Second, and 
of particular importance, the conflicts that the fragmentation of the state inevitably lead to 
are important “checks” on potentially paternalistic and confining modes of service 
delivery that may crop up within some arms. However, such conflicts only become 
“checks” in the context of some mode of coordination that institutionalizes processes of 
evaluation and resolution. With this mechanism in place, the coordinated-fragmented 
state is endowed with something like a mode of immanent self-critique. Combining 
accommodation to a plurality of approaches to service delivery, which inevitably shape 
one another, and the mode of immanent self-critique fostered by the unavoidable conflict 
of the fragmented state, a theory of the coordinated-fragmented state complicates feminist 
understandings of the state, particularly in its service-delivery role. 
While abstract in the foregoing pages, the example of CCRs developed below 
fleshes out the contours of one version of a service delivery system that, in theory, 
effectively coordinates the fragmented state; in doing so, it begins to approximate the 
ideal of the autonomy-fostering state. 
 
III. Coordinated Community Responses: From “Bad” Victims to Multifaceted 
System   
After a decades-long struggle to bring the issue of domestic violence to the 
attention of the community, removing it from the shadows of the so-called “private 
sphere” and into the domain of the state, in particular the criminal justice system, the 
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women’s movement succeeded in fundamentally changing public response to this 
gendered form of violence. By the 1980s, Melanie Shepard and Ellen Pence write, the 
movement had successfully argued that the state has an obligation to intervene in 
“personal” relationships and “private” homes, protect women from batterers, and arrest 
and prosecute batterers.109 Yet, despite these victories, advocates of battered women were 
frustrated by the lack of implementation of the state’s expanded powers. In addition to 
state actors who failed to take seriously the issue of domestic violence and held otherwise 
sexists beliefs, even those committed to taking domestic violence against women 
seriously were often disillusioned by their limited ability to prosecute such cases 
effectively. Survivors of domestic violence frequently refused to testify against their 
batterers and substantial evidence against the batterer was often hard to produce and 
defend. Although increased criminal justice intervention still represented significant 
gains, advocates were finding that the strategy often failed. 
Explaining this failure, Pence and Shepard point to the structural disjuncture 
between domestic violence as a gendered phenomenon of power and control and the 
criminal justice system as an incident- and individual-focused mechanism of achieving 
justice. As a result of this misfit, survivors of domestic violence were often seen as “bad 
victims” because “domestic assault needs to be understood in terms of ongoing patterns 
of behavior rather than as a single criminal act or incident.”110 The contextual variables 
out of which specific incidents arise are often more telling than a given incident itself. 
This coheres with an understanding of domestic violence as a systemic issue that reflects 
gender oppression in society as a whole but is instantiated in particular and concrete acts 
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of violence experienced by actual women. Cognizant that a different approach was 
required in order both to resist the social conditions that make domestic violence possible 
in our society and to foster autonomy in survivors of domestic violence—whose 
autonomy had been drastically constrained both by their relationships to their abusers and 
by the failing criminal justice system—advocates formulated an alternative approach: the 
CCR. Organized by a coordinating institutional body, CCRs attempt to overcome the 
aspects of the criminal justice system that are conceptually and practically ill-fitted to 
respond to domestic violence, where it is understood as an ongoing attempt to gain power 
and control over individual women within the context of unequal power relations, 
stratified across gendered lines.  
Pence and McMahon describe the fragmentation of agencies and individuals 
involved in domestic violence cases as a key motivating factor for the development of the 
CCR model. This fragmentation can often depersonalize and distance the case from the 
actual survivor’s experience—the woman becomes a “case”—while reproducing unequal 
power relations not only between the batterer and the survivor, but also between the 
survivor and the bureaucratic system that she is now engaged with. They write: 
“Individual women’s experiences of violence become translated into and ‘absorbed’ by 
bureaucratically sanctioned, objectifying accounts, designed for ‘case management’ and 
the control of those people who are part of ‘the case.’”  During this process, Pence and 
McMahon explain, “officially sanctioned ‘knowledge’ is expressed in terms of 
management-relevant categories and becomes part of the way power works in the 
reproduction of gender inequality.” Coordination of services, orchestrated by often 
explicitly feminist organizations such as the Domestic Abuse Intervention Program 
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(DAIP) in Duluth, aims to overcome the relations of domination exacerbated by the 
bureaucracy’s orientation towards expertise. Instead, the focus is shifted back to the 
survivors’ own experiences, in particular their safety. They explain, “The DAIP reduces 
the consequences of bureaucratic fragmentation by promoting the coordination of the 
activities of the different agencies around the practical goal of victim safety.”111  
Coordinated Community Response Programs are often mistakenly associated 
solely with mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies. These policies were 
developed in response to the limited success the criminal justice system found in 
arresting and prosecuting batterers, often because of the perceived lack of cooperation of 
survivors in the process. Seeing this problem as a result of the coercive behavior of 
batterers, most states have passed laws that mandate battered women’s participation in 
prosecution and that require police to arrest where they see evidence of assault. I describe 
this controversial aspect of CCRs in greater detail in the next section. It is important to 
keep in mind, however, that mandatory procedures are not synonymous with CCRs in 
their entirety, as is sometimes suggested. Rather, explain Pence and Sheppard, successful 
CCRs include a strong base of services for battered women.112 These include shelter and 
housing services, employment services, primary health care services, children’s 
programs, counseling, and individual, legal, and institutional advocacy, etc. These aspects 
of the CCR are administered by a variety of partners in the system, extending well 
beyond the criminal justice system, yet still acting on behalf of “the state.” 
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112 Pence and Shepard 1999, p. 13. 
74 
   
IV. Public Gains, Private Losses?  Autonomy and Mandatory Policies 
As suggested above, the nature of domestic violence has often made effective 
criminal justice intervention difficult. Many supporters understand mandatory policies as 
both a further manifestation of the shifting understanding of domestic violence as public 
rather than private and as a response to the shortcomings of conventional methods used 
by police and prosecutors. In this section, after briefly laying out the dynamics of public 
and private that have shaped the movement against domestic violence, I describe how this 
analysis is linked to the advent of mandatory policies. I consider both critiques and 
defenses of mandatory policies; the former are often founded on claims regarding affronts 
to women’s autonomy as a result of the increased role of the state, especially police, in 
women’s lives, while the latter are often founded on the claim that publicity in this and 
other cases warrants some sacrifice of autonomy. I criticize the equation of privacy and 
autonomy that seems to frame both sides’ arguments. I further suggest that attention to 
the difference between substantive and procedural autonomy, as well as to the political 
nature of individual autonomy, is important to clarifying this debate. 
In the context of the feminist argument that the public/private division renders 
domestic violence private, individual and episodic, feminists have lobbied for greater 
intervention by the criminal justice system. Supporters of mandatory policies suggest that 
they are necessary in order to both effectively uphold the state’s responsibility to respond 
to these public wrongs enacted against the community and to ensure the eventual 
elimination of domestic violence.113 On the other hand, some feminists have worried 
                                                 
113 The research on the efficacy of increased arrest and prosecution with regard to deterring future violence 
is ambiguous. A small selection among the many studies showing that pro-arrest policies are effective (in 
terms of reduced deterrence and reduced levels of violence) includes: Buel 1988; Dutton et al. 1992; Zorza 
1994; Hanna 1996. Studies and analyses showing evidence to the contrary (i.e. increased recidivism or 
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about mandatory arrest policies increasing state control of women’s lives. This latter 
concern is part of a broader claim suggesting that these policies undermine and fail to 
recognize women’s autonomy. Critics charge that, in assuming that they are best able to 
make choices and determine “life plans” for survivors of domestic violence, these 
policies are paternalistic and also reproduce the relations of domination already extant in 
the abusive relationship. Such policies assume that women’s choices to stay with their 
batterers are “wrong” and often nonautonomous choices. Critics note, however, that 
women are often correct in predicting increased violence if they leave, that they may face 
a lack of access to material resources, and that they may incur problems with child 
custody.114 Coker argues, “[a] woman who opposes prosecution is taking a calculated 
risk, as is the woman who pursues prosecution.”115 A decision to stay or desire to avoid 
prosecution can reflect autonomy, on Coker’s terms. Even where norms of adherence to 
ideals of, for example, self-sacrifice and a desire to “save” one’s partner motivate staying, 
survivors of domestic violence may be acting autonomously; that is, for Marilyn 
Friedman, they may be “living their lives in accord with norms that are evidently very 
important to them.”116 
 On the other side of the debate, many feminists argue that policies mandating 
victim participation do protect women, individually and as a group, from subsequent acts 
of domestic violence. Though they may acknowledge that these policies compromise 
autonomy, they see women’s interests and liberation as advanced by them. Cheryl 
                                                                                                                                                 
failure to deter some groups of batterers) include: Davis, Smith, and Nickels.1998; Hirschel, Hutchinson, 
and Dean. 1992; Mahoney 1991; Sherman et al 1992. See also a recent New York Times editorial by 
Iyengar 2007. 
114 On the genuine risks of “leaving” and motivation for not doing so, see also Mahoney 1991.  
115 Coker 2001, p. 826. 
116 Friedman 2003, p. 146. I will return to whether such beliefs and the actions that follow from them are 
actually “autonomous” below. 
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Hanna’s argument in favor of strong mandatory policies is framed around the 
significance of retaining the public understanding of domestic violence that such policies 
have reinforced.117 Whilst recognizing the tensions arising when state intervention is 
increased and individual women’s choices removed, Hanna defends mandatory policies 
primarily on two grounds: First, mandatory policies, insofar as they both remove the 
responsibility for action from the survivor and deny her the opportunity to choose a 
course of action, highlight state accountability for domestic violence, rejecting the notion 
that, as a private issues, individual women must deal with the problem themselves.118 
Second, publicity shifts the focus from the individual to the community by seeking to 
protect not only the woman in a given case, but also other women who may face abusers 
in the future. With regard to loss of autonomy, Hannah claims, “such an infringement on 
her liberty is necessary to protect women overall.”119 If autonomy is compromised as a 
result of this process of publicization, Hanna argues, it is worth the sacrifice.  
 Like Hannah, Friedman argues that “going public” is worth the sacrifice in 
autonomy. In the context of the social changes advocates of battered women have sought 
to make (and continue to pursue), Friedman claims, “Gaining respect for our 
autonomous—and our nonautonomous—preferences about how our abusers are to be 
treated ceases to be an overriding concern.” Rather, the publicity attained by introducing 
such measures in itself enhances women’s access to citizenship. That is, “Citizenship 
transforms violence to oneself into an injury to the community of which one is a 
                                                 
117 Hanna 1996. 
118 This parallels the larger structure of criminal law. Hanna, 1996, p. 1872 writes: “…the criminal justice 
systems serves the state; thus, prosecutors should not consider the individual wishes of abused women if 
those wishes conflict with community goals. Under this rational, mandated participation would be justified 
in any case in which prosecution is in the state’s interest,” as it would be in any type of case that reflected 
“the state’s interest.” 
119 ibid., p. 1870. 
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member.”120 Thus, Friedman concludes, “the deterrent and citizenship benefits to women 
[as a whole]” are worth the loss of autonomy such policies entail. 
i. Disentangling Privacy and Autonomy: Reframing the Debate  
On the basis of empirical evidence, it is difficult to resolve the debate over the 
utility, or perils, of state intervention in the form of mandated arrest and prosecution.121 I 
return to the question of state intervention broadly speaking in the next section. I argue 
that in the context of CCRs, state intervention, including mandatory policies, can be seen 
as autonomy fostering rather than as disempowering. But the debate over mandatory 
policies on their own highlights a problem with the frame of reference many scholars use 
to ask and respond to questions regarding autonomy, the private/public distinction, and 
state “interference.” In this section, I do not aim to resolve the debate over mandatory 
procedures; the contours of this debate have been extensively traversed, in particular in 
the law reviews. Rather, insofar as my aim is to theorize a feminist conception of both 
autonomy and the “autonomy-fostering state,” I use this controversy in order to set up the 
conception of the state I develop in the next section. By paying attention to the distortion 
of the privacy – autonomy relationship that exists even in the feminist literature, we can 
reconceptualize the state in the more nuanced manner feminist thinkers have already 
made great strides towards. 
Arguments that equate the loss of privacy with loss of autonomy when the state 
intervenes in domestic violence cases perpetuate a problematic notion of autonomy. 
Indeed, in the case of domestic violence, the irony is that such a lack of intervention has 
been deeply constraining to our ability to protect and develop autonomy. With police 
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historically treating battering as “noncriminal” and, when they did respond, rarely 
arresting the assailant, the pervading notion was that “[w]omen’s bodies were the 
province of others, and women’s bodily integrity within marriage was fictitious.”122 
Women living under this system see their autonomy compromised in order to sustain 
their partner’s autonomy. Privacy, here, is not equivalent to autonomy for battered 
women; indeed, the rejection of privacy as a shielding mechanism for the brutality of 
domestic violence against women has been a founding principle of the movement against 
domestic violence. Yet, some feminist arguments have weakened the power of such 
publicity by equating it with the (necessary, they concede) loss of autonomy. This 
argument relies primarily on a procedural view of autonomy.123 I argue that we can more 
usefully understand such interventions as mechanisms by which various arms of the state 
are engaged in the task of fostering substantive autonomy.  
Substantive views of autonomy require that autonomy be consistent with certain 
conditions that go beyond the procedural requirements of, for example, self-reflection.124 
While some strong substantive theories require that autonomous individuals have the 
capacity to direct their own lives in accordance with quite specific values or norms, 
others are less stringent, requiring that one’s autonomous decisions, preferences or 
actions be formulated or taken in accord with broader content-guidelines. For example, in 
a related account of responsibility, Benson suggests that “self-worth” is an ideal 
condition for evaluating standards of autonomy, especially in the context of oppressive 
                                                 
122 Miccio 2005, p. 269. 
123 As an anonymous reviewer notes, the proceduralist view does not commit theorists to saying that 
mandatory policies always undermine autonomy; if women endorse intervention they can be seen as 
autonomous on this view. However, it is the cases wherein women do not endorse intervention that require 
the most explanation: here I want to suggest that in some cases even where such endorsement is lacking, 
the state’s policy (and “the state,” in turn) may be autonomy fostering (and substantive). 
124 For an example of the procedural account see Friedman 2003; see also Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 
Introduction. “Self-reflection” is an oversimplification of the proceduralists account. 
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socialization.125 While self-worth may well be an appropriate substantive marker for 
discerning autonomous agency in many cases, I argue that the substance of autonomy is 
always constituted within a given political and social context. In this sense, establishing a 
specific substantive marker for autonomy may not be appropriately figured within a 
broad theory of the autonomy-fostering state. Rather, I want to endorse an alternative 
methodological approach to theorizing autonomy, one that holds that the content of 
autonomy must necessarily be established with attention to the details of a given context; 
this is especially important given the risks of a substantive approach, which, figured 
wrongly (for a particular context), runs the risk of being too restrictive or potentially 
marginalizing for certain individuals. Indeed, this account of a particular policy arena 
suggests one “space” within which the specificities of the substance of autonomy can be 
worked out. Such a methodological approach can be understood to follow a similar 
trajectory – moving back and forth between concrete intuitions and more general theories 
– to that which has been taken up by feminist theorists, in their emphasis on the relevance 
of “experience.”126 
 The importance of a substantive account, then, is vast, especially if our approach to it 
is not rooted in abstract values, but in empirical realities. A substantive account of 
autonomy gives us the tools to criticize dominant social structures – including the 
misogynistic pursuit of power and control that characterizes domestic violence – that 
constrain the exercise of and limit the development of autonomy within a given political 
context. With the focus shifted from a politics of non-intervention to one of relationality, 
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126 I am very grateful to my colleagues and mentors at the University of Michigan for their suggestions in 
formulating this approach to substantive autonomy. In particular, Mariah Zeisberg provided very valuable 
feedback on this issue. 
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the substance of autonomy comes into view within a given context, allowing us to discern 
between contexts that appear to grant “free choice”127 but maintain relations of 
domination and exclusion, and those that are genuinely supportive of autonomy.  
The need for such scrutiny is evident in the case of domestic violence. Although it is 
uncontroversial that women in battering relationships face added and intensified 
constraints on their autonomy, this does not mean that they are not or cannot be 
autonomous. Similarly, where the state’s mandatory policies are clearly coercive in many 
cases, their application does not imply that battered women who are subject to these 
policies are not autonomous. In each case, instances of coercion, domination, or 
limitation of available options compromise women’s autonomy at a given moment. Yet, 
neither negates the possibility of autonomy as a capacity developed over time that one 
exercises more or less frequently over the course of her life, nor does either case suggest 
that women cannot resist the constraints and oppression they may face.  
In the case of domestic violence, some of the reasons why survivors may object to the 
arrest and prosecution of their violent partners are a function of gender socialization that 
runs counter to the value of autonomy. Whether these survivors believe that their abuse is 
warranted, that they will be bad mothers if they leave their abusive partners, or that they 
have a duty to help their partners overcome their “problem,” we can reasonably assume 
that the pervasive gender norms that exist in our society are in some significant way 
responsible for generating such potentially self-injurious commitments. It is here that 
bringing the “substance” of autonomy into view allows us to make the alternative 
                                                 
127 Of course, entirely free choice is mythological, but I use the term here to echo the rhetoric that such 
claims take up. Rather the distinction is between always relationally situated decisionmaking processes, 
some of which are more or less constraining. 
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normative claims.128 That is, the reasons for staying reflect commitments that, in addition 
to being largely inconsistent with future autonomy, fail to reflect a number of values we 
see as reflecting a lack of autonomy (self-respect or self-preservation are two possible 
candidates among many). An examination of this context leads us, quite reasonably, to 
the intuition that they are not decisions made “freely,” nor are they decisions that impose 
constraints in the present but that imply future access to autonomy. This does not mean 
that women who subscribe to such normative commitments are to blame for their 
continued abuse or that they are guilty, incompetent mothers, or lesser citizens. On the 
contrary, the acknowledgement that autonomy is compromised when decisions of this 
nature are taken reflects a deep acknowledgement of the insidious nature of domestic 
violence as a reflection of the oppressive gender norms that exist in our society. 
 However, women’s reasons for resisting their partners’ arrests and prosecutions are 
also based on very real material circumstances that make the loss of the batterer’s income 
and child-care support a threat to the family’s livelihood, on fear of retaliation by the 
batterer, or on the concern for the well-being of their children who they view as better off 
with their fathers in their lives, rather than in jail.129 In these cases neither the choice to 
remain in the relationship nor the choice to leave, or have the batterer extricated, is 
wholly consistent with future (substantive) autonomy; both options are potentially 
threatening to autonomy.  
Despite the admittedly difficult dilemma that such an array of options poses for the 
survivor of domestic violence, it is still arguable that remaining in the battering 
relationship is most often a greater threat to autonomy than is facing the alternative 
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material or familial barriers, considerable as they in many cases are. Domestic violence 
poses a real and persistent threat to women’s lives. Research convincingly shows that 
such violence typically escalates as time passes. Approximately 30% of female homicide 
victims in the United States are killed by their current or former intimate partners.130 To 
fail to acknowledge the threat to survival that domestic violence poses is to significantly 
underestimate the seriousness of this crime perpetrated against women. Thus, although 
the reasons for staying in a battering relationship may reflect autonomy insofar as they 
are concerned with preserving future autonomy, an autonomous decision in the final 
determination should reflect a choice of the option or set of options that is most consistent 
with future autonomy, as well as with the maximal possible realization of values 
associated with autonomy, such as self-respect or self-worth. It is useful to think of 
autonomy here as existing on a continuum.131 My account of autonomy does not deny 
these acts of autonomous agency; instead it highlights the potentially greater—given 
threats to survival—autonomy possible where the batterer is removed.132 
 The forgoing analysis, then, suggests that the argument in defense of mandatory 
policies is more helpfully framed around a defense of autonomy. But such a defense only 
makes sense when we understand autonomy in the substantive sense. A procedural 
account will not provide us with the tools to distinguish between the options that are 
based on oppressive socialization and those that are not, or between those that are more 
or less autonomy fostering in the long run. Rather than equating privacy and autonomy—
a move that threatens to reproduce both individualistic notions of autonomy and idealized 
                                                 
130 US Department of Agriculture 2002. 
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132 Joseph Raz’s 1986, p. 374 account of “The Hounded Woman” provides a relevant account of the 
limitations threats to survival pose to autonomy. See also LaVaque-Manty 2001. 
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notions of privacy, both of which have historically excluded women—a focus on 
substantive autonomy as a benefit of publicization, reframes the debate in a more helpful 
manner.  
This reframing by no means resolves the dilemma posed by mandatory policies. 
Although I suggest that in most cases the negative outcomes of arrest—material and 
familial—are outweighed by the positive, there may be some instances where this is not 
the case. In some circumstances, the hardships associated with the batterer’s arrest and 
with the state’s intervention into women’s lives may indeed turn out to be extremely 
destructive—even life threatening. Such cases indicate that the state’s response is 
severely inadequate, and highlight the fact that, on their own, mandatory policies do not 
solve the problems associated with domestic violence. The next section puts mandatory 
policies back into the context of coordinated community response programs. These 
programs can contribute the resources, material and relational, that are much more likely 
to make mandatory policies tolerable and indeed to swing the balance in their favor with 
regard to concerns about autonomy (among others).  
 
V. Navigating the State: The Fragmented-Coordinated State in Practice 
Commentators on domestic violence services have noted the importance of situating 
criminal justice responses to domestic violence within a framework of community care. 
Following these commentators, I argue that the tensions associated with mandatory arrest 
and prosecution in our current social and political context, while not resolved, are much 
more readily mediated when they emerge in the context of the diverse set of services of 
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effective CCRs.133 Though they note this possibility with some optimism, few provide an 
extensive analysis of why exactly this structure is promising: why does state service 
delivery in this form promote autonomy while other modes of state intervention pose 
serious threats to women’s autonomy?  I have argued above that the potentially 
autonomy-fostering state can be realized where the fragmented state is coordinated 
effectively. Here, I flesh out this claim by arguing that CCRs are effective because, via 
coordination, they “exploit” the fragmentation of the state. Although the CCR philosophy 
emphasizes coordination, the system still represents a fragmented patchwork of programs 
and institutions rather than a unitary “state” delivering services. By bringing together 
these programs and institutions, CCRs manage to effect a balance between justice and 
care, and in turn between commitments to both impartiality and partiality. Moreover, the 
structure of this mode of service delivery reflects and acknowledges the political nature 
of service delivery. This politicization is critical to averting the threat of relations of 
domination often arising in service delivery contexts.  
i. Fragmentation meets Coordination: CCRs and the “Loosely Coupled” State 
As my analysis of mandatory policies above suggests, it is only in the context of the 
other services offered (or not offered) by the state that we can judge the value of state 
intervention in the lives of survivors of domestic violence. In this case, where CCRs are 
administered adequately, the various arms of the state, which are sometimes in conflict 
with one another, may work to create an overall system that has autonomy-fostering 
potential.  
                                                 
133 See, for example Coker 2001 and Miccio 2005. 
85 
   
Above, I briefly described some of the key tenets and institutions of the CCR; 
let’s now consider a brief sketch of their typical day-to-day workings:134  
• Jennifer and John’s neighbors telephone police to report a domestic dispute. Police  
dispatch officers to the specified location. At the scene, police review evidence and 
interview the victim and assailant; they record evidence in a specific manner and ask 
particular questions, in keeping with the protocols that have been negotiated among 
law enforcement, advocates, community members, and others. For example, they ask 
about previous instances of abuse in order to document a pattern and they note the 
presence of factors – for example John’s suicide threats or aggressive behavior 
toward household pets – that have been identified by domestic violence experts as 
evidence of “lethality” or particularly grave danger. In keeping with mandatory arrest 
policies, police arrest John because there is evidence to suggest that a domestic 
assault has taken place: Jennifer has red marks on her face and there is broken glass 
on the floor. Her story about his attack is credible and supported by this evidence.  
• Once the arrest has been made, police contact advocates from a local organization 
and pass on information about the situation. Advocates record this information and 
then make contact with the survivor. At the survivor’s home, the advocates ask her 
about the incident and the history of John’s abuse. They allow her to relate her 
experience without imposing any particular framework or narrative on it; when she 
expresses her reluctance to leave the situation because of the welfare of her children, 
advocates affirm the difficulty of the situation, while still noting that neither she nor 
her children deserve the abuse. Advocates provide her with some basic information 
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about domestic violence as well as specific information about the services available in 
her community. Jennifer indicates that she is interested in a Personal Protection 
Order; advocates make note of this and a legal advocate from the organization 
contacts Jennifer to assist her with this process the next day. In the course of their 
discussions, Jennifer notes that when the police arrived at her home, one officer was 
particularly sarcastic, commenting on the fact that she had called them on other 
occasions and yet had allowed her husband to return to the home. This upset Jennifer 
and she suggests that it made her weary of telephoning police. When John is released 
from jail on bail the next day, the jail first calls Jennifer to inform her (as agreed upon 
by the members of the CCR), then contacts advocates to provide the same 
information. Advocates contact Jennifer to check in and help her with possible safety 
planning. 
 • In days following, a coordinator reads advocates’ report on this situation, and at a 
meeting of members of the CCR she raises the issue of ongoing reports of 
inappropriate police behavior. The representative of police at the meeting pledges to 
address the issue among her staff. At the same meeting a government representative 
solicits members of the coordinating body to participate in consultations regarding 
new sentencing recommendations for domestic violence offenses.  
 
CCRs still involve arms of the state that may create exclusionary conditions through 
problematic conceptions of impartiality, and which may be paternalistic. However, as I 
suggest in Section II, the coordinated-fragmented state manages to overcome some of the 
perennial feminist critiques of service delivery by (1) accommodating a plurality of 
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modes of service delivery that influence one another and (2) providing mechanisms that 
instantiate a mode of immanent self-critique within the system. Concretely, the CCR 
model responds to feminist critiques of impartiality in two ways. First, in accordance 
with the potential influence of participating and coordinating organizations within the 
system, services under the umbrella of CCRs sometimes self-consciously act partially 
even within those institutions that conventionally understand themselves as impartial 
decision-makers. Second, in capitalizing on the fragmented nature of the state, CCRs 
support the perpetual questioning of “impartial” decisions and procedures undertaken by 
the criminal justice and legal system via a system of institutionalized self-critique 
initiated by those arms of the state that are outside the impartiality-oriented “ethic of 
justice.” In this sense, a critique of the impartiality-oriented aspects of the state is 
immanent within this mode of service delivery. Thus, CCRs also respond to a key 
concern for those who are critical of the notion of a blindly neutral or impartial state: the 
seeming elimination of the need for democratic decision-making practices and/or politics 
itself. Rather, CCRs have “politics” embedded within their framework insofar as they 
embody the negotiation, compromise, and patchwork that define politics.  
 Nevertheless, on the surface, the criminal justice aspect of CCRs—the arena of 
mandatory policies—seems at first glance to be committed to notions of impartiality, 
applying one standard to all perpetrators of domestic violence, and hence to their victims. 
It is plausible, then, that such a framework might be seen as an instance of Wendy 
Brown’s “rationalized, procedural unfreedom.”135 However, other agencies and agents 
involved in CCRs more closely approximate an ethic of care in their approach to service 
delivery, taking up an explicitly partial agenda. These institutions ideally seek to foster 
                                                 
135 Brown 1992, p. 10. 
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the relationships necessary to reintegrate women into their communities, once it is safe to 
do so. Perhaps most distinctive among the various care-based services offered within the 
framework of CCRs is the role of “advocacy” in this model of service delivery. 
“Individual advocates” offer support and guidance to survivors as they navigate the social 
institutions from which they require resources and protection from further abuse.136 
Systems advocacy is aimed at institutional responses to battered women. On both fronts, 
advocates working with and on behalf of individual survivors provide the relational 
support that helps survivors to make decisions regarding their course of action following 
a reported incident of domestic violence. An important contrast emerges here: whereas 
the criminal justice system does not permit the survivor to guide the direction of its 
intervention, advocates may endorse a contrasting, if not conflicting, form of support that 
is directed by the wishes and needs of the survivor herself. That is, although the survivor 
does not have the option to prevent arrest (at least where the letter of the law is followed), 
there are other decisions to be made – whether to get a Personal Protection Order 
(P.P.O.), whether to leave the home and enter shelter, whether to seek out legal assistance 
for possible separation or divorce proceedings, how to handle issues relating to children – 
that advocates can support in a non-coercive way, promoting women’s autonomy.  
How ought we to understand the apparent conflict between the mode of service 
delivery advocates subscribe to, and that of the criminal justice system, especially when 
these two may be closely linked within the structure of the CCR? For example, in the 
CCR responsible for Washtenaw County, Michigan, following police notification 
advocates intervene, providing support without directing the survivor toward any 
particular course of action. The training manual for advocates working in the Washtenaw 
                                                 
136 Thelen 2000, p. 1. 
89 
   
program emphasizes, “[The survivor] is responsible for her own life decisions and the 
advocate’s role is to help her tap her own strengths and abilities and to recognize and 
experience her potential as a woman.”137 There seems to be significant tension between 
this approach to non-coercive “empowerment” and the approach of police, which applies 
the mandatory policy. 
Yet, when we look more closely at the criminal justice arm of CCRs, the picture 
of mandatory arrest as an impartial policy embodying the values of impartial justice is not 
entirely accurate. Rather, recall the plural, yet mutually influencing, nature of the 
coordinated-fragmented state. In fact, there is a fair amount of (partial) attention to the 
particularity and lived experience of battered women even by the criminal justice system 
in this context. It does this insofar as it refocuses agents of the criminal justice system to 
recognize the power imbalances inherent in domestic violence cases; although still 
reflecting many of the standard philosophical stances of the criminal justice state, we 
should not ignore the extent to which by its very participation in the CCR, this arm of the 
state has acknowledged the unique power dynamic – the gendered pursuit of power and 
control – that characterizes domestic violence and requires unique responses.  
Moreover, the function of impartiality in the context of such attention to 
particularity may be somewhat different than a standard critique reveals. In the case of 
mandatory arrest, the impartiality of arrest and prosecution decisions—the mandate to 
proceed in all instances of domestic violence—actually protects the interests of the less 
powerful, namely women, by putting the weight of the state behind her rather than 
rendering her individually responsible for ending her abuse. Here, though initially 
assumed to embody aspirations to impartiality, given the feminist origins of these policies 
                                                 
137 Center 2006, p.20.   
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and the ongoing interaction between the criminal justice system and feminist advocates 
and agencies, mandatory policies may not be as rigidly committed to norms of 
impartiality as they appear. 
Another way in which CCRs complicate our notion of the power relations 
endemic to service delivery can be seen in the mechanism of systems level or institutional 
advocacy, mentioned briefly above. Here, a particularly clear picture of the dynamics of 
self-critique emerges. Thelen describes systems advocacy as “an effort to reform 
institutional responses to battered women, collectively, so that the totality of their 
experience is taken into account, leading to greater safety for victims and greater 
accountability for batterers.”138 Systems advocacy, now an important part of CCRs, has 
also helped to forge the structure of CCRs themselves; mandatory arrest, the coordination 
of various services in the community, and the overall shift of domestic violence from 
private to public, can be understood as results of systems advocacy. Insofar as systems 
advocacy has shaped CCRs since their initiation, it continues to be a critical part of 
ensuring that changes made in the legal and social service systems actually result in 
increased safety for survivors. 
Beyond the work of ensuring that survivors are able to access the services that 
enhance their safety, the structure of CCRs institutionalizes sources of criticism and 
demand for change from the system as a whole. In doing so, it also preserves a baseline 
of participatory decision-making in the system, “institutionalizing ongoing feedback from 
advocates on the effect of any reform on the victim.”139 Advocates, as the term 
“advocate” implies, are explicitly partial; as Thelen writes, their “primary allegiance is to 
                                                 
138 Thelen 2000, p. 1. 
139 Thelen 2000, p. 3. 
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the victim.”140 Advocates may not be employed directly by the state, or even where the 
funding for organizations that train and employ advocates comes from the state, they are 
generally independent agencies. Hence, from the position of their institutionalized role in 
the CCR system, advocates act on behalf of the interests of the diverse set of women they 
encounter in their individual advocacy and other work with survivors.  
In the DAIP CCR, the site of the pioneering program, Thelen’s research suggests, 
“the voice of battered women [via their advocates] at the table provides a valuable 
perspective which leads to solutions that do not pathologize her behavior but rather take 
the totality of her experience into account.”141 For example, advocates shed light on the 
reluctance of women to participate in the criminal justice system’s response to domestic 
violence, highlighting the system failures that work to make her participation an apparent 
or genuine risk to her safety and communal ties. In the Washtenaw County CCR, legal 
advocates participate in systems advocacy by monitoring the legal system and “deal[ing] 
directly with the errant individual” in the system, or where this is unsuccessful, 
consulting with supervisors and taking public action to remedy injustices in the system.142 
Through specific instances of inter-agency communication, designated “coordinating 
counsels,” one-to-one transmission of knowledge, and public action, CCRs are effective 
in part because they have mechanisms within themselves to criticize the system, often 
from very different perspectives.  
This mode of self-critique points to a larger point about this mode of service 
delivery: its political nature. Mary Asmus and Denise Gamache suggest that “victim 
                                                 
140 Thelen 2000, p. 4. 
141 Thelen 2000, p. 7. 
142 Thelen 2000, p. 10. 
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safety” should be the primary commitment of coordinating counsels.143 But, they note, 
this does not necessarily mean that the counsel (the body that “coordinates” the CCR) 
must have a “common goal.” Rather, with safety in mind, these goals are negotiated and 
modified over time as feedback from advocates, survivors, and agents of the legal system 
arises. Because of the fragmentation, albeit coordinated fragmentation, that characterizes 
this mode of service delivery, an explicitly political vision of both the state and service 
delivery emerges. The state is not a uniform entity that imposes “social control” on 
service users, nor is the mode of service delivery an already manifested structure that 
limits autonomy. Instead, both the contours of the state and the particular service delivery 
mode in operation are continually negotiated by a variety of actors. Because some of 
these actors, feminist activists among them, reject dominant commitments to impartial 
reason, their interactions with survivors may disrupt the hegemonic rational-legal 
legitimacy of, for example, the criminal justice system.144 Thus, by virtue of its political 
nature, this mode of service delivery overcomes concerns about the anti-participatory 
tendencies of impartial decision-making by promoting system-wide contestation. 
ii. Threats and Obstacles to the CCR Model 
While I have argued above that the innovative structure of CCRs effectively responds to 
some critiques of the impartial state lodged by feminists and others while forging a 
unique, autonomy-fostering relationship between the ethics of justice and care, it is 
important to note that there are numerous threats to the effectiveness of this model. First, 
the self-critique aspect of the system relies heavily on the presence of diversely populated 
                                                 
143 Asmus and Gamache 1999, p. 79. 
144 The system also attempts to take into account the potential and extant power inequalities within the CCR 
system itself through a variety of mechanisms, including the use of private meetings (excluding criminal 
justice officials) to gather feedback from community members, ongoing training and education of officials 
in the justice system, flexibility in problem-solving strategies, and so on (Asmus and Gamache, pp. 80-82). 
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institutions within the care-oriented arms of the state. Donna Coker highlights the 
importance and often limited existence of diverse advocacy. She writes, “Law and policy 
that is based on the experiences of poor women, and especially of poor women of color, 
is likely to result in reforms that benefit all battered women.”145 It is important to 
acknowledge, as well, that the self-critique function of the CCR I have described will be 
ineffective if not only the legal system, but the advocacy system too, is administered from 
the perspective of the white middle-class survivor. That is, though advocacy may mediate 
the impartiality of criminal justice for white women with material resources insofar as it 
is “partial” to them, it may fail to do so for other women, already disadvantaged in our 
society.146 
Professionalization poses a threat to the potentially radical effects of the “loose 
coupling” of state arenas described above. Haney notes, “[a]t historical junctures, when 
the political environment makes proactive demands on [a particular] state sphere, there is 
often a ‘tightening’ of the links among subsystems.”147 That is, “the system’s boundaries 
tend to tighten in an attempt to maximize desired outcomes…[or to] direct public 
attention to certain political goals.”148 Increased professionalization of advocates and 
other system actors may also result in such a tightening, which reduces the partiality that 
is crucial to the ongoing self-critique of the system.149 When the perspectives or 
orientations of service delivery personnel working within “care-oriented” arms of the 
state become increasingly close to the orientations of those arms of the state that tend 
                                                 
145 Coker 2001, p. 811. 
146 The concept of “mestiza autonomy” recently proposed by Edwina Barvosa-Carter (2007), may be a 
helpful way of theorizing the experience of minority women or women who lack class and racial privilege, 
and the multiple commitments and loyalties they may have in their communities.  
147 Haney 2000, p. 659. 
148 Haney 2000, p. 659. 
149 See for example Coker 2001, Fraser 1990, and Miccio 2005. 
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toward an ethos of universality and impartiality the advantages of fragmentation, as such, 
are lost. Professionalization may also be accompanied by a de-radicalization of domestic 
violence services and an ensuing depoliticization of the movement.150  The political 
nature of CCRs, I have argued, is crucial to their success. 
Finally, as Coker and others note, there are too few CCRs and often a lack of 
funding for the services and programs within CCRs that enable it to provide meaningful 
options to survivors of domestic violence. As I have noted, mandatory policies on their 
own do not constitute CCRs; the autonomy-fostering benefits accrued by CCRs are not 




Many feminists agree that significant gains have been made in modifying both 
societal and state responses to domestic violence over the past few decades. Yet, as with 
many other areas of state service delivery, there remain controversies about how and 
whether the state should be seen as an ally to which we ought to turn, both as theorists 
and activists, in furthering feminist aims of equality, inclusion, self-determination, and 
freedom. But, as Frances Fox Piven writes, it is not just a naïve belief in the state’s 
emancipatory potential that is problematic; “it is an undiscriminating antipathy to the 
state that is wrong.”151 That is, the constructed polarity between autonomy on the one 
hand and dependence on the state on the other is misguided. “All social relations involve 
                                                 
150 See further Garofalo and McDermott 2004. 
151 Piven 1990, p. 250. 
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elements of social control,” Piven writes, “and yet there is no possibility for power except 
in social relationships.”152 
 The model of service delivery found in coordinated community response 
programs suggests a novel way of understanding how such power can be manipulated in 
order to serve feminist ends, even when it must be garnered in the nearby presence of 
state arenas that are often understood as taking up perspectives that exclude women and 
other oppressed peoples through social control or other mechanisms. I have argued that 
when viewed through the lens of a (substantive) relational conception of autonomy, a 
perspective which I defend, CCRs suggest a model of service delivery that responds both 
to critiques of loss of autonomy in the face of publicization of what was once private, and 
to critiques of the claims to impartial reason made by some arms of the liberal state. 
Considering the most controversial aspect of CCRs, mandatory policies, I have argued 
that both critiques and defenses of mandatory policies often misguidedly suggest that in 
shifting domestic violence from the private to public sphere, feminist have sacrificed 
women’s autonomy. Rather, I suggest, we ought to frame the debate in terms of the 
state’s ability to enhance substantive autonomy via publicization and intervention. In 
making this claim, I acknowledge the hardships that arrest and prosecution of batterers 
may cause for survivors, yet I find that in most cases, these hardships are ultimately a 
lesser threat to autonomy than is the failure to hold the batterer accountable. 
 As I have shown, CCRs — and possibly other similar practices — can lessen the 
hardships. The varied elements of CCRs politically and ideologically mediate the 
conceptual tensions (for feminists) inherent in state service delivery. In particular, such 
services as individual and systems-level advocacy are delivered from a perspective that 
                                                 
152 ibid. 
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embraces a sometimes particularistic and partial approach. However, in the context of 
CCRs, even the criminal justice system self-consciously embraces partiality in some 
aspects of its work, while upholding its (aspirational) claims to impartial application of 
the law. The combination of the two ethics in the different aspects of service delivery 
under the umbrella of CCRs demonstrates how the “loose coupling” of state arenas can 
work to create mechanisms of self-critique that undermine potentially anti-participatory 
and exclusionary aspects of some purportedly neutral or impartial state policies. The 
system of service delivery found in CCRs is potentially successful in fostering autonomy 
in our most vulnerable citizens, I suggest, because of the “coordinated-fragmentation” of 
the state.  
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Embodied Recognition, Ascriptive Autonomy, and Harm Reduction  
 
I. Introduction 
 The possibilities for an autonomy-fostering state rest, as we have seen, on a 
conception of autonomy as developed in the context of social relations, which may foster 
or constrain its development and exercise. In order to further comprehend the 
complexities of an autonomy-fostering state, then, we must consider not only the 
facilitating relationships for autonomy, but also the factors and relationships that impair 
autonomy – and the remedies administered through service delivery that these constraints 
on autonomy make necessary. Chapter 3 offered an account of a model of service 
delivery for domestic violence survivors that highlighted the potentially fruitful 
implications of a “coordinated-fragmented” state, wherein the fragmentation of the 
various arms of the state can be exploited to effect a balance between alternative ethics 
(care and justice) and to instantiate mechanisms of self-critique in the system. That 
account highlighted in particular the importance of conceiving of the state as multiple and 
plural, and directed our attention to the spaces where autonomy-fostering relations 
emerge, disrupting monolithic social-control notions of the state. In this chapter I offer a 
corrective to another conceptual relationship that may hinder our ability to theorize those 
space in the state that are potentially autonomy-fostering. I turn here to the relationship 
between harm and autonomy. 
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 Intuitively, we might initially suggest that things that harm us necessarily impede 
our autonomy. A cursory reading of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty might pick up on this 
intuition, citing Mill’s contention that what makes something harmful is the limitation it 
places on our ability to determine our own ends – to act autonomously, that is. The harm 
principle, then, evaluates the extent to which such autonomy constraining factors are 
present and, in turn, the legitimacy of various actions. On this reading, we might suggest 
that autonomy and harm are connected in a zero-sum relationship: more harm, less 
autonomy, and vice versa. But a closer look reveals that this evaluation is not so 
straightforward; complications follow when we ask, for example, what counts as harm or 
who determines what counts as harm?  Moreover, what is the status of these harms when 
they are self-inflicted? The zero-sum hypothesis doesn’t appear particularly illuminating, 
nor accurate once such questions enter the mix.  
In order to better grapple with what now emerges as a complex conceptual 
relationship, I want to turn to a set of polices and practices that fall under the umbrella of 
“harm reduction.” Harm reduction is a model of response to drug use and addiction that 
seeks to minimize the harm associated with drug use, without necessarily requiring 
abstinence. With the rise of HIV/AIDS and the prevalence of other blood borne infections 
such as Hepatitis B and C, policy makers and advocates around the world have 
championed harm reduction interventions as potentially more effective than abstinence-
based or criminalizing models of “treatment.” This particular service delivery model is 
fruitful for our consideration of harm and autonomy because it explicitly and actively 
targets something going under the name of “harm.” Furthermore, users of harm reduction 
services – people who use drugs – are typical cast as non-autonomous; a closer look at 
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harm reduction philosophy, and the harm-autonomy relationship that is central to the 
theoretical foundations of this philosophy, complicates and adds important nuance to our 
understanding of autonomy, disrupting the supposed antithesis between dependence and 
autonomy. Below, I provide two divergent glimpses of each of the programs I will 
examine in this chapter; the tensions and paradoxes that exist in these services 
foreshadow both the difficulties and possibilities this case presents for theorizing the 
autonomy-fostering state, and the notion of harm that it can potential take up.  
 
Steve: In the documentary “Methadonia,” the narrator interviews Steve, who is 
attempting to come off of methadone.153 Charismatic and effervescent in earlier scenes, 
now there are tears running down Steve’s face as he experiences the withdrawal effects of 
methadone cessation, which is marked by a pained expression as he speaks to the camera: 
I feel real bad. It’s like destroying my whole life. Methadone is the worst thing 
you can get on…’cause they treat you like fucking shit once they…once they get 
you hooked. You’re nothing but a junkie. Come get your fix in the morning. And 
I want to be a normal citizen. Now I’m on 60 [ml] today. Today is when they hit 
me with 60…and I feel like shit. I’m being honest with you: I’m very suicidal 
right now. Because if I don’t have something to make me happy, to make me 
worth living for, and I’m in a lot of pain…this methadone…what, they want me to 
come back to beg and plead, “oh no I can’t take it, put me back on.”  Yes, they 
want me to do that so they can have me back! Back in their clinches…liquid 
handcuffs. But I would rather drop dead with this shit on me than ever go back. 
 
Lisa: Lisa Torres is a middle-aged lawyer and methadone advocate. In an extra feature 
on the Methadonia DVD entitled “Methadone 101,” she explains that she has been on 
methadone since she was 16 and addicted to heroin. At first, she resented methadone, 
attributing various physical ailments to her use of it and believing it to be a “crutch”: “It 
was a real badge of shame. I remember I didn’t tell many people.” 
                                                 
153 Michael Negroponte, "Methadonia,"  (USA: HBO, 2005). 
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 Despite this initial reticence, Lisa describes the evolution of her attitude toward 
methadone: 
There was no controlling my addiction…but methadone allowed me to have some 
consistency […]  [On methadone] you can have your life back. I mean you can 
literally do just about anything. And I remember going back to law school, 
allowing myself first of all to get on an effective dose. And the effective dose for 
me was a lot higher than I would have allowed myself to go before; I never 
wanted to go too high because I was just a “visitor” in methadone clinics. I was 
going to get off eventually and I didn’t want to go too high because I didn’t need 
it and all this stuff…but my effective dose was a dose at which I acquired 
blockade and I stopped getting cravings. 
 
VANDU’s Needle Exchange Program: In Vancouver, Canada, the Vancouver Area 
Network for Drug Users (VANDU), an organization consisting primarily of heroin and 
cocaine users, began operating a Needle Exchange Program (NEP) in September 2001 to 
respond to a serious limitation of extant NEPs – their early closing time (8pm). VANDU, 
which is funded in part by provincial and federal government funds, began to operate an 
unsanctioned NEP after hours, dispensing an average of 1200 syringes per night. The site, 
which, like VANDU, is virtually entirely user-run, later gained sanction. The experience 
of user-involvement is captured by one user’s description of VANDU:  
“It brings together a collective experience and wisdom, but also you begin to get a 
different feeling about yourself. To become a part of something for who I am and 
not for who I am not. For who I am as an addict, I’m poor, I’ve got Hep C, I lived 
in wretched housing and all this, and then someone says, ‘Yeah, that all makes 
you a really valuable person. You have a lot to contribute to try to help people and 
to save other lives, and your experience can do that.’ Then I get a different feeling 
about myself.”154 
 
“Operation 24/7”: At the same time that VANDU began to operate its unsanctioned but 
well-used NEP, Vancouver police mounted an intensified effort to alleviate the city’s 
                                                 
154 Thomas Kerr et al., "Responding to an Emergency: Education, Advocacy, and Community Care by a 
Peer-driven Organization of Drug Users: A Case Study of Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users 
(VANDU),"  (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Health Canada Hepatitis C Prevention, Support, and Research 
Program, 2001), 33. 
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illicit drug use problem. In accordance with “Operation 24/7,” the renewed police effort, 
“a plan to place a constant and highly visible police presence on the street corner in front 
of the VANDU NEP” was launched. Wood et. al. found that the presence of police near 
the table where clean needles were being provided produced a dramatic (26.7%) 
reduction in distribution of sterile syringes. The police ultimately shut down the VANDU 
site in 2002, alleging that criminal activities were taking place at the site. Though the 
police chief later apologized and the NEP was reopened, this incident prompted 
considerable outcry in the IDU and IDU advocate community, also commanding the 
attention of the group Human Rights Watch, which issued a report condemning the city 
and in particular the police force for its actions.155  
 
In the foregoing examples, methadone is at once a paralyzing substance that 
allows the state156 to hold clients hostage, to impose “liquid handcuffs,” and an enabling, 
even freeing mechanism that provides opiate addicts with a chance to live normal lives 
and pursue their goals. Needle-exchange programs are both a state-supported but user-run 
way of reducing harm to injection drug users while also providing a space for user 
mobilization and self-realization, and a target of the policing functions of the state who 
view the programs as challenging or violating the state’s prohibition-oriented narcotic 
control objectives. Even the users of harm reduction services, it seems, have divergent 
views of what constitutes harm, and in turn what constitutes the appropriate remedies to 
                                                 
155 Human Rights Watch, "Abusing the user: police misconduct, harm reduction and HIV/AIDS in 
Vancouver,"  (2003). 
156 Some methadone clinics in the United States are public, while increasingly more are privately owned 
and require clients to pay much higher dispensing fees. However, the state intervenes in methadone 
treatment in a sense regardless of whether it actually administers the “treatment” insofar as it regulates the 
legality of and conditions under which methadone can be dispensed. 
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harm. How, then, can we begin to understand harm, and in particular harm in the context 
of the “difficult case” (for autonomy theorists) of addiction? 
In this chapter, I want to embark on an investigation of harm that proceeds from 
three questions: What or who harms? Who experiences harm? How do they harm or 
experience harm? If we accept conventional academic and popular views of addiction, 
the answers to these questions are relatively straightforward: drugs cause harm and, since 
this harm is “self-inflicted,” drug users, too, cause harm; drug users experience the harm 
of drugs; harm is caused by physiological effects of drugs. Yet the examples above 
already suggest, and the chapter will argue, that this narrative fails to capture the multiple 
dimensions of harm. Harm, I will argue, comes in a number of forms, their implications 
for autonomy varying accordingly. While harm can be physical, it can, among other 
things, also be a result of misrecognition – of needs, of identity, of rights to citizenship 
and participation, etc. Moreover, even the physical facets of harm, as the cases below 
demonstrate, are not as clear cut as they may seem, since ideological forces always shape 
our conceptions of pain and pleasure. Although in this chapter I will argue that harm 
indeed impedes autonomy, I resist the zero-sum relationship that often follows from a 
first reading of Mill’s work on the harm principle, instead suggesting that only a 
complicated typology of harm (though I will not endeavor to provide it here) – and even 
then, one that is always open to contestation – can fully point us towards the relationship 
between harm and autonomy. Since harm takes on these various forms, it follows, I 
suggest, that the notion of an autonomous addict is not oxymoronic, but rather an 
example of the confluence of a variety of harms with other potentially autonomy enabling 
forces. Even in situations of extreme dependence, autonomy is, and ought to be, possible. 
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The purpose of theorizing harm and its relationship to autonomy via this example 
is primarily to gain ground on the larger aim of theorizing the autonomy-fostering state. 
Harm reduction programs, I argue, are a unique location at which the state can foster 
autonomy in some of its most vulnerable citizens. The central features of this model are 
elucidated when we understand both harm and autonomy as emerging out of relationships 
– personal and institutional – that are structured in various ways and manifest themselves 
in the form of various state practices. In this chapter I pay most attention to two forms of 
harm that I think are particularly relevant to the case of addiction and harm reduction 
programs. First, this case demonstrates that autonomy competency requires attention to 
embodied forms of harm. While such attention may take on straightforward material 
forms, this type of harm is also developed in a context marked by contestation and 
reinterpretation of dominant discourses of harm: the what, who, and how questions 
described above. In the case of harm reduction service users, the terrain of such 
contestation often revolves around the politics of pain and pleasure. Second, I suggest 
that successful (in the sense of “fostering autonomy,” but often on other measures, too) 
harm reduction programs respond to the harm of misrecognition by enabling a space for 
recognition not just by the state, but by the community too—especially including “peers.” 
It is only within these spaces of multifaceted recognition that a measure of “ascriptive 
autonomy”157 can be achieved in a meaningful sense. As they facilitate recognition, or 
ascription of autonomy, to service users, harm reduction programs also provide the 
mechanisms for the development of the capacity for autonomy—a capacity that may be 
underdeveloped in the context of the stigma and material constraints of addiction. 
                                                 
157 On ascriptive autonomy, see also Mika LaVaque-Manty, "Kant's Children," Social Theory and Practice 
32, no. 3 (2006);Richard H. Fallon, "Two Senses of Autonomy," Stanford Law Review 46, no. 4 (1994) 
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I develop this account of harm and autonomy in the case of a harm reduction 
model of service delivery through an analysis of two types of harm reduction programs: 
methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) programs and needle exchange programs 
(NEP). Before delving into the analyses of the programs, I provide an overview of the 
philosophy and practice of harm reduction. I then turn to the cases. Each example fleshes 
out certain elements of the embodied and inclusive politics of harm reduction that I 
suggest is required in the autonomy-fostering state. Whereas MMT programs are 
sometimes depicted by critics as exemplary of the social-control practices of the state, my 
analysis complicates this picture by pointing to the role of methadone in facilitating the 
material requirements for autonomy and in challenging conventional notions of the 
relationship between embodiment, pleasure, and autonomy. My engagement with the 
service delivery practices entailed in needle exchange programs draws out the value of 
user-involvement and user-run service delivery; these forms of service delivery emerge 
as a site for the organization and politicization of typically marginalized individuals and 
groups. Though at times intervening state and other forces threaten to either co-opt or 
foreclose the empowering possibilities of user-run organizations, ultimately so-called 
social control tactics are tempered by the necessary expansion of the boundaries of the 
“acceptable” emerging out of the forms of service delivery such organizations are 
engaged in. In each case, the particular interaction between physical or psychological 
addiction, dependence on the state, and extreme stigmatization presents a unique lens 
through which to view and complicate our understanding of a relationally conceived 
notion of autonomy and the various forms of harm that threaten to constrain it. 
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II. Harm Reduction: An Overview  
As the accounts of MMT and NEPs in the following sections make clear, not all 
programs delivering (nominally) harm reduction services strictly subscribe to the 
“official” principles of harm reduction. Despite problems in practice, as a potential means 
to theorizing an embodied politics of recognition that effectively fosters autonomy, the 
theory of harm reduction presents some important clues.  
Drug policy and treatment, particularly in North America, are politically charged 
realms. Harm reduction is an increasingly advocated alternative to the “moral model” 
approach favored by the dominant forces in public policy and administration today. 
Rooted in public-health principles and emerging from advocacy among drug users 
themselves, harm reduction seeks to minimize the harms of drug use (and other risky 
behaviors) in our society, while acknowledging that complete abstinence may not be 
possible or desirable for a person at a given time. In addition to rejecting the “moral 
model,” harm reduction also diverges from the increasingly prevalent medical model of 
addiction.158  This model categorizes drug use and addiction as illness. Although positive 
insofar as it “has the advantage of lifting the moral, or criminal, stigma from the deviant,” 
this model is problematic for harm reductionists because it shifts the “control of 
deviance” from “legal authorities to the medical profession.”159  Furthermore, in making 
this move, the medicalized approach takes notice primarily if not exclusively of 
individualized physiological factors, failing to acknowledge psychological, social, and 
cultural factors.160   
                                                 
158 Patricia G. Erickson, "Introduction," in Harm reduction : a new direction for drug policies and 
programs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), x, 476 
159 Ibid.: 6 
160 Ibid.  
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Examples of harm reduction programs include NEPs, MMT, safe injection and 
inhalation sites, safer sex education, smoking reduction programs, controlled or moderate 
drinking programs, and a host of other programs for specific communities or issues. 
These programs all implicitly or explicitly found their practices in part on the fact that 
drug users are marginalized and stigmatized populations; they therefore aim to be “user-
centered” programs.161  Critical to this notion of user-centeredness is the recognition of 
the multiple axes of oppression that a user may experience; the user is seen not just in 
terms of her relationship to the treatment program or to a given drug, but also as an 
individual embedded in various relationships that are always structured by power 
dynamics.  
 In viewing drug use itself from a more complex vantage point, harm reduction has 
an advantage over traditional models of drug treatment. Rod Sorge, the late AIDS 
activist, explains, “Harm reduction focuses largely on the social and environmental 
aspects of drug taking, looking at the way that drug use is ‘produced,’ learned, 
experienced, organized, and controlled and then implementing interventions based on this 
information.”162  Sorge claims that this outlook shifts the understanding of how to 
respond to the needs of drug users: “Because most drug users do not have the luxury of 
leaving their drug-using circumstances behind after or even during treatment, 
interventions are focusing more and more on helping them make use of their contexts and 
communities to survive.”163 Harm reduction moves us away from a model that imposes a 
dominant view of how an acceptable lifestyle looks, instead focusing on the service 
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user’s own needs and desires. 
 Given this focus on the user as the central figure in the creation and implementation 
of harm reduction programs, programs are not meant to be based on a single model or set 
of procedures. Many programs are thus geared towards the needs of particular 
populations that are uniquely situated, for example particular ethnic, racial, or linguistic 
groups. These programs are built with community input and structured in a way that 
makes sense for the population who will be using its services. Moreover, an emphasis on 
“bottom-up” approaches to service development and delivery is particularly important for 
successful programs, according to harm reductionists. Whereas traditionally power 
differentials between providers and users have acted as barriers to genuinely assisting the 
user in better accessing the tools necessary to reduce harm, a growing number of harm 
reduction programs are user-run or heavily involve users. When such user-involvement is 
put in place, “those affected are accepted as partners who are capable of assuming 
responsibility for making personal changes in their behavior and helping others to do the 
same.”164 
 Finally, harm reduction theory typically embraces a low-threshold approach to 
service delivery. Low-threshold access refers to the provision of services without 
extensive requirements, in particular the requirement of abstinence.165 In meeting users 
where they are, harm reduction programs access a much broader range of participants. 
Instead of adopting punitive measures where, for example, service users continue to use 
drugs or somehow deviate from certain relatively trivial norms (i.e. lateness, standards of 
                                                 
164 G. Alan Marlatt, Harm reduction : pragmatic strategies for managing high risk behaviors, (New York: 
Guilford Press, 1998), 55 
165 Contrast this type of service delivery with the paternalist model of conditionality that I discuss in the 
next chapter. 
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“politeness”), as some other treatment programs have traditionally done, low-threshold 
approaches focus on making contact with users and forging an ongoing relationship with 
service users. 
 
III. Methadone, Social Control, and the Politics of Pain and Pleasure 
Addiction has often captivated autonomy theorists, including theorists of rational 
choice, in particular because the conventional understanding of addiction suggests that to 
be an addict is necessarily to act against one’s own will.166 However, by turning our 
attention to the physiological, phenomenological, and ideological nuances that 
characterize addiction, and the perceived harms it is associated with, a more complicated 
picture emerges. Methadone is particularly illuminating as a site for such complication 
because it is at once a “treatment” for addiction and a physiologically addictive 
substance. Moreover, in its service delivery context, it presents unique configurations of 
dependence.  
First discovered during World War II as an analgesic, methadone is a synthetic 
opiate used in “maintenance” treatment as a way to prevent withdrawal symptoms 
associated with cessation of the use of opiates (such as heroin and prescription opiates 
like Vicodin or OxyContin). At a high enough dosage, it blocks the euphorigenic effects 
of other opiates, ostensibly eliminating incentives to use these other opiates. American 
doctors Vincent Dole and Marie Nyswander were the first to experiment with 
maintenance treatment in the mid-1960s. Dole and Nyswander, along with some other 
                                                 
166 See for example the essays in Jon Elster, Addiction : entries and exits, (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1999);Jon Elster and Ole-Jørgen Skog, Getting hooked : rationality and addiction, 
(Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
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colleagues, published a significant amount of research reporting the findings of their 
studies.167 In addition to demonstrating the physical effects of the drug, they found a host 
of other psychosocial outcomes of the drug. Though now reconceived by harm 
reductionists as consistent with their philosophy, Dole and Nyswander conceived of 
heroin addiction on a disease model, arguing that the drug induces “a metabolic disorder 
that places patients in need of continue use of heroin or other opiates.”168 Dole et. al. 
explain: “Because of the short period of action of heroin, [the addict] oscillates between 
the limits of ‘high’ and ‘sick’ with insufficient time in the normal condition of ‘straight’ 
to hold a steady job. Addiction leaves little time for a normal life.”169  In contrast, 
methadone, which is usually taken once a day, was found to enable addicts “to redirect 
their time away from obtaining and using drugs.”170 
Methadone maintenance treatment (MMT), I argue in this section, provides a 
useful example of how an embodied notion of recognition rooted in a relational 
conception of autonomy can yield a form of service delivery that is conducive to the aims 
of an autonomy-fostering state, attending to some of the harms that follow from the 
experience of addiction in social contexts where dependence in general and illegal drug 
use in particular are stigmatized and pathologized. Recognition theorists emphasize the 
centrality of recognition to identity, specifically to the development of an authentic 
                                                 
167 See, among others, Vincent P.  Dole and ME Nyswander, "A Medical Treatment for Diacetylmoprhine 
(Heroin) Addiction.  A Clinical Trial with Methadone Hydrochloride.," The Journal of the American 
Medical Association 193 (1965);VP Dole, ME Nyswander, and MJ Kreek, "Narcotic blockade," Archives 
of Internal Medicine 118, no. 4 (1996);VP Dole, ME Nyswander, and A Warner, "Successful treatment of 
750 criminal addicts," The Journal of the American Medical Association 206, no. 12 (1968) 
168 Peggy L. Peterson et al., "Harm Reduction and HIV/AIDS Prevention," in Harm reduction : pragmatic 
strategies for managing high risk behaviors, ed. G. Alan Marlatt (New York: Guilford Press, 1998), 218-97 
169 Dole, Nyswander, and Kreek, "Narcotic blockade,"  It’s interesting to not this emphasis on work (labor 
market participation) as a primary source of meaning, or at least order, in one’s life. See further discussion 
of work in Chapter 5. 
170 Peterson et al., "Harm Reduction and HIV/AIDS Prevention,"   
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identity, an identity that enables us to be “true” to ourselves.”171  This authentic self is 
always socially constituted, and in turn, where social messages reflect a negative or 
disparaging image back upon individuals or groups, they may experience profound 
damage and distortion to the self. 172 While some theorists emphasize the importance of 
relations of recognition to the psychical development of the individual173 – her sense of 
self and ability to imagine herself as an individual worthy of dignity and rights – others 
suggest that a more structural, less individually focused theory of recognition, rooted in 
concerns about justice, is more appropriate.174 These conceptions are obviously not 
unrelated; both share a sense that the structure of social relations, relations of recognition 
here, importantly shape one’s identity, and in turn one’s ability to act autonomously – and 
that misrecognition is harmful to this development. Through this case, I want to suggest 
that in addition to attending to both the psychical and institutional aspects of relations of 
recognition – both of which constitute responses to forms of misrecognition, or as we 
might view it, harm – we need to consider the embodied aspects of recognition as vital to 
the development and exercise of autonomy. The importance of viewing recognition from 
this vantage point emerges, then, on the bodies of the service users who depend on both 
methadone (the substance) and MMT (the service delivery model) and in the arguments 
of critics of both the substance and the service model.  
                                                 
171 Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann, Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition : an essay, 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 30 
172 Ibid., 25 
173 See for example Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or recognition? : a political-
philosophical exchange, (London ; New York: Verso, 2003);Axel Honneth, The struggle for recognition : 
the moral grammar of social conflicts, (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 1995);Taylor and Gutmann, 
Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition : an essay,  Taylor also point to the work of Fanon as 
demonstrating particularly poignantly the psychical effects of misrecognition. See for example Frantz 
Fanon, Black skin, white masks, (London,: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968) 
174 See Fraser in Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or recognition? : a political-philosophical exchange, 
29 
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i. Critiques of Methadone Maintenance Treatment 
Despite findings suggesting that it is the sole significantly successful manner of 
establishing abstinence from heroin,175 MMT remains controversial. The relevant 
controversies typically fall into three categories. First, some critics argue that MMT 
simply substitutes one form of addiction for another: methadone is an addictive opiate, 
withdrawal from which causes painful and debilitating symptoms. Second, others worry 
that because methadone is an opiate, and for the non-opiate dependent (or, for the 
dependent under some circumstances) may have euphorigenic effects, some individuals 
may exploit the system to attain methadone not for “treatment” purposes, but for the 
purposes of “getting high” or seeking pleasure. Finally, a group of critics charges that 
MMT is a harmful disciplinary practice, seeking to normalize the criminalized addict and 
increase social control over those who do not conform to dominant bourgeois ideals.  
Each of these categories of critique highlights on the one hand, problematic 
conceptions of autonomy that conflate independence and autonomy, and on the other 
hand, a failure to attend to the implications of embodiment in the face of the necessarily 
constructed nature of the regulation of pain and pleasure. Building on one of the key 
insights of a relational conception of autonomy – the rejection of the 
dependence/autonomy opposition176 – an analysis of the limitations of these critiques 
                                                 
175 See citations in Peterson et al., "Harm Reduction and HIV/AIDS Prevention," 154 
176 In their genealogy of the concept of dependency, Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon give an historical and 
theoretical account of the factors that contribute to the ideological production of this concept. They 
highlight the extent to which dependence has been feminized, and hence stigmatized, despite the illusory 
nature of, for example, the white working man’s independence, as contrasted to the economic and 
sociolegal dependence ascribed to the housewife. They site also the absence of a history of feudalism or 
aristocracy in the United States as an explanation of the particularly virulent antipathy to an understanding 
of the interdependent nature of social life. Even with movements for suffrage and challenges to gender 
norms taking hold in more recent times, Fraser and Gordon argue that the language of independence has 
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allows us to draw out the contours of an embodied notion of recognition, which I claim 
underpins the philosophy of this harm reduction service. Thus, in spite of these critiques 
– or rather, by way of them – MMT is recast here as a potentially autonomy-fostering 
form of service delivery. However, I do not dismiss the deeply problematic nature of 
MMT service delivery, in particular in the U.S.; the problems associated with this form of 
service delivery highlight the need for a multifaceted politics of recognition in the context 
of the autonomy-fostering state, a model further explored in the following section on 
needle exchange programs. 
A common mantra of those who criticize MMT for the physical and psychological 
dependence it is thought to perpetuate is that MMT users are “replacing one addiction 
with another.” Tapert et. al. note that both resistant politicians and some people who use 
drugs themselves express this sentiment. They explain, “the notion of maintaining a 
methadone dose level indefinitely is unappealing to some people, because participants are 
not truly ‘drug free.’” 177 Abstinence oriented programs like Alcoholics and Narcotics 
Anonymous also generally reject methadone use as an incomplete form of adherence to 
their programs. Phillipe Bourgois describes one arm of the dependence-focused critique 
group as framing its resistance around notions of morality; he refers to these opponents as 
the “Just-Say-No camp.”178  Members of this camp are “oblivious or else hostile to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
only taken further hold with dependence even more abject: “With all legal and political dependency now 
illegitimate, and with wives’ economic dependency now contested, there is no longer any self-evidently 
good adult dependence in post-industrial society” (26). Thus all that is left is the pathologization – see for 
example the inclusion of “dependent personality disorder” in the DSM – and hence further 
individualization of dependency. See Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, "A Genealogy of Dependency: 
Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State," in The subject of care : feminist perspectives on 
dependency, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Ellen K. Feder (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2002), ix, 382. Addiction provides a particularly poignant window into this pathologization.  
177 Peterson et al., "Harm Reduction and HIV/AIDS Prevention," 155 
178 Phillipe Bourgois, "Disciplining Addictions: The Bio-Politics of Methadone and Heroin in the United 
States," Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 24 (2000): 173 
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‘addiction is a metabolic disease’ discourse […] they exhort citizens to personal 
abstinence based on individual willpower and spirituality.”179  
Critics also express concern about the pleasurable effects of methadone. That is, if 
the drive for using heroin and other opiates in the first place is the pursuit of illegitimate 
pleasure – pleasure that extends beyond the “natural” and appropriate forms that are 
constructed as legal and legitimate in our society – the “treatment” for this unwieldy need 
for excessive pleasure ought not to generate further pleasure. In fact, in opiate-dependent 
individuals, methadone does not have euphorigenic effects.180  For those who are not 
dependent, however, such effects are present. As Bourgois notes, critics fear that those 
who are “not truly addicts will wheedle their way into methadone addiction – or worse 
yet, that individuals who actually enjoy methadone may become addicted to methadone 
for its latent euphorigenic properties.”181 Critics are also wary of the potential abuse of 
methadone in combination with other licit and illicit substances, a phenomenon 
documented particularly forcefully in the documentary Methadonia, wherein many of the 
profiled MMT clients are seen to abuse benzodiazepines, a class of sedative drugs that 
enhance the effects of methadone, generating euphoria.182 The methadone black market 
that exists in most jurisdictions where MMTs exist, with some clients receiving “take-
home” doses (doses that need not be consumed in the clinic) and diverting them to the 
street, is further fuel for the fears of the “illegitimate pleasure” camp. 
                                                 
179 Ibid. 
180 Bourgois claims that “a significant number of addicts actually managed to enjoy the methadone high,” 
either by requesting higher doses than needed for “maintenance purposes” or because of the variations in 
the effects of methadone depending on one’s metabolism. However, at the appropriate dose, most sources 
suggest that euphoria is minimal to non-existence in dependent individuals. Ibid.: 181 
181 Ibid.: 175-76 
182 Negroponte, "Methadonia." 
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Perhaps the most pressing critique for the purposes of my argument here falls into 
the “social control” category. This critique suggests that MMT is a vehicle for both state 
and other actors to exert control over those deemed “deviant”; by way of this form of 
service delivery, the “deviant” is disciplined, monitored, and reconstituted in the form of 
an idealized “straight” subject. In fact, this critique incorporates several of the attributes 
found in the preceding two critiques, albeit in a somewhat different light. On the one 
hand, the dependence created by the substance and the form of service delivery is seen to 
undermine the service-user’s autonomy and make the intrusion of disciplinary power into 
the user’s life is imminent. On the other hand, concerns about the regulation of pleasure 
are seen to embody the “bio-power” exerted by the state, as it produces and manages the 
particular bodily experiences of these subjects. However, unlike the other two critiques, 
the social control critique is not concerned about the moral failings of the addict (and the 
failure of methadone to remedy these) or the potential for transgressors to exploit the 
program; instead, the critique is targeted at relations of domination that are perceived to 
emerge through the subtle manipulations of the service user – with these relations acting 
on and through the user via his or her agency. 
In the case of methadone, the perceived medicalized approach of this service is 
seen as emblematic of the forms of social control most concerning to those theorists who 
view the welfare state as necessarily involved in the project of social control. In 
particular, it is the embodied nature of the power relations present in these contexts that 
stands out. Writing critically about the structure of and meanings associated with MMT 
programs, both Phillipe Bourgois and Jennifer Friedman and Marixsa Alicea draw on 
Foucault in order to conceptualize the problematic dynamics they observe in the 
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clinics.183 Bourgois claims that MMT is an example of the use of biopower, Foucault’s 
term for the ways in which “historically entrenched institutionalized forms of social 
control discipline bodies.”184 According to Bourgois, the medicalization of methadone as 
drug treatment – as opposed to the non-medical, criminal status given to heroin or other 
offending drugs, for which users must be alternately punished or treated – already 
suggests the ways in which normal and abnormal, legitimate and illegitimate come to be 
constructed via biopower. Additionally, Bourgois points to the study of MMT by 
scientists and social scientists as a site for this configuration of power relations. Social 
scientific, as well as medical and juridical, accounts of methadone maintenance, he 
argues, focus on quantified data, failing to capture the imbrication of this “treatment” 
modality in “a Calvinist-Puritanical project of managing immoral pursuits of pleasure and 
of promoting personal self-control in a manner that is consonant with economic 
productivity and social conformity.”185 Debates over the adequate dosage of methadone, 
for example, are common in work produced by disciplines that study methadone; 
Bourgois sees this technical tinkering as masking the actual disciplinary functions of 
methadone, manifested somewhat differently at both high and low dosages. 
Friedman and Alicea emphasize the way the medicalization of methadone 
treatment provides a language with which the service user is seemingly able to define 
herself (as having a “metabolic disease,” for example), in an apparently agentic manner, 
yet always through the lens provided by the “institution” of methadone. As they are 
                                                 
183 Bourgois, "Disciplining Addictions: The Bio-Politics of Methadone and Heroin in the United States," 
;Jennifer Friedman and Marixsa Alicea, Surviving heroin : interviews with women in methadone clinics, 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001) 
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transformed into “safe deviants” through methadone maintenance, the authors explain, 
the women are often silenced; they are co-opted into the “machinery controlling 
themselves and others who fail to conform.”186 They adopt a medicalized and therapeutic 
discourse rather than a political one and, in turn, “learn to distrust their perceptions and 
doubt their critical assessments of the dominant culture.”187 This runs counter to the way 
Friedman and Alicea conceptualize (illicit) drug use. Women’s heroin use, on their 
account, is a form of resistance, which they frame as a response to oppression, by virtue 
of which “women are often denied the vision and means to create their own 
subjectivities.”188 Though they acknowledge that heroin use is neither entirely 
“resistance,” nor is it solely passive dependence, their emphasis is on the former, 
highlighting it as a counterpoint to the biopower extant to the methadone. According to 
this narrative, the physical effects and aftermath of heroin addiction paint a picture of 
agency and self-government that is subsequently quashed by the methadone institution: 
“By scarring their body through needles, women refuse to accommodate patriarchal 
expectations of them and maintain control of their bodily self-expressions, gestures, and 
appearances. Through their own agency, these women transcend feminine passivity and 
invisibility.”189 
ii. Refiguring Methadone: Autonomy, Embodiment, Recognition 
Each of these critiques raises important and challenging questions for our 
consideration of the practices of an autonomy-fostering state, as well as for how we 
conceive of autonomy and recognition. The first two critiques figure largely in highly 
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politicized public debates over MMT programs; the third critique is a significant site of 
contention in academic and activist discussions of methadone service delivery. Here I 
suggest that each critique presents, to varying degrees, impoverished notions of the 
relationality and embodiment that are pivotal to an adequate conception of autonomy.  
Addiction situates questions regarding dependence and autonomy in a unique 
light. While it may be intuitive to imagine one who is addicted – one who physically and 
psychologically depends on some substance or behavior – as utterly lacking in autonomy, 
I want to suggest that such a view conflates independence and autonomy. The potentially 
(and at times, actually) fruitful dynamics of methadone maintenance programs, in fact, 
suggest that there are conditions under which someone who is dependent in this way can 
be self-governing in many respects, enabling the individual to determine and pursue her 
life plans. Though this self-government or autonomy may be partial – it is determined in 
part by dependence on another substance, methadone – to discount it for this reason 
elides the fact that all human beings are dependent on at least some other persons or 
substances. Such dependence, as this case shows in particular, can actually be an enabling 
relational basis for the development and exercise of autonomy.  
The arguments advanced by those who see MMT as simply substituting one 
addiction for another reflect the stigmatized and pathologized conception of dependence 
noted above, obscuring important aspects of what may aid in the development of 
autonomy. If we turn to these enabling aspects, a different picture of MMT emerges. If 
autonomy is developed in the context of enabling social relations, as I have suggested, 
one such relation, at the most functional level, must be that between the clinic and the 
methadone user; by dispensing methadone, by responding to the physical and 
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psychological need of the opiate dependent individual, the clinic (and the service delivery 
system) affords her part of the recognition that is necessary for her autonomy-
competency. Taylor argues that the notion of equal dignity stems from a claim that all 
human beings deserve our respect because they possess what he refers to as “universal 
human potential,” which he interprets as “the potential for forming one’s own 
identity.”190 Setting aside what may be (and often is) the inadequate respect afforded 
MMT clients in the clinic setting, the provision of the material benefits of this service 
itself reflects some respect for the service user’s ability to develop her identity, to live an 
autonomous life, despite her dependence on opiates. This form of recognition, then, is 
one component of the relational support necessary to foster autonomy.  
Where recognition is a key component of endeavors to foster autonomy, 
misrecognition, I argue, is a distinctive type of harm that hinders autonomy on a number 
of levels. At the outset of this section, I noted the variation in approaches to recognition, 
with some theorists adopting an institutional approach and others taking up the psychical 
aspects of recognition, suggesting as well that a third dimension of recognition – an 
embodied one – ought to be highlighted.  Harm can be inflicted at every junction: 
structural failures of recognition that impair participatory possibilities, psychical violence 
that weighs upon the subjectivity of those who are misrecognized, or the failure to 
recognize the bodily needs, desires, and experiences of some subjects. By harm we may 
mean limitations on political and social freedoms that exclusionary structures generate, 
we may mean the development of unfavorable relations-to-self that limit who we are, 
who we aim to be, and how we can achieve our life plans in a given society, or we may 
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mean, in both of the preceding interpretations, embodied forms of such harm, both 
institutionally located and psychically located.  These forms of harm resulting from 
misrecognition, it is quite clear, are certainly not discrete; rather, one always inhabits the 
terrain of the others. Remedies, therefore, must take note of each dimension. 
MMT makes the importance of such an embodied approach to recognition more 
concrete: it is not just the recognition of need in an abstract sense that characterizes the 
dynamics of MMT programs, it is recognition of actual, intense, bodily need. Methadone 
meets the physical needs of the opiate dependent; the fact that it can relieve the pain 
caused by withdrawal symptoms is uncontestable. Critics who are skeptical of providing 
a “treatment” that potentially provides forms of illegitimate pleasure to the user first, 
ignore the constructed nature of notions of pleasure, legitimate or illegitimate, and 
second, reflect a view of autonomy that excludes the body, locating it as yet another 
source of autonomy-limiting dependence. From the perspective of such critics, certain 
types of pleasure – either legal/legitimate pleasure or pleasure that is not related to 
addiction/dependence – as well as certain types of pain relief – relief from pain that is not 
“one’s own fault” or that is not caused by supposedly hedonistic excesses of pleasure – 
are seen as warranted and not necessarily compromising to autonomy. In contrast, in the 
case of addiction, these critics police the morality and legitimacy of pleasure, effectively 
denying that the bodily needs of methadone users are valid sites of recognition that must 
be attended to in order to adequately foster autonomy. 
It may seem simplistic to consider the mere provision of a chemical substance as a 
form of “recognition” – indeed, as I will explain below, it is insufficient on its own in the 
pursuit of fostering autonomy. However, the politically fraught nature of this substance – 
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navigating the politics of pain and pleasure as it does – makes its provision more 
complicated than the provision of other substances (medical, nutritional, etc.). Moreover, 
because this realm of pain and pleasure is deeply rooted in experiential knowledge that 
cannot necessarily be accessed through straightforward attempts at establishing moral 
respect, in particular those rooted in notions of taking up the other’s position via some 
form of substitution,191 MMT presents an opportunity to conceive of respect and 
recognition in a somewhat different manner – one that allows for difference that need not 
be transparent. Iris Young writes, “Through dialogue people sometimes understand each 
other across difference without reversing perspectives or identifying with each other.”192 
In moving away from the notion that we must entirely inhabit the rational thought 
processes or reasons of those around us in order to be able to achieve reciprocity and 
avert misrecognition, another way of viewing and acknowledging the other moves into 
focus: in her capacity and sensitivity as an embodied agent.193 Whereas theorists like 
Honneth and Taylor lay emphasis on the psychic needs associated with recognition – 
“feelings of discontent and suffering […] coincide with the experience that society is 
doing something unjust, something unjustifiable”194 – and Fraser emphasizes the 
institutional structures required for recognition – “institutionalized patterns of cultural 
                                                 
191 The most  well known version of this is found in Habermas’s theory communicative action. See, among 
others, Jürgen Habermas, The theory of communicative action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).  Seyla 
Benhabib also takes up a substitution model, though she is more attentive to the role of difference. See 
Seyla Benhabib, Situating the self : gender, community, and postmodernism in contemporary ethics, (New 
York: Routledge, 1992) 
192 Iris Marion Young, "Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought," in 
Intersecting voices : dilemmas of gender, political philosophy, and policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 38-59: 39 
193 Ibid.: 50 Young writes, “While comparing the situation and desert of agents according to some standard 
of equality is ultimately necessary for theorizing justice, prior to such comparison there is a moment of 
respect for the particular embodied sensitivity of the person.” 
194 Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or recognition? : a political-philosophical exchange, 129 
124 
   
value express[ing] equal respect for all”195 – the space for recognition that emerges out of 
an embodied sense of recognition opens up an arena in which to contend with the highly 
subjective realm of such notions of pain and pleasure.  
 The distorted notion of pain and pleasure that some critics of methadone endorse 
–  their failure to recognize the contingent phenomenology of these sensations – extends 
beyond the morality based critiques to the social control critiques advanced by others. 
Bourgois argues that the social control function of methadone is advanced by its use as a 
tool to deny opiate users the pleasure they gain from using the substance for which 
methadone substitutes (i.e. heroin). The difference between the two drugs, he claims, 
turns entirely on the question of pleasure: “Ultimately, it can be argued that the most 
important pharmacological difference between the two drugs that might explain their 
diametrically opposed legal and medical statuses is that one (heroin) is more pleasurable 
than the other (methadone).”196 Methadone is thus “a biomedical technology that 
facilitates a moral block to pleasure.”197 However, Bourgois too, despite his effort to call 
into question the particular construction of pain and pleasure extant in the late capitalist 
liberal state, ends up freezing in place a static notion of pleasure (and, ultimately, 
identity) in advancing this claim. In claiming that methadone necessarily “blocks” the 
user’s pleasure, Bourgois ascribes a narrow notion of pleasure to the drug user. It is as 
though by virtue of being an opiate user, one is necessarily interested only in a hedonistic 
lifestyle; pleasure for the drug user as conceived by Bourgois, must be “getting high,” 
and not the stability – and ensuing lack of periodic discomfort associated with withdrawal 
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– that methadone may bring, or the ability to pursue other life goals, as described, for 
example, by Lisa in the opening vignettes in this chapter. Such an argument, then, 
reinscribes the bourgeois notions of pain and pleasure that Bourgois wants to call into 
question insofar as it characterizes “addicts” as monolithically in pursuit of “deviant” 
pleasure. 
In conceptualizing methadone as a tool for delegitimizing and denying addicts the 
pleasure of heroin, Bourgois may be understood to suggest that the pursuit of the heroin 
high is, at least in some significant part, an autonomous pursuit, one that users prefer, 
after reflecting on their own values and priorities, to the effects of methadone. In fact, in 
explaining this apparently autonomous preference and the context out of which it 
emerges, Bourgois’ argument may seem to accord with the relational conception of 
autonomy I defend in this dissertation, and in turn the role played by recognition in 
structuring the relational context that is best suited to fostering autonomy. Bourgois 
argues that “the search for cultural respect” importantly informs and shapes the dynamics 
of methadone on the streets.198 Methadone, he explains, occupies an “unsatisfactory 
location in street-based status hierarchies.”199 Thus to be “recognized” as an equal or as 
legitimate on “the street” may preclude the use of methadone. Moreover, Bourgois adds, 
the problematic dynamics of the clinic (to which I return below), which may be 
degrading or unjust, also fuel antipathy towards methadone.  
But both of these constraining factors – street based respect and clinic climate – 
do not sufficiently show that methadone maintenance, as a treatment modality and as a 
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source of embodied recognition, necessarily generates social relations that restrict 
autonomy. Moreover, as with the notion of pleasure Bourgois associates with users of 
heroin, the ideal of respect put forth here also implies a static notion of the “addict’s” 
identity.200  It assumes that street-based respect is the only configuration of respect that 
the user values. In contrast, the provision of methadone in and of itself may signify a type 
of respect (for the needs and goals of the user) outside the realm of street respect. As 
well, the service users’ broadened possibilities, afforded by methadone, may well open 
the door to other relations of respect and recognition. This is not to discount the 
ethnographic work that informs Bourgois’ conceptualization of the “search for respect” 
that shapes the experience of the heroin user; rather, the point is to call into question 
“street respect” as a determinative structure for the addicts current and future life 
situation. Autonomy may be developed in the context of a various types of relationships; 
no one set of relationships is necessarily ideal in this respect. However, some contexts are 
better than others, and given the political and social climate in North America, i.e. the 
war on drugs and the ensuing criminal penalties for drug use and the extant social welfare 
system, the dynamics of (an ideal) MMT program may be better than those of “street 
respect” for the purposes of autonomy fostering.201 
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 Like Bourgois’, Friedman and Alicea’s critique of the social control function of 
methadone relies on a limited view of the conditions under which autonomy and agency 
are developed and exercised by heroin users, in this case women heroin users. On 
Friedman and Alicea’s account, because of the image of heroin as particularly destructive 
and deviant, women who use heroin conceive of themselves as transgressing particularly 
precipitous boundaries. They write, “[b]y using heroin, [women] can break though the 
confining walls of objectification and envision themselves living beyond preestablished 
traditional gender boundaries.”202 Imagining themselves—and imagined by society—as 
“wild” rather than manageable, women who use heroin resist the norms of passivity and 
silence expected of them, instead taking up the oppositional qualities of being “loud, 
critical, uncontrollable, and unpredictable.”203 Demonstrating this phenomenon, 
Friedman and Alicea quote “Jane,” a client at a methadone clinic where they conducted 
interviews: 
It made ya [you] feel like ya had confidence even though you didn’t. You know 
what I mean?  You didn’t feel like that when you were straight because I never 
had any confidence in myself. I always felt stupid. So when I got high it made me 
feel like I was somebody, I guess, you know what I mean, in the beginning, 
anyway.”204  
 
Interpreting Jane’s comments, Friedman and Alicea situate the lack of confidence and 
other self-defeating feelings she describes, as a function of, among other societal 
constraints, oppressive gender norms. 
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 Although this account of women’s heroin addiction in general and the experience 
of the particular women the authors encounter in their research is compelling, Friedman 
and Alicea’s interpretation of their subjects accounts of heroin use at times masks the 
illusory nature of the resistance they are engaged in, an illusiveness captured in Jane’s 
comments, quoted above. Introducing Jane’s comments, the authors write, “Free from the 
pressures of living up to traditional expectations they feel confident—and unlikely 
feeling for those who often are subjugated.”205 But, in fact, this analysis doesn’t exactly 
convey the limited nature of the confidence – it’s short-lived status and its contrast to the 
reality experienced when “straight.”  Thus, when Friedman and Alicea shift to their 
critique of the methadone clinic, they rely on a somewhat misleading counterpoint in 
order to conceptualize what they take to be the autonomy-constraining function of the 
clinic.  
Once they are “on the clinic,” or begin a MMT program, the women “become 
‘safe deviants’ by becoming dependent on social service systems, being processed 
through conventional institutions, and being watched by ‘straight’ people—clinic staff 
and doctors.”206 Disciplined, yet infused with an illusive but ubiquitous sense of self-
government that reflects the dominant norms of the methadone institution and the larger 
society, these women begin to  “regulate their own behaviors,” Friedman and Alicea 
write. Such regulation is the target of their criticism. Whereas the context of “resistance” 
out of which the women’s heroin use emerges apparently reflects the capacity for 
autonomy, the authors claim that the methadone clinic creates relations of domination 
that constrain autonomy.  
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Again, the particular conditions of the methadone clinic are probably represented 
accurately in their account. Nevertheless, the contrast between the substance heroin and 
the social relations of the “heroin world” and the substance methadone and the social 
relations of the methadone clinic does not suggest that the latter is necessarily an arena 
where autonomy cannot be fostered. On the contrary, the autonomy that Friedman and 
Alicea ascribe to the women while they are in active heroin addiction assumes a static 
condition under which the “heroin addict” identity will remain in place and that the 
oppressive relations that contribute to the women’s motivation to use drugs in the first 
place are fixed. This is not to say that dependence on heroin rules out autonomy, but 
again, that a possibility for greater autonomy may be possible and to preclude the 
possibility of alternative enabling-relational contexts is to place a limit on the human 
potential of the subjects in question. 
iii. Recognition as multifaceted: the limits of methadone 
MMT presents an interesting case of a mechanism for fostering autonomy through 
relations of embodied recognition. In conceptualizing MMT this way, I want to call into 
question critiques that fail to consider the possibility that first, methadone as a substance 
(even as a substance upon which one becomes dependent) may provide the embodied 
support (remedy to physiological harms) necessary to foster autonomy, and second, 
MMT as a service that recognizes bodily need may structure enabling relations of 
recognition that act as remedies to the harm of misrecognition – even if this remedy is 
admittedly incomplete. An ideal form of recognition (with regard to the aim of fostering 
autonomy) is not only an embodied, relationally attuned one, but one that emerges from 
multiple locations – that is “multifaceted.”  As I will explain further in the next section, 
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because autonomy is, at least in part, ascriptive, it matters both if one is recognized as 
autonomy and who is ascribing autonomy to whom. Unfortunately, though the provision 
of methadone itself may reflect a recognition of bodily need in a context of 
interdependence that allows for the development of autonomy, the often problematic 
service provider-service user relationships as well as the social stigma attached to MMT 
services make the recognition afforded by these programs a highly impoverished form of 
recognition. Ultimately, this limited form of recognition may be outweighed by the 
dignity-harming treatment that many experience in these settings.  
There are a number of practical aspects of MMT service delivery that have been 
shown to improve the experience of service users: a “low-threshold approach” (see 
above), adequate dosing (for moralistic and financial reasons, as well as out of apparent 
ignorance, many clinics under-dose clients, a self-defeating practice that results in a 
failure to effectively block the effects of other opiates and removing cravings), and 
improved therapeutic services, to name a few. But one category of remedies in particular 
speaks to the problems of recognition described above: user involvement. Involving users 
in service delivery may generate conditions under which a wider set of actors is 
“empowered” to ascribe autonomy to one another. Moreover, the experience of engaging 
peers and the community may be an important tool for both building wider relations of 
recognition (creating institutional change to enable participatory parity) and developing 
the skills and sense of self necessary to develop the capacity for autonomy (creating 
psychic change). As Suzy Hodge and Peter Beresford write, successful attempts at 
involving users in service delivery “show us how there can be a much closer relation 
between people’s needs and the services provided. They also offer insights into a 
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different relationship between citizenship and human need.”207  Attending to needs, as I 
have argued, is critical to fostering autonomy; at the same time, allowing for 
opportunities for service users to create and define needs, as well as participate in their 
satisfaction, is an important site for expanded participation. In the following section, I 
explore a model of harm reduction service delivery that adopts such an approach. 
 
IV. Needle Exchange and User-Run Service Delivery 
NEPs are one of the most politically visible and controversial forms of harm 
reduction services. With the HIV/AIDS crisis coming into the public eye in the mid-
1980s, the public health implications of injection drug use became particularly urgent. 
Further, with injection drug use as the fastest-growing risk factor for HIV infection, the 
need for strategies to reduce this risk cannot be overstated.208  The first NEP was started 
in Amsterdam by a self-organized group of illicit drug users, the Junkiebond, which 
received support from municipal authorities despite official legal constraints on the 
distribution and sale of syringes in the Netherlands. In the United States, early NEPs were 
often formed as acts of “civil disobedience,” forging ahead despite legal restrictions. The 
first official NEP in the U.S. to receive support from its county health department after its 
establishment was formed in Tacoma, Washington. Subsequently, NEPs have been 
established in many jurisdictions in the U.S., as well as around the world. Nevertheless, 
limitations on resources, political opposition, and social stigma, have severely limited the 
availability and scope of NEPs in North America. 
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Like MMT programs, NEPs face a host of moral condemnations that both reject 
the validity of providing such services to the “deviant” population they are intended to 
reach and fear that these services will result in increased drug use. Moreover, the 
establishment of the actual venues for needle exchange is difficult, with NIMBY politics 
prevailing in many instances. Political opposition to NEPs often flies in the face of 
statistical evidence pointing to epidemic levels of HIV/AIDS and the effectiveness of 
provision of clean needles as a mechanism for halting the spread of this devastating 
phenomenon. For example, in Washington D.C., where an estimated 1 in 20 residents live 
with HIV, federal law prevents the investment of local tax dollars NEPs.209  Moreover, 
the political resistance to NEPs often limits the effectiveness of these services even where 
they do exist. Police interference (as described in the opening vignettes), limitations on 
the number of syringes exchanged, limited hours of operation, and so on, can severely 
restrict the number of people who can access this service.210 
 Where effective NEPs exist, they are often primarily user-run or heavily involve 
service users, as well as other community members, in their design and implementation. 
In this section, I explore user-involvement in service delivery and user-run service 
delivery as mechanisms for fostering autonomy. The theoretical foundation for this 
analysis of user-involvement rests on a notion of autonomy as ascriptive. In configuring 
the appropriate relations necessary to generate the embodied relations of recognition 
described above, individuals, groups, and institutions are engaged in the ascription of 
autonomy to certain individuals, individuals with various types of bodies and bodily 
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needs. As Mika LaVaque-Manty describes, “Autonomy is […] at least partly ascriptive: I 
am autonomous if someone ascribes self-authorization to me.”211  Therefore, ascription of 
autonomy is an outgrowth or manifestation of recognition. But it is also intimately linked 
to the development of the actual capacities necessary for autonomy. LaVaque-Manty 
writes, “There is a complex interaction between acquiring the capacity for responsible 
agency and coming to be recognized (in one’s closer and wider social environment) as 
capable of being responsible.”212 That is, if others – especially those in positions of power 
– recognize me as autonomous, even if I lack some of the requirements associated with 
the capacity for autonomy (for example, self-esteem or a sense of self-worth), the very 
ascription of autonomy may cultivate these requirements. In turn, if others refuse to 
recognize me as a self-governing individual, I may be utterly incapable of conceiving of 
myself as such, and therefore lack (or continue to lack) the psychic and institutional 
resources necessary for the development of autonomy.  
But who is responsible for such ascription? One aspect of the “autonomy-
fostering state,” I argue, is the configuration of relational support via the delivery of 
social services in such a way that these ascriptive practices are overdetermined in favor of 
broad and meaningful relations of recognition that provided the tools for the development 
of autonomy. Service delivery that allows for sites of recognition at multiple locations 
presents meaningful opportunities for such development. In the case of user-involvement 
or user-run NEPs, the fact that state agents are not the sole ascriptive body in relation to 
“clients” is key. Rather “clients,” here reimagined as citizens, derive recognition as 
autonomous individuals from their peers and the wider community. Furthermore, such 
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relations take different forms, in accordance with the fact that recognition may follow 
from speech acts, recognition of bodily needs and provision of embodied forms of 
support, simple moments of symbolic respect, and so forth; to be effective, then, enabling 
relations of recognition must attend to a variety of potential and extant harms. Of 
particular importance to a multifaceted recognition politics is the need for participation 
by community members (including service users) in service delivery, advocacy, and 
support work with one another; though symmetrical reciprocity (substitution) is still not 
achieved (or desirable) here because of the diversity of members of these groups, shared 
experiences of identity and/or ascription of identity form one side of a community’s 
ability to “reason[] about the connected implications of the actions and effects on one 
another that multiple narratives and critical questioning reveal to us.”213 
 Following, I look at the example of VANDU, a Vancouver organization of drug 
users engaged in service delivery, including an NEP. I then situate the successes of 
VANDU in the context of the politics of recognition that I have argued is most conducive 
to fostering autonomy. Despite the positive implications of this form of service delivery – 
many of which attend to the concerns raised by MMT in the preceding section – there are 
some tensions and questions that arise, which I also explore below. 
 i. A Case of User-Involvement: VANDU 
Advocates of user-involvement, emerging particularly out of Britain where this 
mode of service delivery has gained considerable traction, point to the benefits of user-
involvement for enhanced citizenship, inclusion in the politics of needs-interpretation, 
and individual empowerment. However, even supporters of this approach have raised 
important critiques of the manner in which service-users have been incorporated into the 
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system and the effects of the institutionalization of the originating movements’ agendas. 
The push for user-involvement is not only a product of user-initiated activism. Croft and 
Beresford point to right wing critiques of the welfare state that look to user-involvement 
as a way of reducing government intervention and as an expression of distaste for the 
“nanny state.”214  
Croft and Beresford divide approaches to user-involvement into two main 
categories. First, from the right, “consumerist” approaches shift the language of service 
provision to that of the market, no longer referring to service users or clients, but instead 
to “consumers.” In addition to emphasizing the needs and wants of the consumer, this 
approach engages in a process of “converting [consumers’] needs into markets to be met 
by the creation of goods and services.”215 Second, the “democratic” approach has 
emerged primarily from user-groups and organizations, rather than from service 
providers as is the case for the latter approach. Beyond just a focus on services and their 
delivery, this approach more broadly “is concerned with how we are treated and regarded 
more generally; with the achievement of people’s civil rights and equality of 
opportunity.”216 Or, in other words, the democratic approach to user-involvement is 
concerned with establishing a just politics of recognition. 
An important aspect of the benefits of the “democratic approach,” wherein we 
find the confluence of need-satisfaction with a broader, more solidaristic, attention to 
social justice, is that such programs are more likely to carefully consider the social 
context of the user in their design and implementation. For example, the widespread 
acknowledgement of the racism of drug policy and laws in the U.S. is often a critical 
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factor in how a program catering primarily to people of color will be structured. Thus, 
successful user-involved programs consider the varying social pressures and layers of 
oppression in which users may be embedded. Furthermore, by considering the user as not 
just a product of her relationship with the drug itself but as situated within a complex web 
of social relations, such programs are engaged with assisting the user in a holistic sense. 
Walter Cavalieri, an activist who runs a needle exchange program in Toronto writes, 
“Workers here have pushed the limits to make our exchanges safe places to receive 
assistance, friendly help, good information, attention, validation, and so forth. We are 
involved with peoples' lives, not exclusively with their veins. With the whole person. 
With their families/communities. With the community as a whole.”217  
VANDU, the user-run organization of people who use drugs introduced in the 
opening pages of this chapter, is a useful example of Croft and Beresford’s notion of the  
“democratic” approach to user-involvement; moreover, it embodies the contextualized, 
relationally aware approach to service delivery described above. VANDU was formed in 
1997 by a group of local drug users, activists, and other community members who, in the 
face of the growing public health emergency that gripped the Downtown Eastside 
neighborhood in Vancouver, felt that something had to be done. Through postering and 
word of mouth, organizers held a series of meetings from which they gathered 
information on the needs and issues of concern facing their peers. A report on the 
organization notes, “By bringing the meetings to drug users and allowing all to 
                                                 
217Walter Cavalieri, "Working With Lives and Not Just Veins," Harm Reduction Communication Spring 
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participate, no matter how high they were or how bizarre their behavior, the organizers 
were able to successfully document users’ concerns using a low threshold format.”218 
VANDU eventually gained funding from the Vancouver/Richmond Health Board 
(and later from other sources), a development that required certain features of the 
institution to become more formalized (i.e. registration as a non-profit charity). But the 
organization remains true to its initial emphasis on user-run service delivery. The mission 
statement of VANDU reads, “The health of our participants is enhanced by including 
users and former users in decision-making and task fulfilling opportunities which build 
self-esteem, trust, informal networks of support, and a sense of community.”219 With this 
framework in mind, one of the key aims of the organization is to “[challenge] traditional 
client-provider relationships and empower people who use drugs to design and 
implement harm reduction interventions.”220 In order to maintain the emphasis of user-
run service design and delivery, relatively fixed rules regarding participation are in place. 
VANDU includes full members—former or current drug users—and supporting 
members—those who are not or have not been users. The latter group must not exceed 
10% of membership and cannot vote, though such members are permitted to express their 
views and participate in other ways.221  
                                                 
218 Kerr et al., "Responding to an Emergency: Education, Advocacy, and Community Care by a Peer-driven 
Organization of Drug Users: A Case Study of Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU)," 10. 
219 Ibid., 15. 
220 Ibid., 16. 
221 The report on VANDU notes that although the organization is indeed user-run, the (paid) program 
director, Ann Livingston, is not a current or former user. However, members interviewed in Kerr et. al.’s 
report claim that Livingston’s actions are very much guided by the voices of users. As an advocate for users 
who are subject to the illegality of drug use in Canada, Livingston has the advantage of increased stability 
and some immunity from the various risks that drugs users face which may at time compromise the 
consistency of their service. Though some questions have been raised about this dynamic (i.e. the 
leadership of a non-user) externally, internally, the group is supportive of her role. Ibid., 21. 
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With services like the NEP, as well as the provision of basic first aid, supervision 
of after-hours toilets, syringe recovery effort in local low-income hotels, etc., one of the 
key features of VANDU is the decoupling of dependence, physical and social, from 
autonomy and choice, more broadly. The report suggests, “In realizing that drug users 
can make a difference through choice, members are able to reinvent or reframe 
themselves in a more positive and productive light that stands in stark contrast to the 
disabling stigma typically afforded to drug users by society.”222 Central to this stigma is 
the notion of the addict as overcome by her body, unable to resist its desires, and 
therefore capable of neither acting autonomously nor participating effectively in social 
and political life.223  The use of the needle itself, insofar as it violates the imagined 
boundaries of the body in what is perceived to be an unnatural manner, is particularly 
potent as a symbol of the self overcome by embodied existence; the barriers between 
body and world, inside and outside, no longer exist, or are severely compromised.  
This example, then, demonstrates that by minimizing the harm associated with 
drug use – in a manner that necessarily is concerned with attending to the needs of the 
body by making continued drug use safer – the services delivered by VANDU foster 
autonomy even in the face of dependence, including dependence that is deeply embedded 
in bodily need. NEPs enable users to make the choice to use clean needles, but they also 
make possible the autonomy gained by users because of the choice to use clean needles. 
The latter form of autonomy-fostering is a function of not only the physical freedom 
                                                 
222 Ibid., 33. 
223 Erving Goffman describes the Greek conception of stigma as closely related to “bodily signs designed to 
expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier.” While he claims the modern 
notion of stigma is less concerned with bodily evidence and more focused on “the disgrace itself than [to] 
the bodily evidence of it,” his further analysis of stigma still demonstrate the key role of the body in 
generating such disgrace.Erving Goffman, Stigma; notes on the management of spoiled identity, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 1-2 
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associated with averting blood-borne diseases, but also the minimization of the social 
harms of failure to recognize the embodied and relational needs of, in this case, people 
who use drugs. 
The manner in which user-run programs like the NEP, and organizations like 
VANDU, meet these relational needs is central to their distinction from the somewhat 
limited autonomy-fostering potential of the harm reduction program discussed in the 
previous section (MMT). In both cases, external forces are also critical sources for 
affording members recognition; in the former case, the structure of the service delivery 
does not effectively enable such recognition, stopping short at meeting the bodily needs 
of the service user, an important but insufficient configuration of relations of recognition. 
In contrast, by cultivating an organization that attends to the needs of its members while 
developing their capacities for autonomy (as described by the members’ accounts of their 
experiences of empowerment and personal growth via participation), the user-run 
structure of VANDU has allowed members to access a measure of ascriptive autonomy, 
as described in sections above. As it gained members, became increasingly organized, 
and effectively met the needs of its members, VANDU has become a key stakeholder for 
local, provincial, and federal government; the state recognizes VANDU members 
collectively as autonomous actors that provide key input regarding their own access to 
social services. Officials are known to pay particular attention to the voices of VANDU 
representatives when making and implementing policy decisions.224 Moreover, media 
outlets turn to VANDU as a key source, while other community organizations regard it as 
an important partner. Thus, relations of recognition here are multifaceted: they extend 
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140 
   
from a variety of sources, fostering autonomy both through the actual acknowledgement 
of service user’s autonomy and through the opportunities to develop the capacity for 
autonomy that ensue from the acknowledgement of the potential for autonomy on the 
part of these citizens. This acknowledgement is critically related to the fact that VANDU 
is run by users. 
ii. Limitations: Origins, Cooptation, and the Conflicting Imperatives of the State 
 Let me summarize the qualities I have attributed to user-involvement in service 
delivery, in particular use-run service delivery, which might exist in an autonomy-
fostering state. Such a service delivery model generates relations of recognition that are 
both attentive to the embodied nature of autonomy and that extend from multiple 
locations to provide ideal ascriptive conditions for autonomy. In providing the resources 
necessary to meet the bodily needs of users, and more importantly because of their ability 
to gain access to peers in a way that client-service provider hierarchies have traditionally 
thwarted, user-run organizations and programs like VANDU and NEPs, respectively, 
offer an embodied form of relational support. At the same time, through self-
organization, both empowerment and development of capacities follow, presenting 
further opportunities for user-run organizations to gain ascriptive autonomy. These, then, 
are qualities that offer a more complete model of harm reduction, and therefore an ideal 
basis for fostering autonomy. But there are limitations to the possibilities of user-run 
service delivery and user-involvement. First, some commentators point out that user-
involvement schemas emerging out of social movements, rather than the service delivery 
sphere itself, are most likely to be successful, with the latter point of origination generally 
failing to achieve desired goals. Second, though the state may make claims to support the 
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values associated with user-involvement, the power dynamics already embedded in our 
social structures, as well as underlying social control agendas, may impose discursive 
constraints that undermine the aims a user-involvement model aspires to in the first place. 
In such cases, the result is a subtle cooptation and depoliticization of service users by the 
state. Finally, the multiplicity of the state – its various institutions, each with their own 
interests and imperatives – may result in conflicting goals and clashes of values that 
hinder rather than foster autonomy. 
 The first concern is, I think, difficult to overcome. It is an empirical question 
whether social-movement originated user-involvement supersedes state originated user-
involvement with regard to meeting the sorts of objectives described here. In their article 
on user-involvement, Croft and Beresford note that the “political process” (they 
emphasize that it is political) of involving people in need-definition and interpretation 
“has most often grown from political rather than welfare movements.”225 They point out, 
“the gay switchboards, lesbian lines, rape crisis and women’s centres have grown out of 
women’s and gay liberation movements and not a social policy tradition.”226 Many NEPs 
and VANDU also largely emerged organically, though public health imperatives have 
fostered their continued existence (while other political forces have constrained them). If 
it is true that user-involvement stemming from such organic social justice struggles is 
more likely to yield positive outcomes for users, one implication is that the state has an 
obligation to enable the social and political conditions out of which citizens can engage 
freely in such struggles; freedom of organization, freedom of speech, availability of 
public spaces in which to organize, and so on, are all examples of the types of conditions 
                                                 
225 Croft and Beresford, "User-Involvement, citizenship and social policy," 16 
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that makes such struggles possible. However, it is worth noting that organization occurs 
even where, and perhaps especially when, such conditions are not present. 
 A more complicated question is whether state actors should actively organize 
citizens (service users) to form user-run organizations or to organize them to lobby on 
their own behalf for user-involvement. Indeed, if there is to be an “autonomy-fostering 
state,” one aspect of it might even necessarily require such intervention by the state. The 
second limitation highlighted above points to a potential problem with such state-initiated 
user-mobilization. Some scholars argue that the power dynamics between state 
institutions/actors and service users, particularly marginalized and vulnerable service 
users, are so stark and so ingrained, that it is impossible to create conditions under which 
free and equal participation by users will be possible. In a study of service user 
involvement that seeks to use “analysis of discourse [to shed] light on the politics of 
service user involvement,” Suzanne Hodge finds that power dynamics are played out 
through subtle manifestations in “patterns of linguistic interaction” that bound and 
discipline the shape of permitted discourse.”227 These findings seem to suggest that there 
are major obstacles to state-led user-involvement strategies.  
Though the organization Hodge studies makes some self-conscious adjustments to 
its practices in order to contend with potential power disjunctures (having service users 
chair meetings, for example), Hodge argues that the terms of the discourse in the forum 
she observes are still largely determined by a dominant normative framework that is not 
meant to be challenged. When users stray from this dominant framework, though they are 
not prevented from participating, they may have to overcome multiple attempts to divert 
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discussion from controversial or challenging issues. In the case that she describes, where 
the hot-button issue of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is discussed, users challenge the 
legitimacy of this practice, yet an official tells Hodge, “[t]hat isn’t the view within the 
current clinical practice, clinical evidence within health services.”228  With this appeal to 
expertise of professionals, the official suggests that discussions of the issue are not 
particularly fruitful. Hodge’s interpretation of the officials comments suggests that 
“although, on [the official’s] account, members are not prevented from raising the topic, 
there is no potential for it to be come the subject of debate oriented to changing policy” 
because the forum is not set up “to be a mechanism by which contested norms such as the 
use of ECT would be opened to change.”229 
However, despite these objections, it is not clear that even within such discursive 
boundaries productive change, including change that ultimately fosters autonomy, cannot 
occur. The disorderly suggestions of users in the context of the somewhat resistant but 
not prohibitive forum may actually be part of the process of expansion of discursive 
boundaries and/or the shifts in thinking that are required of institutions. In this sense, 
while Hodge raises valid concerns, she does not acknowledge any possibility for the 
(admittedly frustrated) efforts of users to raise controversial issues, to gradually shift the 
terms and substance of the discourse they are both engaged in and resisting. Though the 
immediate response is “no response,” in fact it may be the pressure they exert on the 
discursive boundaries of the forum that is most important in expanding the scope and 
nature of relations of recognition in this context. Given this potential for gradual change 
in the face of the potential limitations of state-led user-involvement initiatives, I think it 
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is hasty to dismiss such initiatives out of hand. Hodge ultimately suggests that user-
involvement that evolves from the service-led initiatives is less productive than 
“independent, user-led organizations,” which “engage with the kind of issues that are off 
the agenda for most user involvement initiatives”; the latter, she argues, should be 
“promoted,” though she does not explore how such promotion works here.230  While this 
may be true broadly speaking, where user-led organization do not exist at present, it is 
misguided to eliminate the possibility for state- or service-led initiatives. Even where the 
motivations of such state-led initiatives are not always consistent with the goal of 
fostering autonomy in service users, they may inadvertently have this effect.231 
Yet, while sometimes, whether intentionally or inadvertently, the imperatives of 
the state align themselves with the goal of fostering autonomy and extending relations of 
recognition to further social justice aims, some commentators worry that at other times 
the multiplicity of the state and the resulting conflicting imperatives may thwart such 
progressive outcomes. The example given in the opening pages of this chapter helps to 
explicate the concern raised here: while on the one hand the state (the federal and 
provincial governments that fund VANDU and the NEP) lends its support to the NEP and 
to the work done by VANDU members, the goals of another arm of the state, the criminal 
justice arm, seem to run counter to this goal. With goals of harm reduction and 
prohibitionism espoused by different arms of the state (or by the same arm in different 
contexts or to different audiences) at the same time, sometimes devastating outcomes 
                                                 
230 Ibid.: 177 
231 See Domestic Violence chapter, where I explore fragmented state potential for creating space for 
fostering autonomy where not necessarily intended. In this case, Hodge notes, “the impetus for [the 
forum’s] creation came primarily from the key statutory mental health agencies in the locality which need 
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follow: in this case, the increased police presence and ultimate crackdown at the NEP led 
to a substantial decrease in the number of clean needles accessed by users.232 Both the 
bodily benefits of clean needles and the relational resources provided by user-delivered 
programming are lost in this case, at least over a period of time. 
Despite the serious obstacles such clashes pose for the aims of harm reduction and 
autonomy-fostering more generally, user-run services may be particularly well equipped 
to handle the potentially conflicting messages directed at them by various arms of the 
state. The organization of VANDU, its connections to the community, the dedication of 
its volunteers, among various other factors, served to bolster a strong response to the 
police crackdown. In fact, going further than the status quo, service users became 
frustrated with the slowness of the implementation of a long discussed Safe Injection Site 
(SIS). Thus, describing the action as “a direct community response to the reallocation of 
44 VPD [Vancouver Police Department] officers to the DTES [Downtown East Side] 
[…] also intended to protest the government’s failure to open a sanctioned SIS,” a 
coalition of community organizations and individuals (including VANDU) opened an 
unsanctioned SIS.233 Kerr et. al. describe the concurrent efforts of coalition members to 
document and protest police harassment. But despite the police presence and multiple 
efforts to force the SIS out of its quarters, the unsanctioned site was in operation for 181 
days. Kerr et. al. write. “The injection drugs users involved in this particular project 
organized themselves in the face of a police crackdown despite the health and legal risks 
associated with this type of action, and in doing so focused the attention of politicians and 
the public on the harmful effects of the police crackdown and the outstanding need for a 
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sanctioned SIS within the DTES.”234 Despite the conflicting, discontinuous aims of the 
state, in its multiplicity, the presence of user-run services, even when they come under 
attack, proves to be a fertile ground for organizing against those interventions that 
threaten to limit autonomy. Moreover, the recognition already afforded service users by 
community organizations and community members, in this case expanded as the public’s 
attention was drawn to the unsanctioned SIS; surely, the police had the physical power to 
shut down the SIS, but they did not make use of this power to its fullest extent for a long 
period of time. Finally, as I discussed in the last chapter, given appropriate coordination, 
state fragmentation can indeed produce conditions that foster autonomy. 
Although there are obstacles to fully effectuating the potential benefits of user-
involvement in service delivery as a means for fostering autonomy, there are many 
reasons to believe that the resilience of user groups is such that the benefits outweigh the 
threats. Moreover, even seemingly small shifts in the power dynamics of the traditional 
service provider-client relationship go a long way in addressing what emerge as the 
shortcomings of otherwise autonomy-enabling programs like MMT. By making space for 
a multifaceted politics of recognition, emerging from multiple sites to generate enabling 
ascriptive conditions for autonomy, and attending to the embodied nature of autonomy 
and the relational conditions this understanding points to, user-involvement and user-run 
service delivery present a useful model for theorizing the autonomy-fostering state. 
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V. Conclusion 
 In an article criticizing what he takes to be the overemphasis on neutrality and 
cost-benefit analysis in current harm reduction rhetoric, Andrew Hathaway argues that 
this positivistic approach has hampered harm reduction as a political movement. He 
writes, “Discursive efforts to persuade based on strict rationality reinforce endangerment 
themes over drug use entitlement […] unduly overlooking the deeper morality of the 
movement with its basis in concern for human rights.”235 Hathaway is concerned that 
advocates of harm reduction are emphasizing the “cost” savings associated with the 
programs the movement encompasses – both in terms of economic resources and other 
measures such as health and employment – while overlooking questions of 
marginalization, domination, and exclusion. Moreover, this approach, which often relies 
on scientific data to back up its claims, neglects one of the key tenets of harm reduction 
theory: “Harm reduction in principle recognizes that there are both costs and benefits to 
drug use, and is chiefly respectful of the motivation and decision to use drugs.”236 
Because, as I have discussed above, pleasure is not easily incorporated into our extant 
frameworks for evaluating autonomous behavior, this “benefit” side of drug use is 
particularly fraught. Ultimately, Hathaway’s main concern is that the rhetoric of 
neutrality adopted by harm reduction means that its “underlying respect for human rights 
is sacrificed in exchange for an illusion of neutral standing.”237  He continues, “Arguing 
for social change requires we make a choice between rival traditions of argumentation,” 
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here between prohibitionism and tolerance.238 The language of “harm,” Hathaway argues, 
has been used in a way that prevents such normative claimsmaking. 
 By imbuing the notion of harm with the normative content provided by 
aspirations to fostering autonomy and remedying misrecognition, we can salvage, if not 
bolster, harm reduction as a political movement. Harm, as Hathaway’s argument 
suggests, and as the complexities of the cases of harm reduction services discussed in this 
chapter demonstrate, cannot be conceived of as existing in a zero-sum relationship to 
autonomy. It is not the notion of harm itself, but rather the failure to theorize and 
operationalize plural and contested notions of harms and their remedies – rather than one-
dimensional ones – that renders the rhetoric of harm reduction potentially impotent, as 
Hathaway worries.  
In this chapter I have argued that harm reduction may provide a useful model for 
theorizing the autonomy-fostering state, wherein a multifaceted, embodied politics of 
recognition serves to enable the social relations that best allow for the development of 
autonomy competency and minimization of autonomy-constraining harms. Understood as 
a form of harm, misrecognition can be considered in light of both institutional and 
psychical concerns, with particular attention to the needs of the body and the regulation 
of pain and pleasure – aspects of harm that are often overlooked in contemporary 
accounts. As Hathaway notes, harm reduction, as is perhaps the case for all radical 
political movements, is constantly in danger of “cooption and negation […] by competing 
mainstream interests.”239 However, when its principles are used as the foundation for the 
development of service delivery that incorporates users and offers the material and 
                                                 
238 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
239 Ibid.: 135 
149 
   
physiological resources necessary to enable autonomy, it presents an instructive 
challenge to the stigmatized notion of dependence, decoupling independence and 
autonomy. Even in this stark case of dependence, the ideal of the autonomy-fostering 
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The New Paternalism: Forced, but not Free 
 
I. Introduction 
In the foregoing two chapters, I explored several aspects of the autonomy-
fostering state: the enabling possibilities of “coordinated fragmentation,” an embodied 
notion of recognition, and the multifaceted recognition that may emerge from user-run or 
-involved services. In keeping with the notion of an autonomy-fostering state, all of these 
aspects reflect the understanding that state “intrusion” into the lives of (vulnerable) 
citizens is potentially an enabling mechanism for the development and exercise of 
autonomy. This understanding is consistent with the relational conception of autonomy I 
have defended throughout: rejecting a notion of autonomy that conflates the concept with 
either independence or privacy, autonomy should be understood to emerge out of the 
context of social relations, rather than in a vacuum or protective buffer zone that prohibits 
the entry of other citizens. This chapter examines a third case of service delivery in order 
to respond to an important concern that has lurked on the margins of the other two cases: 
is the theory of the autonomy-fostering state simply a version of “forced to be free”? Is 
the very notion of the state “fostering autonomy” imbued with some elements of 
paternalism? Moreover, can the state force us to be free; that is, can paternalistic social 
service delivery ever be autonomy-fostering?  
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In this chapter, I distinguish autonomy-fostering from paternalist practices, and in 
doing so demonstrate that a theory of the autonomy fostering-state is largely consistent 
with the commonly held assumption that paternalism and autonomy are incompatible. In 
keeping with the larger orientation of the dissertation toward contextualized theoretical 
claims, I turn to specific practices and from them seek to understand the theoretical and 
empirical shortcomings of paternalist policy, on the one hand, and the distinctive nature 
of autonomy-fostering policy, on the other hand. In developing such a contextualized 
critique of paternalism – and highlighting how autonomy-fostering policies and practices 
differ from paternalism – I look to “New Paternalism,” the influential theory of 
“supervisory” approaches to social welfare service delivery that can be linked to recent 
welfare reforms in the United States and Britain, as well as some other European 
countries. Because it has been so directly influential in the U.S. context following the 
welfare reforms of 1996 (under the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act, PRWORA), I direct my attention there in this chapter. Although 
much philosophical work has been done on paternalism in general, little theoretical work 
specifically targets this supposedly “new” genre of paternalist policy.  
I look specifically at two instances of new paternalist service delivery: workfare 
and pregnancy-prevention programs, both directed at welfare recipients. These two 
programs respond to what many new paternalists claim are the two primary causes of 
poverty: nonwork and unwed pregnancy. Workfare is by far the most pronounced and 
largest scale paternalist program in the reformed welfare states; pregnancy prevention 
provides a useful lens through which to examine in particularly crystallized form, first, 
the destructively gendered nature of paternalist policy, and second, the specifically moral, 
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rather than solely material implications of paternalist policy. A careful look at each of 
these programs sharpens our view of what it means for the state to foster autonomy – or 
to fail to do so, as is the case here. 
In making this distinction, I suggest that this incompatibility between autonomy-
fostering and paternalist social policy is best understood when premised upon a particular 
notion of paternalism – one that, as I explain below, highlights its implication in 
oppressive power relations rather than solely its association with interventionist policy.240 
I further existing analyses of paternalism by applying an understanding of autonomy as 
both an ascriptive attribute and a capacity developed from within social relations. I 
emphasize that while interventionist policy is necessarily a part of the autonomy-
fostering state, the interventions associated with new paternalism fail to produce the 
social relations necessary to foster autonomy, on either account, and are therefore 
incommensurable with such a model of the state.  
In highlighting the distinction between autonomy-fostering and new paternalism, I 
use the relational conception of autonomy to expose the failings of the assumptions that 
underpin the latter approach to service delivery. A number of “techniques” emerge out of 
new paternalism: conditionality, increased discretion, and sanctioning, for example. For 
reasons of clarity and space, my focus here is on conditionality. Because conditionality in 
new paternalist policy is premised upon the faulty assumptions underlying paternalism – 
primarily the claim that the values of the poor or of service users are inconsistent with 
their actions, i.e., they are incompetent – they only serve to replicate the relations of 
power that already constitute the structural reasons for poverty and associated problems, 
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while also contributing to the erosion of relational support necessary to foster autonomy. 
Though conditionality itself might be justifiable under conditions where its use is 
founded on assumptions of respect, in the cases I describe, this is (often explicitly) no the 
case. The negative effects of conditionality and other techniques use by new paternalists 
play out both on the axis of autonomy as status and that of autonomy as capacity. Both 
implications draw out the gendered notions of the autonomous self that are at the core of 
paternalist thought, contributing to a misguided (and often unsubstantiated by research) 
analysis of the conditions under which autonomy is developed or even possible.  
Recurrently, these ideal conditions are conceived of as those that have as their end 
result the attainment of an individualistic sense of self, bolstered neither by familial 
relationships or relations of care, tellingly both feminized configurations of social 
relations.  Indeed, the private sphere is seen alternately as an inadequate site for meaning 
making in the lives of poor women or in a distorted manner that highlights the 
devaluation of care-related interdependence. On the first count, contemporary notions of 
“liberated” womanhood suggest that to turn to the household for fulfillment is an 
indication of oppression. On the second (related) count, care and the relational 
connections that follow from it are devalued; such activities and social relationships exist 
at the bottom of a hierarchy of activities that autonomous agents may engage in, with 
labor market participation resting at the top of this ranking. In both the case of pregnancy 
prevention and that of workfare, the targets of the paternalist policies are women, upon 
whom conceptions of the ideal mother and ideal worker are cast at once, often at odds 
with one another. The claim that these policies expand access to citizenship is unsettled 
by the tension between two sets of underlying assumptions: on the one hand, the idea that 
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prevention of pregnancy will allow women to pursue other goals and/or prevent them 
from bearing ill-fated children and, on the other hand, the notion that work confers status 
upon the workfare participant. In fact, these conflicting, misconceived ideals only serve 
to narrow the boundaries of access to the autonomous agency required for citizenship. 
I begin with a brief discussion of paternalism: conventional accounts of the 
debates surrounding it, the feminist recasting of this debate, and finally the ideas upon 
which the “new paternalism” hinges. With a broad critique of paternalism in place, I then 
move on to an examination of the two programs: workfare and pregnancy prevention. I 
draw from these two “case-studies” a more focused critique of the autonomy-impairing 
aspects of new paternalist policy, as well as a clearer account of the contrast between an 
autonomy-fostering state and a paternalist state. 
 
II. Paternalism, New Paternalism, and Autonomy 
i. Two accounts of paternalism 
Paternalism has justifiably been a key concern for autonomy theorists. It cuts at the 
very core of what autonomy refers to: on my account, the capacity to determine one’s 
own life plans. Paternalistic policy and the programs that emerge from it hinge on the 
claim that some individuals ought not to have the opportunity to exercise this capacity in 
given contexts, where such constraint has been deemed to be in accordance with the 
individuals’ “own good.” How, then, can such a claim be justified, if at all, if autonomy 
is accepted as (at least one) primary value in our society? This is the question that 
political theorists have grappled with in their treatments of paternalism. Even more, the 
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question of state intervention into citizens’ lives has often been a proxy for the question 
of paternalism.  
What I refer to here as the “conventional” accounts of paternalism often begin 
from the work of John Stuart Mill, the consummate (it is claimed) champion of liberty 
and trusty resister of most forms of infringement upon such liberty. 241 In his classic 
account, Gerald Dworkin defines paternalism as “the interference with a person’s liberty 
of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, 
interests or values of the person being coerced.”242 Explaining Mill’s opposition to 
paternalistic measures, Dworkin emphasizes that Mill views paternalism as an affront to 
the essence of what it means to be a human being—and that is deeply tied to recognition 
as an autonomous agent. Dworkin explains, “It is the privilege and proper condition of a 
human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his 
own way.”243 
In Chapter 4 I noted, following other theorists, that autonomy can be understood 
as both a status and a capacity, the two of which are closely related but distinct. On both 
accounts, I suggest that autonomy emerges out of social relations. Our capacities are 
developed or restricted in the context of enabling or constraining arrangements of social 
relations. Our status as autonomous agents is often constituted by larger social relations 
that configure the distribution of recognition and respect in our society: institutional, 
cultural, and market relations, among others. Where forms of misrecognition restrict the 
latter notion of autonomy, the former notion may also be impeded, since the development 
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of the capacity for autonomy may be closely tied to such qualities as self-esteem or self-
respect – qualities that misrecognition may quash.   
The conventional critique of paternalism addresses infringements on each of these 
dimensions of autonomy in some respects. Insofar as autonomy is ascriptive, Dworkin 
and other liberal theorists’ critiques of paternalistic measures suggest that these measures 
fail to ascribe autonomy to their targets. Dworkin’s exegesis of Mill, then, proceeds as 
follows: “it is because coercing a person for his own good denies [his] status as an 
independent entity that Mill objects to it so strongly and in such absolute terms. To be 
able to choose is a good that is independent of the wisdom of what is chosen.”244 The 
target of paternalist measures is unjustly denied his status as a “chooser,” which I want to 
suggest is equivalent on these accounts to being denied his status as an autonomous 
individual. Moreover, on this critique, which stresses the potentially deleterious effects of 
state intervention into citizen lives, the opportunity to develop autonomy as a capacity, 
and to exercise this capacity, is also limited. Dworkin’s account of the most plausibly 
palatable forms of paternalism demonstrates this claim; he argues that “a concern not just 
for the happiness or welfare, in some broad sense, of the individual but rather a concern 
for the autonomy and freedom of the person” is most tolerable.245 He goes on to suggest 
that a potentially justifiable form of paternalism “preserves and enhances for the 
individual his ability to rationally carry out his own decisions.”246 
This last statement by Dworkin points to the source of criticisms of the 
conventional critique raised by feminist and other theorists. Insofar as Dworkin suggests 
it is possible for paternalism to be autonomy-fostering – or at least autonomy preserving 
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– what is noteworthy is that such a configuration of relations is still termed 
“paternalism.” The Dworkin view, Marion Smiley writes, leads us to view “all forms of 
government protection as paternalistic.”247 Smiley explains, the accepted definitions 
“ignore the context of paternalistic choice-making – or in other words, the relationships 
of domination and inequality that exist between a paternalist and those subject to 
paternalistic treatment.”248 The problem with paternalism, then, is not only or entirely its 
infringement on individual free choice, but the fact that it “perpetuates (or at least 
expresses) relationships of domination and inequality among individual members of a 
community.”249 With this problem acknowledged, Smiley suggests that we no longer 
need to accept the assumption that all government protection is paternalistic, including 
that autonomy-enhancing form referred to by Dworkin above.250 Smiley’s rejection of 
Dworkin’s version of paternalism points to one of the key insights of a social relational 
understanding of autonomy: the necessity of distinguishing between different types of 
intervention in the lives of individuals (and the relationships upon which such 
intervention hinges), rather than equating intervention with diminished autonomy. 
A power differential between state and citizens or state agents and citizens in 
itself does not signal paternalism; it is specifically when such power is used in a coercive 
fashion that serves oppressive ends that paternalism can be seen. This is central to the 
distinction Smiley makes between paternalism and non-paternalistic “protection.” To 
make this distinction, which highlights one of the important distinctions between 
paternalism and autonomy-fostering (though in somewhat different terms), Smiley 
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emphasizes how protective legislation can challenge systems of domination and 
inequality, whereas paternalistic legislation perpetuates them. She notes, “protective 
legislation enables individuals to organize themselves collectively against powerful 
actors who, because of their institutional positions of strength, are able to lead other 
individuals to take serious physical risks.”251 Or, more generally, protective legislation, 
which might include the provision of autonomy-fostering services, gives the marginalized 
and weak the collective power that they may inherently lack given their societal 
positioning. In contrast, the conditionality that characterizes new paternalist services, 
which I will turn to below, compounds domination by explicitly deeming service users 
incompetent and ignoring contextual details that contribute to their marginalization. 
Given this revised understanding of paternalism, it is useful to return to the 
ascriptive/capacity-building dual notion of autonomy I referred to above. When cast in 
this light, the differences between the first critique of paternalism and the second become 
more lucid; the importance of this distinction, moreover, becomes clearer when I discuss 
the “new” paternalism, shortly. As the quote above suggests, Dworkin claims (along with 
Mill) that paternalism limits autonomy as status insofar as autonomy is understood to be 
an individual’s status as “an independent entity.” Immediately, the conflation of 
independence and autonomy suggests a problem. Where paternalism is understood to be 
government interference in individual’s lives that perpetuates relations of domination and 
inequality, the status is denied not because it signifies a lack of independence, but 
because of the power relations that, in many cases, are tied to the assumption of 
incompatibility between autonomy and dependence. When the state imposes certain 
restrictive conditions on women on welfare, it acts paternalistically not simply because it 
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fails to view her as independent (we know she is not, nor any of us), but because her 
dependence is stigmatized. It is stigmatized in this context in such a way that it is 
inconceivable that her status as welfare dependent (as well as her race, gender, marital 
status, etc., which may connote “dependence” within a given context) could be consistent 
with a status as an autonomous agent, or one who deserves to be treated as such. 
The distinction between the two understandings of paternalism can also be seen in 
light of an understanding of autonomy as a capacity. Again here it is useful to turn to 
Dworkin’s potentially acceptable cases of paternalism; Dworkin suggests that an 
acceptable form of paternalism might allow for the enhanced ability to carry out “his own 
rational decisions.” Putting aside the fact that we might want a more expansive notion of 
autonomy than one that requires rationality as a primary marker, the difference between 
the revised understanding of paternalism and Dworkin’s is that the former situates the 
ability or capacity within a given social context. So for example, in the context of the 
broad based coordinated community response program service model for domestic 
violence survivors, the mandatory arrest policies I discuss in Chapter 2 seek to enhance 
battered women’s abilities to develop and act autonomously in a situation where relations 
of domination (between both individuals and individuals and the state) specifically hinder 
this ability.  I think Dworkin would deem this an acceptable form of paternalism. The 
approach Smiley takes, however, might suggest that this intervention resists rather than 
perpetuates relations of domination and equality, and therefore need not be thought of as 
paternalistic. In contrast, without the autonomy-enhancing features of the larger response 
program (which provides resources for various social welfare needs and individual 
advocacy), the mandatory arrest policy might be deemed paternalistic, insofar as the 
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imposition of the state’s will on the battered woman without the crucial supportive 
resources offered by the response program perpetuates relations of domination and 
equality.252 Dworkin’s account, however, might not be able to make such a distinction, 
since it does not highlight the contextual details that contribute to power relations in such 
a situation. This too, might be considered a form of acceptable paternalism. 
 
 
ii. New Paternalism 
 With this revised critique of paternalism in mind – here recast in the language of 
autonomy as both an ascriptive and capacity-related quality – I now shift to paternalism 
in (one of) its contemporary form(s). The “new paternalism” is a philosophy of social 
service delivery, coined as such by political scientist Lawrence Mead, that seeks to 
reinforce and further the trend of more paternalistic social welfare policies. This 
philosophy has been very influential in welfare reforms in the United States and abroad. 
It is worth considering here both because of its ubiquity on the ground, and because, I 
argue here, it is sharply marked by the relations of domination and inequality that, 
according to the more attuned definition of paternalism, characterize such programs. 
While new paternalists acknowledge the centrality of coercion to their mode of service 
delivery, their writings suggest that these programs ultimately foster autonomy, even if 
they temporarily restrict it to attain this end. I contest the theoretical bases of this claim 
here, and in doing so demonstrate this philosophy’s incompatibility with the theory of an 
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autonomy-fostering state. Moreover, in the process, the features of the latter model of the 
state come into clearer view. 
 According to Mead, the new paternalism involves “social policies aimed at the 
poor that attempt to reduce poverty and other social problems by directive and 
supervisory means.”253  Such means impose penalties or restrict benefits when recipients 
fail to conform to certain behavioral requirements – work, mandatory attendance at 
various programs, abstinence from drugs, etc. According to Mead, “[t]hese measures 
assume that the people concerned need assistance but that they also need direction if they 
are to live constructively.”254 The relations of power involved in new paternalist 
measures are configured, in part, by this claim regarding the need for direction: Mead’s 
argument rests on the notion that the poor are specifically lacking in some capacities – 
not least among them what I would conceive of as autonomy. This is because, on his 
account, it is misguided to assume (with regard to the welfare dependent) that “behavior 
is consistent with intention.”255 He argues, the poor do not have the capacity to live 
according to their life plans, even when they have generated these plans and express a 
desire to pursue them.  New paternalist policy is therefore not coercive in the sense that it 
dictates what values individuals ought to have; rather, “the clients of paternalism 
commonly do accept the values being enforced. […] However, they commonly fail to 
conform to these values in practice. Paternalism seeks to close that gap.”256 
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 As it suggests that the problems at the root of poverty ought to be seen as rooted 
in individual pathology, the new paternalism makes its most obvious cuts against 
autonomy insofar as it denies its targets’ status as autonomous agents, or as agents 
capable of autonomy. The programs described by Mead and his cohorts in a collection of 
essays on new paternalism rely heavily on the claim that poverty can only minimally be 
explained by structural conditions – social, economic, or political. Rather, as Sanford 
Schram points out in his review of the collection of essays, the emphasis laid in particular 
on mental health “represents a veritable medicalization of the topic, reducing the poor to 
‘damaged people,’ who are unable to act like everyone else. This implies an 
infantilization of the poor.”257 It is perhaps the case, Schram goes on to say, that such 
pathologization is necessary to justify new paternalist policy.258 Mead acknowledges that 
the assumptions of paternalism can be seen as demeaning, specifically because of the lack 
of recognition of autonomy: “By assuming that recipients cannot be trusted to pursue 
their own interests, paternalism in effect treats adults like children.”259 Moreover, 
although he initially refers to paternalist policy as “postracial social policy,” he notes that 
the demeaning nature of such policy “is especially egregious in the case of black 
Americans,” ostensibly because of the historical injustices inflicted upon them. Despite 
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the obvious affronts of paternalism to recognition of the status of autonomy, Mead 
concludes, “[t]he assumptions of paternalism no doubt are demeaning, but the problems 
the poor have with working and other civilities are far more damaging to them.”260 
 The demeaning nature of new paternalist services, I want to show in the latter half 
of this chapter, stems not only from the assumption of incompetence, but from the 
structure of the policies that respond to these assumptions. In particular, I emphasize one 
aspect of this structure: conditionality. As implemented, this strategy adopted in new 
paternalist service delivery philosophies limits autonomy, whether autonomy is 
understood from an ascriptive perspective or from a capacity-related perspective. 
In order to respond to supposed incompetence, many new paternalist programs 
employ a strategy of conditionality, making vital services conditional upon conformity to 
behavioral requirements. The power relations that follow from the demeaning 
assumptions of new paternalism in combination with the use of this strategy of 
conditionality not only affect recognition of autonomy status, but also the development 
and exercise of the capacity itself. While conditionality on its own doesn’t necessarily 
imply a violation of autonomy – under the right circumstance, it could be a sign of 
respect rooted in expectations that individuals can be responsible agents – because 
paternalist conditionality is so closely tied to a lack of respect, it becomes autonomy 
constraining. Nevertheless, eliding this distinction, new paternalists suggest that although 
autonomy constraining in the immediate application, these policies ultimately should 
enable the poor to become more autonomous. In the sense that parents may place 
limitations on their children’s autonomy in order to enable them to become fully 
autonomous in the future, new paternalists suggest that programs like workfare make the 
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same sacrifices in the interests of long-term gain. Mead refers to the strategy of service 
delivery employed under such a philosophy as “help and hassle.”261 Case managers under 
an entitlement system once acted “as advocates for the poor who helped them get all the 
benefits to which they were entitled.”262 In contrast, paternalist case managers “do this 
but they are authority figures as well as helpmates.”263 Such “authority,” in the context of 
welfare service delivery, however, creates relations of domination; authority in the 
context of parenting has fundamentally different implications, and does not necessarily 
constitute domination.  
To make more sense of this distinction and further consider the implications of 
the conception of agency underlying paternalists’ use of conditionality, we might say that 
on the one hand, it is plausible that behavioral expectations that follow from the authority 
expressed by these caseworkers are a marker of respect. That is, the existence of 
expectations indicates that the authority figure understands the service user to be an 
autonomous agent capable of conforming to these expectations; such respect, one could 
say, is thus autonomy fostering. Indeed, we might understand expressions of parental 
authority this way. However, in the context of new paternalism, as I have noted, the 
assumption is not that the service user is an agent, but rather that she is incompetent. 
Rather than offering a type of enabling respect, new paternalist services do quite the 
opposite, if occasionally “pretending” to view users in such a respectful light.  Therefore, 
the constraining social relations that emerge hinder the development of the capacity for 
autonomy. Moreover, in addition to the recognition-limiting starting point of the 
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incompetence assumption, conditionality isolates and stigmatizes service users by virtue 
of the existence of regulations imposed upon some, rather than all citizens and therefore 
compounds obstructions to recognition. While other citizens are subject to reciprocal 
obligations in order to access certain goods, unlike service users they have much greater 
latitude in negotiating and consenting to the terms of such agreements. 
One example of a the way in which such “authority” is expressed in the context of 
new paternalism helps to highlight the ways in which such intervention is distinct from 
what I refer to as autonomy-fostering. Mead quotes a caseworker in a paternalist 
program, John Gardner: 
I’ll do anything to help you [get] a job. But if you disappoint the employer—if 
you make me look bad—if you screw me over—you better watch out. I’m coming 
after you. I’m in your face. You’ll wish you’d never been born.264 
 
According to Mead, although to the sensibilities of middle-class people such a statement 
may seem harsh, on new paternalist accounts the poor are in fact enabled by such an 
approach.265 On such an account we might take this to be an example of an attempt to 
enable relational autonomy: the relationship between caseworker and service user 
develops in such a way that it enhances the user’s ability to pursue her own ends. But in 
fact, even in Mead’s assertion about the differences between communication styles of 
middle-class and poor people, the lack of respect that premises such an approach is 
evident. Though I believe caseworkers of some form might play an important role in a 
genuinely autonomy-fostering state, here as described above, the required recognition and 
respect is absent, and reinforced as such by the language of the caseworker. It is hard to 
see how the relations of domination evident in such an approach foster autonomy, even in 




   
the long run; instead, a culture of intimidation pervades, hardly the sort of conditions that 
enable an individual to ultimately define her own life plans. 
 
III. Workfare Programs 
In Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 report entitled, “The Negro Family: The Case 
for National Action,” the crisis of the African-American family is traced to the figure of 
the emasculated African-American male.266  With black women taking on the role of 
primary bread winner and dominant source of disciplinary force in the family, the black 
male experiences a total loss of self; he is dependent, Moynihan argues, not just on his 
wife but on the state in the form of female relief workers.  Whereas the idealized 
conception of the American citizen was (and remains, for the most part) the 
autonomous—independent, self-sufficient, self-supporting—white male, the emasculated, 
dependent, black male, lacking entirely in both self-ownership and property, is the 
antithesis of autonomous.  Central to his fall from his already compromised position as a 
black man in a still racist polity is the transition from employment to dependence on the 
state.  Moynihan writes: “The critical element of adjustment was not welfare payments, 
but work.”267 About thirty years later, with welfare rolls vastly increased and a politically 
charged battle to “end welfare as we know it,”268 political actors, popular media, and 
scholars maintained the belief that work – understood in these debates as labor market 
participation – was alternately the conduit through which welfare rolls could be reduced 
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and poverty ended, or the poor “cured” of the deviant qualities that have positioned them 
in poverty in the first place. 
Workfare, now a part of poverty policy in the United States and Britain, as well as 
some other Western European states, is the most developed and known example of new 
paternalist policy. Spun as the ultimate rehabilitative program for the often pathologized 
poor, work is now not simply strongly encouraged but required as a condition for 
receiving aid from the state; therefore, it is an example of paternalist programming.269  In 
my analysis of workfare here, I explore what makes work, and thus workfare, appear to 
be a panacea for the ills of society. One possibility is expressed by President Bill Clinton; 
while touting the value of his proposed reforms, he claimed that work “gives meaning 
and self-esteem to people who are parents”270 Work, Clinton said, is a source of “dignity, 
order, and hope.” If this is the case, according to a theory of relational autonomy, work 
ought to be a significant element of the relational support necessary for the development 
of autonomy.  Below, I will consider this possibility, noting the assumptions underlying 
new paternalist views of work. Ultimately, misconceptions about the intentionality of 
service users and about the values associated with work of various kinds make the claims 
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i. Theorizing Work: Meanings and Assumptions 
 There are two assumptions at the foundation of paternalists’ claims about 
workfare. First, in keeping with the widely held beliefs of many western societies, 
“work” is valorized as a good in itself, one that is somehow constitutive of our identities 
as citizens and human beings. Moreover, the boundaries of what is considered work are 
relatively narrow and inflexible. Second, the primary reason for nonwork is assumed to 
be incompetence – not lack of opportunity, not discrimination, and not an alternative set 
of values that discounts the valorization of work. I elaborate both of these claims in the 
pages that follow. In the next subsection I discuss how the paternalist policies founded on 
these assumptions are flawed both because of their foundation on faulty assumptions and 
because they fail to address the problems of poverty and nonwork that actually exist. 
 Work, in the rhetoric of welfare policy and beyond, is the antithesis of 
dependence. It is, for most able-bodied individuals, a marker of citizenship and a gateway 
to all the rights that citizenship bestows upon us.271 I do not wish to dismiss the 
possibility that work indeed is an important source of meaning-making in people’s lives 
and, in the context of our society and economic system, a primary means of gaining 
recognition, which itself is a condition for meaning-making. Nevertheless, given that 
most workfare jobs, as well as those jobs that welfare recipients who leave the rolls take, 
are low-wage, low-flexibility jobs, that tend to be associated with low levels of personal 
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fulfillment. This is not to say that these jobs are necessarily wholly burdensome, and 
never enabling, but rather that the conditions are hardly ideal.272  
If autonomy is ascriptive – if it is in part constituted by recognition, and not only 
by capacities – advocates of workfare can be understood to lay claim to this policy as an 
important key to enhancing recognition of service users as citizens, or as potentially 
autonomous agents. In making this claim, they welcome work as a tool to distinguish 
between the deserving and undeserving poor – a distinction whose loss some 
conservative writers had lamented during the era of entitlement beginning with Johnson’s 
Great Society programs. 273 Since, as Carole Pateman writes, in the United States under 
the workfare policies emerging from PRWORA, “employment is [characterized as] the 
social contribution owed by citizens,” those who fail to fulfill this obligation—the able 
but unwilling—are deemed undeserving. But this distinction means that the “deserving” 
poor can unburden themselves of the stigma once placed upon those who receive 
“something for nothing.” Mead claims that by moving welfare recipients into the 
workplace, their dependency becomes acceptable and they can be integrated into broader 
society.274  Even though income may not increase significantly for these recipients, 
“gains to equal citizenship, however, were significant.”275 Even though they may still be 
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dependent on the state, like social security recipients,276 welfare recipients who work will 
be accepted because “[i]n citizenship terms, fulfilling the demand to function is far more 
important than minimizing one’s demands on the society.”277 Mead claims that work 
serves to “rebuild ties between the poor and the rest of society.”278 
The second assumption, also stemming from the general value-action disjuncture 
claim advanced by paternalists, is that nonwork is a problem not of lack of opportunity or 
structural constraints, but rather one of competence on the part of the jobseeker. Deterred 
by previous experiences of failure, preoccupied with other concerns, or simply lacking in 
motivation, the poor fail to find work because, without the coercive force of the state, 
they cannot organize themselves to do so. Mead presents a psychosocial explanation for 
this failure. The poor share with the rest of society the value placed upon work; indeed 
“[n]ot working…causes shame and discouragement, since they are not living by their 
own values.”279 However, the “gap between intention and behavior makes work 
enforcement necessary.”280 But this enforcement is facilitated by the fragmented yet 
existing “work ethic” that already exists among the poor; “Mandatory work programs do 
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not ask people to do something alien to them…They now have to do what they always 
wanted to do.”281 Despite these shared values, the poor are “different” psychologically 
from more successful members of society, Mead argues. It is in the realm of 
intentionality where this difference is seen:  
Better-off people generally behave according to their own intentions. If 
they do not do something, it is because they do not want to. They will 
resist anyone telling them to do otherwise. Middle-class analysts too 
readily assume poor people are equally consistent.282  
 
In our blurry middle-class analysis, we mistakenly believe that those who do not work 
choose not to, according to Mead. 
 Further evidence presented by Mead continues to emphasize the individualized 
nature of the explanation provided for non-work. Though some explanations of 
joblessness refer to what William Julius Wilson calls “spatial mismatch” – “a growing 
mismatch between the suburban location of employment and minorities’ residence in the 
inner city” – Mead rejects such structural explanations of poverty.283 Although he 
acknowledges that the mismatch between skills and jobs that resulted from 
deindustrialization in major cities in the U.S., Mead for the most part dismisses this as 
relatively insignificant. A study conducted in Chicago by Wilson, he notes, “found…that 
low-skilled immigrants worked at high levels in the same ghetto areas where poor blacks 
and Puerto Ricans worked at low levels.”284 Therefore, this argument goes, if some 
groups are able to find work while others are not, the problem is with the intention-
behavior relationship and not the system. 
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 New paternalist workfare policy, then, follows from these assumptions, creating 
coercive systems of service delivery in order to respond to both the assumptions of work 
as a conduit to recognition and of nonwork as a product of voluntary or incompetent 
behavior. But, as I will expand upon below, these assumptions are faulty. Moreover, both 
the reasoning behind and the response to these assumptions serve to perpetuate relations 
of domination and oppression, conforming to the understanding of paternalism as not just 
interventionist policy, but policy that reinforces and reproduces oppressive conditions.  
ii. Conditions, Care, and Community: The Limits of Paternalist Work Policy 
 Conditionality is a key aspect of the service delivery practices favored by 
paternalist workfare programs. As James Q. Wilson writes, “Paternalism works when 
paternal commands cannot be ignored.”285 While advocates of workfare claim that 
workfare improves the image of welfare recipients in the eyes of other citizens by virtue 
of participation in the labor market, a highly valued marker as noted above, we must 
consider the ways in which the conditionality that accompanies this participation 
modifies its potential for expanding the boundaries of citizenship.  
In order to evaluate whether workfare can produce the recognition that 
entitlement apparently failed to produce, which instead has been met by great stigma and, 
as new paternalist rhetoric makes clear, pathologization of recipients, it is useful to 
consider the basis for attitudes held by citizens towards the poor and those who receive 
social assistance. A significant amount of research has been done in this area in the U.S. 
context. While Americans react negatively to survey questions about “welfare” or 
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associated terms, they have positive reactions286 to questions about “poverty.”287  Indeed, 
Hugh Heclo notes that both advocates and critics of welfare reform in the 90’s were 
neither here nor there on the question of whether individual or societal forces are 
responsible for poverty.288 Given the apparent ambivalence of American public opinion, 
the manner in which politicians and other political actors are able to manipulate the 
rhetoric of work, welfare, and citizenship is of particular salience.  It is in significant part 
by way of this rhetoric that welfare reform289 was constructed as urgent and rendered 
appealing to the average citizen.   
Nevertheless, Mead rejects the notion that the rhetoric espoused by political actors 
holds any significant sway over the average citizen’s views on welfare.  He explains, 
“people respond to social problems out of their own lives, and elites or the media have 
only limited influence.”290 Thus, according to Mead, it was the individualized behaviors 
of the poor that brought AFDC to its knees; “Since AFDC traditionally did not enforce 
good behavior, welfare became intensely unpopular even though programs to help the 
poor were endorsed.”291 However, it is unclear how people were privy to this “bad 
behavior” on the part of welfare recipients.  On Mead’s account of the history of AFDC, 
average citizens simply infer from their “own lives” that the permissiveness of welfare 
had led to failure to work and comply with other social norms.  Mead’s attempt to locate 
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the shifting meanings of welfare and work in individual citizens is unconvincing and 
cannot account for the general acceptance of PRWORA, the quite radical welfare reform 
legislation passed in the U.S. in 1996. 
 This acceptance, however, does not indicate that average citizens now regard 
welfare recipients engaged in “work activities” as full citizens, capable of acting as 
autonomous agents. If participation in the labor market actually garners recognition once 
denied to dependents in our society, the conditional nature of benefits that is the hallmark 
of workfare programs undermines this recognition by flagging service users as 
specifically lacking in the qualities dominant culture ascribes to citizens. While I do not 
think conditionality is necessarily unjust, I claim here that conditionality in the context of 
our current social and political conditions fails to foster autonomy, which I regard as one 
element of a just welfare policy. I return to this below, drawing on Stuart White’s 
interesting arguments in this regard. In this context, as Desmond King charges, 
conditionality in the form of “workfare might well produce a deepening sense of 
alienation and exclusion among those it claims to help.”292  Although Mead describes 
work as a veritable “cure” to the resentment, stigmatization, and exclusion that plagues 
welfare recipients who receive benefits without so-called obligations, he neglects to 
consider the deleterious effects of the assumptions that underlie the policy, and the stigma 
that follows from the ways in which these assumptions single out certain individuals to be 
the targets of coercive policy. King argues, “participants in workfare are treated 
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differently, and not in a positive sense, from participants in other state-administered 
benefit programs.”293  
Such stigma inevitably shapes the perception citizens have of workfare 
participants. Contrary to that claim the work will enhance citizens views of welfare 
claimants, King argues that “rather than making the rest of us feel that workfare 
participants have legitimate claim on society, we may instead view them as incompetent, 
hence lacking the qualities need for membership in the polity as equal citizens.294 
Mapped onto the racialized nature of welfare stigma, workfare only further differentiates 
recipients from their fellow citizens. Indeed, the risk of viewing workfare participants as 
incompetent is highly likely given that incompetence is the very foundation of paternalist 
policy. Consider James Q. Wilson’s claims about the need for paternalism. Wilson 
suggests that the government should extend paternalism to people “who have by their 
behavior indicated that they do not display the minimal level of self-control expected of 
decent citizens.”295 Those displaying this lack of self-control include “the homeless, 
criminals, drug addicts, deadbeat dads, unmarried teenage mothers, and single mothers 
claiming welfare-benefits.”296 Clearly, there is a difference between viewing someone as 
contributing what they owe as a reciprocal gesture towards the benefits they receive and 
viewing someone as duty-bound to obey because they are personally flawed. Moreover, 
the flaws that are attributed to welfare recipients, as Wilson’s argument suggests, are 
specifically those that cast the recipient as an individual incapable of autonomy; 
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therefore, whatever recognition labor market participation may have garnered is 
ultimately obscured by the underlying reasons for the coercive conditions under which 
they work. 
 Nevertheless, as Stuart White notes, the argument for reciprocity in the realm of 
welfare benefits is not easily dismissed. White argues that conditionality in social welfare 
benefits is not necessarily unjust when viewed from this perspective. He articulates a 
number of conditions under which the imposition of conditional welfare benefits may be 
acceptable and indeed necessary to uphold our egalitarian institutions. That is, “free-
riding, or accepting benefits without social contribution, generates a clear risk that the 
egalitarian institutions in question will provoke feelings of alienation and resentment and 
so undercut the very spirit of solidarity on which they depend.”297 The obligation to 
reciprocity, White argues, can only be enforceable under certain required background 
distribution conditions; “to assert otherwise is to assert that significantly disadvantaged 
individuals in a highly inegalitarian society may have an enforceable moral obligation to 
co-operate in their own exploitation.”298 Instead, he suggests four intuitive conditions that 
must be in place for fair reciprocity to be enforceable: guarantee of a decent share of the 
social product for those meeting minimum participations standards; decent opportunities 
for productive participation; equitable treatment of different forms of participation; and 
universal enforcement of the minimum standard of participation.299 Though such 
requirements cast conditionality in a more favorable light than paternalist arguments that 
hinge on incompetence claims do, in practice they are not likely to be met in the context 
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of our current politics, both in a material and ideological sense. On the one hand, below-
subsistence level wages, an economic system that cannot support full employment, and 
discrimination against job applicants, and on the other hand, the prevailing racialized and 
gendered stigma of poverty that prevents a basic level of respect that must underlie 
conditionality to make it justifiable, make the idea of such conditions appear lofty.  
 White also rehearses a plausible paternalist argument for welfare, ultimately 
dismissing it. Following Dworkin, he notes that even an autonomous individual can fall 
prey to times of non-autonomy. Knowing this, “a citizen looking ahead in a spirit of 
reasonable prudence might rationally choose to limit his or her own liberty in specific 
ways so as to forestall action, undertaken in moments of irrationality or weakness of will, 
that risks [tragic and irreversible] consequences”300 White suggests that given that “we 
know” unemployment may lead to loss of skill and motivation that may prevent future 
employment, work related eligibility rules might be justifiable under the kind of 
argument for self-protection above. White concedes that such paternalism would be 
legitimate if the gains from the measure enforced outweighed any potential pressure to 
take poor jobs or other negative effects. However, given that such gains may be 
distributed unevenly among those people concerned, he concludes that the paternalist 
argument is flawed and not an adequate defense of conditionality. Moreover, in response 
to Mead’s competence argument (individuals that are competent will maximize their 
interests and therefore work), White argues, “[welfare recipients’] non work might well 
reflect a perfectly competent welfare-maximizing response to a labour market which 
offers them only poor quality jobs at low wages.”301 
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 But there is another reason that the paternalist argument is questionable and that 
even White’s reciprocity argument is problematic: both assume a narrow definition of 
work and “social contribution.” The reciprocity argument suggests that the only 
acceptable reciprocal activity for receipt of benefits is labor market participation. The 
paternalist argument, in turn, suggests that it is specifically non-participation in labor 
market activity that leads to the potentially deleterious effects listed above. Pateman and 
other feminists argue that the definition of work as paid employment overlooks the 
unremunerated caretaking labor that many women are engaged in.302 Women who are 
engaged in this care work, however, are counted among the “able but unwilling to work” 
and therefore as undeserving.  Their domestic work, the narrow definition of work 
ultimately implies, does not “earn” them any benefits.  Mead argues that one of the 
demands of citizenship is the civility of “work.”  However, Pateman points out that such 
a view ignores another important role of social reproduction, which refers not only to 
motherhood but also to “the maintenance and future of the public or common weal and 
the care of citizens.”303  
If work is a condition of citizenship because it is something “owed” by one citizen 
to another, social reproduction, too, ought to be included in this notion of obligation.  
Pateman explains, “[C]itizenship can also be seen as a horizontal relationship between 
citizens; that is to say, it becomes a part of the social web of interdependence.  This view 
makes it much harder to distinguish activities that fulfill specific duties of citizens from 
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those that contribute to general social well-being, to democratic social reproduction.”304  
Therefore although welfare reform rhetoric links dependency to a “failure to perform a 
duty owed to fellow citizens,” it does so only by ignoring the other duties citizens 
perform outside of paid employment.   
Moreover, some thinkers suggest that carework has a particularly important role 
to play in our common citizenship, and in turn, in fostering autonomy. Just as workfare 
advocates suggest that labor market participation is worthwhile not only for its 
recognition value, but also because participation itself has positive effects on the self-
esteem, self-image, and self-efficacy experience by workers, some argue that care has 
intrinsic value for the individuals acting as caregivers, not just those who are cared for. 
Paul Kershaw makes this argument in conjunction with his proposals to implement a 
carefair system. He writes, “[d]omestic care is an activity that facilitates individuals, 
regardless of their privilege, to explore their place in a family and community lineage, as 
well as the values and life pursuits that this social location affirms.”305 Kershaw’s 
argument highlights in particular how cultural and social norms have conventionally 
excluded men from this role, therefore “undermin[ing] some men’s full participation in 
this key domain of affectivity.”306 Most pressingly, according to Kershaw, the “legacy of 
male freeriding on female care” may lead to the internalization of “a pathology of 
patriarchal dependence that obstructs their interest-satisfaction vis-à-vis their (potential) 
network of care relations.”307  
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Whether or not care has the potential to bring about the benefits Kershaw refers 
to, the important point for the purposes of the present critique of the paternalist argument 
for workfare is that the narrow definition of “work” is a symptom of the patriarchal 
underpinnings of new paternalism in the first place. Further, it potentially obviates the 
multiplicity of sources of meaning making and fulfillment available to citizens. 
Moreover, though I have suggested that the argument that labor market participation 
generates autonomy-fostering recognition is faulty because of the stigmatization 
following from conditionality, if we were to accept this argument, the narrow view of 
“work” serves to reproduce the problematic devaluing of carework that already exists in 
our society. That is, the social reproduction work mothers who receive welfare are 
engaged in continues to be minimized, cast as both unfulfilling work and work unworthy 
of being counted as a marker of reciprocity. 
So far I have suggested that new paternalist workfare policies fail to deliver on the 
aims of an autonomy fostering state because they do not generate the relational 
conditions of recognition that may foster autonomy and they do not acknowledge the 
relational value of carework in enhancing autonomy-competence. Another aspect of 
workfare that I have noted above is the reliance on the assumption that nonwork is never 
involuntary. This claim is obviously a dubious one simply on the basis of the fact that we 
do not have an economic system that supports full employment.308 But if we revisit 
Mead’s argument that the uneven unemployment demonstrated between different ethnic 
and racial groups in the same area, we can see yet another failure to attend to the 
relational conditions of autonomy in this context. Beyond market conditions, other 
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factors contribute to unemployment. One important factor is the structure of social 
relationships that shape the ways in which individuals both view and participate in the job 
search process. Some research suggests that as a result of chronic conditions of racism 
and poverty, black jobseekers may adopt an approach to job search that is particularly 
individualist, failing to seek out the support (and when sought, to successfully receive 
this support) necessary to secure employment.309 
Sandra Smith’s research findings show that attention to interpersonal or 
intersubjective relations in this context is important because such relational connections 
help to constitute the conclusions that jobseekers come to with regard to the challenges of 
they face on the job market. That is, the process of meaning making that individuals 
engage in is importantly shaped by social relations, and in turn, is significant “in shaping 
how poor blacks engage with each other as actors.”310 Based on substantial ethnographic 
research, Smith describes a phenomenon of “defensive individualism.”311 Defensive 
individualists do not reach out to the community for fear of failing to live up to the 
expectations of those around them; they justify this behavior in individualistic terms. 
“Within the context of poverty, friends, relatives, acquaintances, and institutions in their 
social milieu blamed the black poor and jobless for their persistent joblessness, deploying 
discourses of joblessness that privileged individuals’ moral shortcomings and stressed 
personal responsibility and self-sufficiency as a panacea. Cognizant of how they were 
viewed and of how their joblessness was understood, job-seekers became defensive 
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individualists.”312 The individualizing message of new paternalism exacerbates this 
phenomenon of defensive individualism; the discourses that Smith refers to above may be 
understood to stem in part from the internalization of the messages espoused by 
privileged actors who deploy such strategies as workfare to respond to supposed 
incompetence. This argument also helps to unhinge – or at least situate within a structural 
account –  Mead’s argument  about the availability of jobs based on the success of some 
groups rather than others in finding employment. 
While Smith’s arguments seem to counter some earlier studies of poor black 
communities, wherein the importance of connectedness through kinship relations in 
particular is stressed, she notes that the individualistic reaction to joblessness does not 
necessarily prevail in all arenas. For example, in the categories of childcare, housework, 
and housing, sharing of resources or “exchange” is much more likely.313 This is important 
to my argument here: given the individualism – motivated by distrust – that may 
characterize some arenas of poor black women’s lives, it might make sense to suggest 
that seeking relational support in other arenas, i.e. through childbearing, follows 
logically. The next case that I look at deals directly with the relational conditions out of 
which teen and multiple pregnancies in poor, unwed, women emerge.  
 
IV. Pregnancy prevention 
While workfare policy obscures the relational limitations of strategies of 
conditionality, the social context of job search behavior, and the contributions of 
carework to fulfilling one’s obligations as a citizen, pregnancy prevention policy takes us 
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more directly into the “private” sphere, the sphere where dominant discourse tells us 
relationality is most suitably situated. Yet here, though relational conditions are not 
ignored, they are conceived of through the lens of middle class perceptions of the sources 
of meaning in women’s lives, a lens that paradoxically both privileges “independence” 
and idealizes self-sacrificing motherhood. Of course, as we have seen, workfare policy 
too extends its influence and justifications into the private sphere, as well. Nevertheless it 
does this primarily by way of the devaluation of activities that take place there. It is in the 
context of such devaluation that paternalist pregnancy prevention policy is developed. 
They therefore fail to respond to the relational needs that more effective pregnancy 
prevention policy might take up, instead relying again on a strategy of conditionality.  
Conditionality has been discussed widely in the context of workfare programs—a 
debate that I engage with above—but much less so in other arenas. Perhaps because work 
is seen as so fundamental to North American identity, and the failure to do so often 
associated with deviant behavior, considerations of whether or how individuals should be 
coerced to work strike at fundamental ideological issues for both supporters and critics of 
these programs. Yet, despite the fact that in the context of welfare, pregnancy is 
intimately tied to work -- it affects women’s ability to work outside the home, it is the 
foundation of social reproduction, it is an embodied manifestation of the differing effects 
of working conditions on women, etc. – little attention has been paid to paternalism in 
this arena. As with workfare, conditionality and paternalist pregnancy prevention in 
general emerge here as a strategies ill-fitted to fostering autonomy, both in the 
recognition and capacity building senses. 
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i.  Preventing pregnancy: intentionality, competence, and autonomy 
Teenage pregnancy, as well as multiple fertility in poor, unwed, women more 
generally, has long been a focus for poverty researchers and policy analysts, who worry 
about not only the material implications of additional mouths to feed, but also the effects 
on a variety of other outcomes typically measured in children. Moreover, they warn of 
the possibility of a generational “cycle” of unwed pregnancy. In turn, new paternalist 
thinkers have turned their attention to these issues, citing teenage pregnancy in particular 
as a classic example of the value-action rift. Laying claim to this incompetence-based 
argument, Rebecca Maynard claims, “[a]s a group, those who unintentionally get 
pregnant and begin parenthood at a young age signal their inability to make decisions that 
are in their own best interests, the best interests of their children, and the best interests of 
society.”314  
Maynard’s account presents a classic argument for why paternalism is necessary 
in such cases, yet even within her own account, tensions and inconsistencies point to the 
theoretical weakness of the value-action argument, and the empirical problems of the 
conditional and discretionary elements of the policies proposed. In fact, scholars have 
shown that pregnancy in poor women and teenagers has much greater personal and 
symbolic implications than the simple explanation provided by Maynard (that of 
irresponsibility and incompetence), and these implications are directly tied to conditions 
of injustice and oppression that many of these women face. In this section, I look first at 
the misplaced assumptions of incompetence and the ensuing conditionality of service 
provision, which, as with workfare undermine recognition and obscure the relational 
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needs that the policy ought to address, thereby also limiting the development of 
autonomy, understood as a capacity. Since there is little information available on the 
specifics of paternalist pregnancy programs beyond Maynard’s advocacy and some 
descriptions of PRWORA related programs, my focus here is on the faulty assumptions 
that, on the basis of Maynard’s description, underlie paternalist programs.  
 The central argument behind Maynard’s advocacy of the new paternalism hinges 
on the incongruity between young mothers’ values – the belief that waiting to have 
children at a later date is better – and their actions – continued teen pregnancy. Yet, even 
Maynard’s own ethnographic data seems to suggest that the assumption of incompetence 
is misleadingly straightforward. Maynard quotes teenage mothers who themselves signal 
the ambiguity around intentionality in this realm. Says one mother, “ ‘I didn’t plan it, and 
then again, I kind of knew that it was going to happen because I wasn’t really taking the 
pills like I was supposed to. I couldn’t remember every day to take the pill. And, I still 
don’t.’”315 Although the pregnancy was not planned per se, it’s also not clear that the 
interviewee specifically believed that she should avoid pregnancy, yet failed to act in 
accordance with this view, nor that her actions entirely oppose her intentions. But this 
ambivalence only captures one dimension of the ambiguities in intentionality surrounding 
this issue.  
In other research, the complexities of distinguishing between “planned” and 
“unplanned” pregnancy appear in greater relief. Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas’ 
intensive study of motherhood and marriage among low-income women in Philadelphia 
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reveals a multitude of reasons for teen pregnancy.316 For our purposes, most striking 
among these reasons – which also include coercive relationships with male partners and a 
desire to escape a troubled home – are those that highlight the central role a child can 
play in a context where relational support may be limited, and the ability to define oneself 
may also be constrained by both material and relational conditions. Indeed, Edin and 
Kefalas point to the “relational poverty” (citing Kaplan) that emerges from “the social 
isolation that is the common experience of those who live in poverty [which] is 
heightened for adolescents, whose relationships with parents are strained by the 
developmental need to forge an independent identity.”317 These limitations of relational 
support, which scholars importantly note are closely related to the structural conditions 
that limit trust among the poor, “can create a compelling desire to give and receive 
love.”318 The question of intentionality in teen pregnancy, then, is in part a colored by the 
very real, and indeed arguably internally logical, reasons why these young women may 
be motivated to become pregnant, or at least to not actively prevent pregnancy. 
“[P]regnancy offers the promise of relational intimacy at a time few other emotional 
resources are available,” their interviews suggest.319 
 Although, according to Maynard’s evidence, young unwed mothers appear to 
share in the mainstream value system that suggests waiting until one is older to bear 
children, other values come into play, the significance of which are obscured by a 
narrow, individualistic view of the ideal self that is dominant in particular in North 
American discourse, and that is apparent in new paternalist thought. Following from this 
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view, a masculinist perspective that devalues relationality and interdependence while 
holding motherhood up to an unrealistic ideal also serves to obviate the importance of a 
range of other values associated with childbearing in young, poor women.320 Edin and 
Kefalas’ work underlines the ways in which not only masculinist or individualistic 
conceptions of the self, but also some widespread appropriations of feminism are 
uncomfortable with the positioning of childbearing as source of meaning making and as a 
social resource. As Edin and Kefalas note, “[t]he idea of a woman viewing her offspring 
as a resource violates powerful social norms about how a mother should behave. 
Altruism, not need, ought to govern her relationship to her children.”321 Indeed, though 
feminists have long endeavored to destabilize it, the ideal of mother as self-sacrificing 
and entirely other-regarding remains a strong one in our society.322 Yet, despite the 
feminist critique of this self-sacrificing ideal of motherhood, a typical feminist alternative 
conception of motherhood still does not fit comfortably with the empirical evidence Edin 
and Kefalas offer. Even if we reject the notion of motherhood as necessarily only 
altruistic, the idea of women deriving meaning primarily from their role as child bearers 
might be seen as oppressive or constraining from the vantage point of white, middle-
class, feminism. Are these women not simply falling victim to standard gender roles that 
suggest some essential maternal yearnings? 
 Yet, to dismiss the value of motherhood as a resource for both meaning-making 
and relational support is both to ignore poignant experiential evidence and to leave 
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unexplored the finer details of the ways in which this resource is drawn upon – details 
that tell us something not only about policy choices, but also the ways in which autonomy 
is developed and exercised. In fact, the evidence suggesting the relational value poor 
women may draw from motherhood, especially at a relatively young age, first points to 
the ways in which the ascription of such value challenges the white middle-class ideal of 
motherhood, which is mired in a problematic, uneasy, if not untenable, relationship 
between selflessness and autonomy. The meaning and support that some women draw 
from motherhood foregrounds the existence of or potential for autonomy among these 
women, therefore disrupting claims paternalists make regarding competence and 
intentionality. Second, it suggests the need to address problems of relational support 
rather than, as paternalists repeatedly suggest, incompetence.  
 The dominant figure of the mother as self-sacrificing, selfless, and at the mercy of 
the needs of her child(ren) and male partner raises obvious problems for feminists. It is 
not that to love one’s child is somehow incompatible with feminist values, but rather the 
ways in which such an ideal subsumes women’s identities in their roles as mothers, 
denying them recognition as autonomous individuals, as full citizens, render this ideal 
problematic, at least where subscribing to it is not a matter of “choice.” If we understand 
autonomy as the capacity to determine one’s own ends, the utterly self-sacrificing mother 
seems hard pressed to be worthy of such a status: someone else’s needs always determine 
her own ends. Andrea Westlund explains the quality of self-abnegating deference as “the 
systematic subordination of oneself to another whose interests, needs, and preferences are 
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treated as pre-emptively decisive in one’s own practical reasoning.”323 The self-
sacrificing mother, then, fits easily within this category of behavior.  
However, contrary to the intuition that such behavior is inconsistent with 
autonomy, since she may plausibly endorse this self-subordination – identifying with one 
competing ideal of motherhood that equates competence with full attention to the needs 
of one’s child at the expense of any self-interested concerns – the self-sacrificing mother 
may be conceived of as autonomous in terms of an “identification” approach, such as that 
proffered by Harry Frankfurt, and in somewhat modified form, Michael Bratman. On 
such accounts, “autonomous agency is exercised when one is motivated by a desire with 
which one wholeheartedly identifies—a desire that is endorsed in other words, by a 
higher order desire with which one is satisfied in the sense just described,” (Frankfurt), or 
on Bratman’s account, when the desire is treated “as providing a justifying reason.”324 On 
such accounts, as Westlund points out, we may well view the self-abnegator as 
autonomous, since she is likely to identify with and hold her behavior up to the standard 
of justifying reason. Westlund suggests that in order to understand autonomy in a way 
that would make our assessment of a self-abnegator coherent, we need, in addition to 
identification, to pay attention to the critical reflectiveness present in the subject that 
demonstrates “responsibility for the self” – “holding oneself answerable, for one’s 
endorsements, to external critical perspectives” – something that the self-abnegator 
generally cannot achieve.325 Whatever standard one ultimately chooses to hold the self-
                                                 
323 Andrea C. Westlund, "Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: Is Deference Compatible with 
Autonomy?" The Philosophic Review 112, no. 4 (2003): 485. 
324 Ibid.: 489-90. 
325 Ibid.: 495. Westlund’s argument focuses on the requirement of justificatory dialogue.  
191 
   
abnegator up to, this case highlights the role of oppressive socialization in complicating 
our assessments of some subjects’ capacity to act autonomous. 
 Consider in contrast the sense of self that emerges from the evidence provided by 
Edin and Kefalas. One of the women they interview, Aliya, says, “ ‘Some people may 
say it was for the wrong reasons, but it was like too much around me going on…I guess 
that was my way out of all these situations. [But] I wanted a child because it was mine. It 
was [for] love.’”326 Pamela, in turn, contends, “ ‘I just knew, growing up, ‘Oh, you’re 
gonna have your kids…the kids are gonna love you. They’re yours.”327 Although Aliya 
and Pamela express different sentiments here, it is noteworthy that for both women 
motherhood is not only or even mostly about the needs of the child, but also about the 
fundamental needs of the mother for love, for affirmation, for support. Moreover, as Edin 
and Kefalas note, “the stronger preference for children among the poor can be seen in the 
propensity of the women we interviewed to put children, rather than marriage, education, 
or career, at the center of their meaning-making activity.”328 In contrast to the ideal of 
selflessness described above, these expressions of appreciation of children do not seem 
self-abnegating. But are they expressions of these women’s will, of their autonomous 
desires? 
 There are two ways, I want to suggest, of interpreting the comments of Edin and 
Kefalas’s interviewees. First, where the self-abnegating mothers fall prey to the dominant 
ideal of white, middle-class, motherhood, the poor women who see their children as 
providing them with much needed self-affirmation subvert the dominant paradigm, and 
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within this resistance we find a kernel of autonomy.  Second, viewing childbearing as the 
primary source of women’s meaning making seems antiquated, a result, as in the case of 
self-abnegating mothers, of oppressive socialization. The women’s movement has 
struggled to open up a far greater range of opportunities that can contribute to a 
meaningful life; these women, on this interpretation, are limited in their autonomy insofar 
as they fail to access or take advantage of such broader opportunities. Which of these 
interpretations best captures the potential for autonomy or existence thereof in women 
who become pregnant at an early age? Both in the case of the woman for whom 
motherhood must be a selfless pursuit and for the woman for whom motherhood is the 
primary source of meaning-making and relational support, a consideration of autonomy 
must take into account the social context, the relational conditions, out of which such 
preferences emerge.  
 On the first interpretation, consideration of the contextual variables at play 
suggests that, indeed, situating childbearing as an avenue to the types of self-affirmation 
described by the interviewees can be seen as resistant, and thus, perhaps, as autonomous. 
As described above, as a response to the relational poverty that some young women who 
become pregnant may face, the connection formed with a child is not an unreasonable 
means of acquiring what is lacking: loving and, in some ways, supportive relationships. 
Kaplan’s theory of the poverty of relationships helps to explain why such an approach to 
childbearing as a relational resource makes sense, and may well be considered to be a 
marker of autonomous agency. The poor, black, young women she interviews “describe 
being disconnected from primary family relations, abandoned by their schools and by the 
men in their lives, and isolated from relations with other teenagers at the time of 
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adolescence, when it is most important that they experience positive relationships.”329 
Motherhood, on this account, is a strategy used to cope with the conditions under which 
these young women are operating. Writes Kaplan, “In using the motherhood strategy, the 
teen mothers in this study were not behaving pathologically, but were using the only 
survival strategy they believe available to them.”330 This does not mean, however, that 
childbearing at a young age is an ideal autonomous choice under the given conditions. In 
fact, that it is not ideal is exactly the point; to question paternalist pregnancy prevention 
strategies is not to endorse teenage pregnancy or (for the most part) multiple pregnancies 
of poor women. It suggests instead something about what type of interventions are 
necessary, shifting the terms of the “diagnosis” offered by the paternalists, and in turn the 
“cure” (to use the paternalist language of pathology).  
On the second interpretation, unlike with the oppressive socialization 
interpretation that applies fairly easily to the self-abnegating mother, the structural 
conditions that affect these women suggest instead that poor women are not necessarily 
succumbing to sexist norms or values that limit women’s opportunities. Rather, these 
women make a fairly accurate assessment of the limitations that exist on their potential 
resources for meaning making and fulfillment. As Edin and Kefalas write, while middle-
class women face significant opportunity costs when they have children at an earlier age, 
the same cannot be said for poor women.331 Rather, “[d]isadvantaged girls who bear 
children have about the same long-term earnings trajectories as similarly disadvantaged 
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youth who wait until their mid or late twenties to have a child.”332 Other outcomes are 
similarly minimally affected by early childrearing. But it is not just that the opportunity 
costs are relatively low; situating childbearing as a primary source of meaning also 
reflects the lack of opportunities that exist for poor women. Write Edin and Kefalas, 
“While middle-class women are now reaching new heights of self-actualization, poor 
women are relegated to unstable, poorly paid, often mind-stultifying jobs with little room 
for advancement.”333  
 These interpretations of poor women’s use of childbearing to make meaning – in 
ways that challenge conventional middle class views of the appropriate sources of such 
meaning – in lives that are fundamentally limited by structural conditions highlight the 
incoherence of paternalist response to pregnancy. As with workfare policy, in order to 
respond to “incompetence,” the strategy of conditionality is one of the primary 
approaches taken up in pregnancy prevention. Yet, as we have seen, the incompetence 
argument is deeply flawed, both with regard to the perceived intentionality of the subjects 
in question, and with regard to the complex reasons behind such intentionality. However, 
in the American context, the 1996 welfare reform bill PRWORA made provisions to 
devote a significant amount of funds to abstinence promotion plans. Moreover, it allowed 
states to implement mandatory programming as well as other behavioral requirements for 
young mothers, in efforts to prevent repeat pregnancies.   One paternalistic approach to 
pregnancy prevention coercively requires that teenage parents (under eighteen) reside 
with their own parents. If they do not do so, they will receive less income support from 
the state. Another approach, discussed in Maynard’s piece on new paternalist measures, 
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is mandatory programming that has “clear” moral messages discouraging further 
pregnancy; such programs are required to receive benefits. 
 The requirement that teenage mothers must reside with their own parents is, on 
the surface, attentive to possible relational needs. However, given the explanations 
proffered by the women Edin, Kefalas, and Kaplan interview, it is often the case that 
parents fail to provide the support that girls and young women need. Indeed, this is partly 
the motivation for bearing children. Here we can see that a failure to grapple with the 
intentions of pregnant teenagers leads to a faulty policy prescription. If teenage 
pregnancy were truly the result of incompetence alone, then perhaps parental supervision 
would help to rein in such pathological behavior. Yet since this is not the case, rather than 
reinforcing the conditions that contribute to the lack of relational support that some of 
these women experience, an autonomy-fostering state would seek to provide options for 
alternative sources of meaning-making and relational connections. By individualizing the 
behavior of teenage parents, paternalists fail to recognize the ways in which teen 
pregnancy can be understood as a response to institutional oppression, wherein 
childbearing appears as a reasonable and viable strategy.334 In turn, the utilization of 
pregnancy prevention programs that hinge on a “strong moral message” – another 
strategy advocated by new paternalists – suggests a further failure to clearly see the 
sources of teenage and unwed pregnancy. By characterizing teenage and unwed mothers 
as morally deviant, such programs perpetuate the stigmatization that compromises 
various sources of support to begin with, in part because of the exclusionary impulses of 
                                                 
334 Elaine Bell Kaplan, Not Our Kind of Girl: Unraveling the Myths of Black Teenage Motherhood 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 184. 
196 
   
institutional sources of support, but also because the stigma itself may lead some women 
to avoid seeking support  
The issues emerging in the context of policy directed toward pregnancy among 
young and unwed women point us back toward the distinction between paternalist and 
interventionist policy. As I noted above, paternalism is best understood as referring to 
forms of intervention into individuals lives that serve to perpetuate oppressive social 
relations by way of their coercive and stigmatizing tactics. As Ellen Kaplan notes, the 
ways in which a lack of relational support contributes to teen pregnancy suggest that 
service delivery personnel ought to be “retrained to see themselves as supporters, to be 
empathetic, to offer real job training, and to seek economic and emotional support for the 
entire family unit.”335 How this is enacted depends on context and further research, but 
what is important here is that such intervention need not be paternalistic; rather, it can be 
autonomy-fostering, in the context of interdependence, and enabling in general, when the 
faulty exercise of unequal power relations entailed by new paternalist policy is curbed. 
Moreover, like in the case of service users who use drugs, discussed in chapter 4, the 
failure of the state to recognize the needs and intentions of these young women who 
become pregnant is an example of the harm of misrecognition; paternalist policy, unlike 
autonomy-fostering policy, intervenes on the basis of such misrecognition, such harm, 
ultimately restricting the possibilities for autonomous agency. 
 
                                                 
335 Ibid., 190. 
197 
   
V. Conclusion 
 New paternalists challenge an economistic notion of the individual as a rational 
self-maximizer. In this sense, they are allied with feminists who wish to complicate 
rationality alone as a marker of autonomous agency. Yet, new paternalism does not 
actually do away with the ideal of rationality as a prerequisite for autonomy; rather, these 
theorists wish to challenge the extension of the ideal to all individuals. Writes Mead, 
“Understanding dysfunction requires positing a more complex psychology, where people 
fail to do what they themselves desire and thus fail to exhaust the potential of their 
environment.”336 Pathologizing the poor and dependent, Mead here reinforces what, from 
a feminist perspective, the critique of conventional notions of autonomy wishes to 
overcome. Instead, I argue that we need a notion of autonomy that takes into account 
affective needs and relational ties, one that makes room for a wider range of values, while 
also providing the tools for the development of capacities related to autonomy. That is, 
fostering autonomy requires not a narrow view of autonomy to which we must coercively 
instruct citizens to strive for, but a relational account of autonomy that responds to the 
limitations of the structural conditions under which individuals exist and to the complex 
ways in which autonomy can be expressed, thereby enhancing access to autonomy, 
understood in both recognition and capacity related terms. 
 As both the workfare and the pregnancy prevention examples show, paternalist 
policy is founded upon flawed assumptions about incompetence and intentionality. 
Rather than fostering autonomy by suspending it for a limited amount of time in the 
service of a long term ideal, new paternalism replicates the relations of power that have 
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contributed to the need for services in the first place. The autonomy-fostering state, in 
contrast, seeks out interventions that correct or respond to these unjust power relations. 
Moreover, the revised notion of paternalism discussed in the second section of the paper, 
which distinguishes paternalism from interventionist policy in general, is an important 
lens through which to understand the contrast between the two approaches to service 
delivery. Finally, these two cases bring to light the ways in which relationality comes to 
be either marginalized or misconstrued, in part because of its association with the 
feminized private sphere. This insight is noteworthy for the development of autonomy-
fostering programs, which must revalue the activities of the private sphere – in particular 
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In these final pages, I want to return briefly to two of the examples I discussed in 
the preceding chapters: harm reduction service delivery in the highly impoverished 
downtown eastside area of Vancouver and mandatory arrest and prosecution of 
perpetrators of domestic violence. Since I began writing this dissertation in 2006, public 
attention has once again turned to these services.  
Shifts in the political climate in Canada have rendered the issue of drug policy 
particularly controversial of late. In fall of 2007, the media spotlight was cast upon harm 
reduction services in Vancouver as it has been on several occasions now, each time 
marking the juncture at which the Federal government must renew or extend a waiver of 
Federal drug laws that makes the operation of the city’s Safe Injection Site (SIS), 
“Insite,” possible. Though the government did issue the extension, they did so under the 
proviso that they sought continued “scientific research” on the effectiveness of SISs. One 
source of so-called scientific research supporting the government’s case against SISs 
came from an open access online journal published by an anti-harm reduction lobby 
group, who received funding for their research from the federal police force (RCMP).337 
In the six months following this decision, the Conservative government, acting on their 
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“law and order” mandate, has implemented US style mandatory sentencing guidelines 
and adopted a “get tough” approach to drug policy. Most recently, a United Nations 
agency – the International Narcotics Control Board – condemned Insite as well as “crack 
kit” programs (harm reduction tools for crack users) that are planned or in effect in some 
parts of Canada, citing a treaty signed by the country in the 1960s. The future of Insite, 
ever unstable, continues to be perilous. With their funding and legal status called into 
question, we might wonder whether the state can indeed foster autonomy through such 
means; is state funding for autonomy-fostering services short lived, destined to collapse 
upon itself? 
In August 2007, the New York Times published an editorial by economist, Radha 
Iyengar.338 In a piece titled “The Protection Battered Spouses Don’t Need,” Iyengar 
reported the results of a study she conducted, comparing rates of murder by intimate 
partners prior to and following the institution of mandatory arrest laws. According to her 
study, though intimate partner homicides have decreased overall in the past 20 years, “in 
states with mandatory arrest laws, the homicides are about 50 percent higher today than 
they are in states without the laws.”339 Iyengar interprets these results as an indication 
that mandatory arrest acts as a deterrent to victims calling the police. “Victims want 
protection,” she explains, “but they do not always want to see their partners put behind 
bars.”340 Or, she notes, victims may wish to see their partners arrested, but fear that they 
will be released quickly. Though arrest is often desirable, Iyengar acknowledges, “it 
makes no sense to keep following a strategy that discourages victims from reporting 
                                                 





   
abuse.”341 This new research again challenges the effectiveness of the state as a protector 
and promoter of autonomy; these policies may in fact be responsible for the ultimate loss 
of autonomy – loss of life 
These somewhat disheartening developments call into question the notion of an 
autonomy-fostering state. Does the state in effect run up against itself when it tries to 
implement such enabling practices? Ought we to shift our focus elsewhere given the 
types of constraints that come up in cases like these? As I have noted elsewhere in the 
dissertation, some theorists suggest that we should indeed reject the state as a primary 
venue for enacting emancipatory projects. However, by pointing to service delivery as the 
key site for fostering autonomy, I have advanced a theory of the state that suggests that it 
can and should foster autonomy. Rather than viewing these apparently negative twists in 
the progress of these two cases as indicative of a failure of the very premise of an 
autonomy-fostering state, I want to suggest that the theory of the autonomy-fostering 
state that I have offered in this dissertation provides a framework through which to 
understand these developments. Moreover, these developments, viewed from the 
perspective of a theory of the autonomy-fostering state, remind us that the motivations 
and practices that arise in such a state – or in the processes of struggling for such a state – 
are always political. It is true that some, if not many, initiatives to foster autonomy, 
particularly in the marginal, the dependent, the stigmatized, will be met with resistance 
from a variety of state and non-state actors. But this does not make the theory of the 
autonomy-fostering state misguided. Rather, it suggests the need for a “language” with 
which to understand the social relations that generate such resistance; such a language 
emerges from the theory of the autonomy-fostering state.  
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In the pages that follow, I consider these recent developments in light of the 
theory I have developed in the preceding chapters. I return here to some of the concepts 
at the heart of the dissertation, which I want to suggest help us to make sense of these 
developments. In light of my account of the autonomy-fostering state developed here, we 
can use these now enriched and expanded notions of each concept to better make sense of 
the developments in the realm of harm reduction and violence against women 
interventions. 
 
I. Ideology and the Politics of Drug Policy 
It follows from my earlier arguments, particularly the account of substantive 
autonomy I have developed above, that we must acknowledge the political nature of 
conceptions of autonomy, and in turn, the structure of the autonomy-fostering state. In a 
short response piece, Evan Wood, Julio S. Montaner, and Thomas Kerr offer a critique of 
an anti-harm reduction article written by Thomas Mangham. The article they are 
concerned about condemns Insite and harm reduction in general on the basis of shaky 
scientific evidence in a forum, the Journal of Global Drug Policy and Practice, that lacks 
the institutional and intellectual safeguards provided by peer-reviewed journals.342 They 
note that this article has nevertheless been taken up as a worthy source of information by 
government officials, attributing this problematic use of research to the “Canadian federal 
government’s new ‘ideological’ opposition to harm reduction.”343 Though Wood et. al. 
are certainly right to voice concern about this questionable entanglement between state 
                                                 
342 Evan Wood, Julio S. Montaner, and Thomas Kerr, "Illicit Drug Addiction, Infectious Disease Spread, 
and the Need for an Evidence-Based Response," The Lancet Infectious Diseases 8, no. 3 (2008). 
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officials and pseudo-academic research, itself funded in part by the state, the notion that 
ideology infects science as a basis for policymaking is not surprising or, I contend, 
“new.” Rather, if we think of our understanding of autonomy – which I maintain is 
central to the debate here – as always contextually formed, the task of theorists and 
advocates in such a case might be not to find an ideology-free zone, but rather to 
challenge and denaturalize the assumptions that are at the core of ideological perspectives 
which generate something other than an inclusive, just, and enabling notion of the 
substance of autonomy. That is, questions about the state fostering autonomy are 
political; in turn, even questions about service delivery, though scientifically informed, 
must be acknowledged as political, too. This makes most sense when we specify a 
substantive conception of autonomy. 
As I argue in earlier chapters, a substantive conception of autonomy provides the 
tools with which to make normative claims about, in this case, particular state-citizen 
relationships or service delivery models. But this substance must be worked out on the 
ground, in particular social and political contexts, to reflect the communal values and 
aims of a given society. In diverse and pluralistic societies, the nature of these values will 
always be contested. But this is not a reflection of the inevitably of the failure of the 
project of autonomy fostering when taken up by the state. Rather, it focuses our attention 
on what is at stake in the politics of social service delivery and it shifts our analysis to 
take account of the contested terms of the debate. Consider, for example, that Mangham’s 
article, which Wood et. al. criticize, itself suggests that harm reduction is “ideological.” 
Mangham suggests that a House Committee (in Canadian parliament) (prior to the recent 
contraction of liberalized drug policy) “contained a majority of harm reduction 
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ideologists” leading to “a biased federal report calling for significant liberalization of 
drug policy.”344 In turn, Mangham calls for the “depoliticization” of drug policy, which 
he claims can only take place when “some form of action to stop [harm reduction 
ideology’s] momentum” is enacted. Instead of the damaging ideology espoused by harm 
reduction advocates, Mangham argues that in many cases “drug use can often be merely a 
symptom” of the lack of cohesion in a community; “Anything we can do to increase 
cohesion, order, altruism, neighborliness, compassion and caring in communities as well 
as integrity and responsibility in youth will pay great dividends.”345 
What are the contested terms underlying this debate? Ranging from the notions of 
embodied pain and pleasure at the heart of discussions of drug policy and use, as I 
explored in Chapter 4, to our understanding of caring and compassion, to conceptions of 
orderliness and societal cohesion, our understandings of all of these contested terms are 
integral to the ways in which we conceive of autonomy, and in turn the autonomy-
fostering state. By drawing our attention to, on the one hand, the need for a substantive 
account of autonomy in order to make important normative claims, and on the other hand, 
the inherently political nature of the “substance” of autonomy, which must itself be 
worked out in a given context, we can view the debate that has remerged with regard to 
harm reduction as a site for further development of an appropriately structured autonomy-
fostering state. That is, we must consider what is at stake in the development of the social 
relations necessary to foster autonomy in light of particularized conditions that shape the 
ways in which we think about the embodied, racialized, gendered, and economically 
situated experience of drug use in a particular country, province, neighborhood, etc.  
                                                 
344 C Mangham, "A Critique of Canada's Insite Injection Site and its Parent Philosophy: Implications and 
Recommendations for Policy Planning," in Jounal of Global Drug Policy and Practice (2007), 3. 
345 Ibid., 9. 
207 
   
However one ultimately decides to conceive of these conditions, it is worthwhile 
to back away form a stance of neutrality – which both the anti-harm reductionist 
Mangham and the harm reduction advocates Wood, et. al. seem to romanticize – and 
instead acknowledge and grapple with the politics and ideals at the heart of the debate. 
For example, Andrew Hathaway points to “the respect for free will and human adaptive 
potential a the core of the [harm reduction] tradition,” rejecting the impetus to “keep such 
ideological liberty-based values out of the analysis [in favor of] opt[ing] for a morally 
neutral form of inquiry wherein autonomy and rights have no apparent value in 
themselves.”346 It is not Hathaway’s particular conclusions about the value of harm 
reduction that I stress here, but the ways in which the normative terms of the debate come 
to the fore in his analysis in order that we may better conceive of the “substance” of 
autonomy at the heart of the autonomy-fostering state. 
 
II. Social Citizenship in the Fragmented State 
Like in the debate over harm reduction, framed above by questions about the role 
of “ideology” in the realm of drug policy, Iyengar’s analysis of domestic violence policy, 
specifically mandatory arrest, may be better understood in the context of an alternative 
framework. Iyengar writes, “I recently conducted my own study of mandatory arrest laws 
by comparing the rates of murder by intimate partners before and after the laws went into 
effect.”347 Certainly, the rate of murder by abusive partners is a well-warranted choice of 
variable to track in our considerations of the effects and shortcomings of domestic 
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violence policy. Yet, if we consider only this variable, the movement of which Iyengar’s 
study suggests demonstrates the mortal effects of mandatory policies, the state may seem 
to be a poor choice as an agent of protection and development of autonomy-competency. 
However, when we consider the outcomes laid out in the editorial from the vantage point 
of a theory of an autonomy-fostering state, instead of resulting in the collapse of this 
theory, we can see how an explicit concern with fostering autonomy reshapes our 
understanding of these findings (though it certainly does not trivialize them), and how 
disaggregating the state, as a theory of the autonomy-fostering state must, leads us 
already to spot spaces within which responses to the issues Iyengar points to can be 
formulate and enacted. 
One of the insights into the aim of the state fostering autonomy that has emerged 
from the cases I examine in this dissertation is that in order to understand the possible 
configurations of social relations that might make such an aim plausible, we must 
conceive of the state, not as a monolithic entity, but rather as a disaggregated body, a 
collection of “loosely-coupled arms,”348 which depending on the “looseness” of their 
coupling, may exist in tension or in concert with one another. Given this notion of the 
state, as I discuss at length in Chapter 3, Iyengar’s focus on the effects of mandatory 
arrest laws on their own directs our attention to only one arm of the state – the criminal 
justice arm, specifically the law enforcement segment of that arm – without accounting 
for the effects of other arms and their policies. The responses to Iyengar’s editorial are 
indicative of the limitations of her research in this respect. For example, as Sue Else, 
president of the National Network to End Domestic Violence writes, “The safety of 
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survivors depends on much more than a mandatory arrest policy. Prosecutors charge the 
batterer, judges need to hold batterers accountable and victims must have access to viable 
resources.”349 Indeed, I stressed in Chapter 3 the importance of having the appropriate 
resources to adequately balance the effects of police power in the context of domestic 
violence policy, and to institute mechanisms of self-critique via the “fragmented 
coordination” of the state’s arms. 
In addition to the role of this “self-critique” existing among the arms of the state, 
the underlying relationality of autonomy, which is at the core of the larger theory 
presented here, highlights the important nuance that must go into an analysis of Iyengar’s 
data. She notes that though mandatory arrest was meant to “impose a cost on abusers,” 
ultimately “because of psychological, emotional, and financial ties that often keep 
victims loyal to their abusers, the cost of arrest is easily transferred from abusers to 
victims.” That is, “victims want protection, but they do not always want to see their 
partners put behind bars.” Moreover, to avoid this situation, she surmises, they do not call 
police where mandatory arrest laws exist. But what are the reasons for this preference? Is 
it an autonomous preference? As I discussed Chapter 3, we need to consider the role of 
oppressive socialization in our still-sexist society, wherein a certain level of violence 
against women is both widespread and deemed acceptable in some contexts, and where 
the role of women within the family unit remains relatively determined by traditional 
conceptions of caregiving. Indeed, though we might think of mandatory policies as 
paternalistic, it’s worth recalling the account of paternalism I discussed in Chapter 5: 
paternalism must be understood not only as intrusion into the lives of citizens (ostensibly 
                                                 
349 Sue Else, "To Stop Abuse, Hold the Abusers Accountable (3 Letters)," in The New York Times Online 
(2007). 
210 
   
for their own good), but specifically as intrusion of a particular nature that results in the 
reproduction and maintenance of existing relations of oppression and domination. In this 
case, the intervention (particularly when coupled with other sources of support) does the 
opposite of this, seeking to counter the oppressive nature of domestic violence. 
 
III. Deliver Me: From Ascribing Autonomy to Prescribing Jail Time 
Returning to the harm reduction case, I will remain preoccupied with the 
appropriate role of the state, in particular law enforcement arms of the state, in our lives, 
assuming that fostering autonomy remains a goal. The move to institute mandatory 
sentencing laws in Canada was met with much disparagement by users and advocates, 
whose critiques often highlighted the failure of similar policies to reduce drug use and 
drug availability in the United States, coupled with the exponential growth of prison 
populations that such policies helped to produce south of the border. A briefing paper 
issued by the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network provides a host of information 
explaining why mandatory minimum sentencing runs counter to human rights claims and 
health-related evidence.350 Nevertheless, it is relevant to note that despite wholeheartedly 
condemning this type of policy direction, the Network suggests alternative strategies that 
themselves call upon the state to engage in autonomy-fostering (though the term is not 
used) practices. The paper states, “Canada needs a new approach to drug policy.”351 Such 
an approach would include “strategies to reduce harms such as HIV both to individuals 
who use drugs and to communities affected by drugs, as well as expanded access to 
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humane and human-rights-based addiction treatment.”352 It is not that the state as a whole 
is incapable of fostering autonomy; rather, it should shift its focus. Increased 
incarceration for nonviolent drug crimes results in drastic constraints of autonomy, while 
also explicitly failing to provide the resources to develop this capacity – for example 
addiction treatment or harm reduction services – and the space within which one may be 
recognized as autonomy, i.e. allowed to claim such a status. But service delivery does not 
have to be this way. 
As Joe Soss study compellingly shows, “welfare programs are important sites of 
adult political learning.”353 As citizens, our experience of service delivery teaches us the 
limits and possibilities of state-citizen relationships, which must also shape our sense of 
membership in the community and ensuing ability to participate in political and social 
life. Increased incarceration for predetermined periods of time is clearly a dismal ground 
upon which autonomy can be fostered. In contrast, the example of VANDU (Vancouver 
Area Network for Drug Users) points in the opposite direction, creating the grounds upon 
which a multifaceted form of recognition can serve the important purpose of ascribing 
autonomy to service users and the experience of participating in service delivery can be a 
site for the development of enabling capacities. On Soss’s account, the welfare system is 
where the poor are able to make claims on the state’s ability both to punish and protect – 
and, I would add, its ability to provide the resources necessary to foster autonomy. 
Moreover, people who use drugs will frequently have some kind of interaction with the 
state, whether it is through the criminal justice system or through other social services; 
noninvolvement with the state is not often an option.  
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We can take these two claims – the system as a site of claimsmaking and the near 
inevitability of some use of services – as pointing to the fact that service delivery 
relationships are not “pre-political.”354 Recipients interpret their experience with the 
system on their own terms, or those terms relevant to their particular contexts. All of this 
paints a dreary picture of the effects of mandatory sentencing, yet it also draws our 
attention to the vast possibilities for alternative forms of service delivery. It is not just 
that an alternative model of drug policy (be it harm reduction or another tack) would be 
more just or more effective (on whatever terms we choose), but that once we recognize 
service delivery as a potentially pivotal site for enabling autonomy – and always a site for 
having some effect on autonomy, be it enabling or constraining – we can engage in the 
political and rhetorical struggles necessary to bring about the policy changes necessary 
for such fruitful state-citizen relationships to form. 
 
IV. Struggling for Autonomy 
Given the cases I examined in the preceding chapters, and these recent 
developments, perhaps the main “battlegrounds” for such struggles can be found two 
categories: stigma and oppression. These two devastating configurations of social 
relations can be mapped onto the two notions of autonomy that I have relied upon, 
throughout: ascriptive and capacity-related autonomy. The stigma associated with being 
an addict, a welfare mother, a survivor of domestic violence355 – all of these categories 
give way to certain assumptions in our society that are related to our conceptions of 
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dependence as pathological or blameworthy. Moreover, the constraints imposed by social 
and political relations that subordinate certain groups or individuals, often those already 
stigmatized as (feminized) dependents, and perpetuate relationships of domination often 
generate life circumstances that result in increased dependence, often on the state. Such 
oppression, then, is often connected to our societal disdain for dependence. 
The theory of an autonomy-fostering state that I have outlined in this dissertation 
is a hopeful response to the crushing effects of stigma and oppression. The theory begins 
with a rejection of the conflation of independence and autonomy – a conflation that 
compounds the negative perception of dependency. This rejection generates a particular 
way of thinking about service delivery, one that views state-citizen relationships in this 
context as a possible site of empowerment and autonomy fostering, provides adequate 
resources, and treats service users in accordance with this way of thinking. Such a mode 
of service delivery would be enabling, rather than oppressive. The interplay between the 
initial assertion that autonomy and independence are not the same thing, nor is the latter 
required for the former, and the development of services in accordance with this assertion 
is something like the relationship between ascriptive autonomy and the capacity for 
autonomy. In the same way that the ascription of autonomy itself may foster the capacity 
for autonomy – insofar as the experience of being recognized as an autonomous agent 
may lead us to cultivate the personal resources we need to act autonomously – the 
delivery of services in a way that reflects a non-stigmatizing approach to dependence and 
that seeks to promote autonomy may create the conditions for the broader society to 
recognize service users as fellow citizens, as potentially autonomous individuals. 
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Moreover, as the this recognition occurs, the stigma related to dependence, which is both 
produces and is a byproduct of oppression, may dissipate. 
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